(Re)imagining history and subjectivity : (dis)incar-nations of racialised citizenship by Shields, Rachel
University of Lethbridge Research Repository
OPUS http://opus.uleth.ca
Theses Arts and Science, Faculty of
2012
(Re)imagining history and subjectivity :
(dis)incar-nations of racialised citizenship
Shields, Rachel
Lethbridge, Alta. : University of Lethbridge, Dept. of Sociology, c2012
http://hdl.handle.net/10133/3249
Downloaded from University of Lethbridge Research Repository, OPUS
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(RE)IMAGINING HISTORY AND SUBJECTIVITY: (DIS)INCAR-NATIONS 
OF RACIALISED CITIZENSHIP 
 
 
 
RACHEL SHIELDS 
B.Sc., University of Lethbridge, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies 
of the University of Lethbridge 
in Partial Fulfilment of the 
Requirements for the Degree 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
 
 
Department of Sociology 
University of Lethbridge 
LETHBRIDGE, ALBERTA, CANADA 
 
 
© Rachel Shields, 2012 
 
 
	   iii	  
Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the ways in which modern history-writing practices reiterate 
race-based categories of citizenship. To investigate these practices across time, I 
have examined discourses produced by the United Farm Women of Alberta 
(UFWA) in 1925, and discourses produced by the contemporary magazine 
American Renaissance (AR). The UFWA were concerned with the promotion and 
definition of citizenship, and in so doing laid race as a foundation of Canadian 
identity. AR is a magazine that concerns itself with white nationalism in the 
contemporary United States. Drawing upon Avery Gordon and Wendy Brown’s 
theories of history and haunting, I have situated these discourses in imaginative 
relation to one another, illuminating the “past” in the present. I have also critically 
examined how I am complicit in reproducing the historical practices under study; 
as an architecture of history, haunting helps to imagine alternatives for the study 
of history and social life, particularly our own.  
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Proem 
 
Wandering around on the University of Illinois campus with Jason, my 
supervisor, I feel excited about the conference being held here. Because I have 
been told that this particular conference provides a space to speak critically not 
only about what research is being done, but how (and to what end), I am eager to 
meet the people he knows. Jason introduces me here and there to various scholars 
whose names I mostly recognise. As I shake hands with someone I’ve just met, 
we make friendly eye contact and he smiles at me: “so what is your thesis about?” 
 I smile back but feel slightly disconcerted. This question has been posed to 
me countless times and in a variety of situations. Being put on the spot by 
strangers (who, I worry, are much more articulate than me) usually results in me 
being at a loss for words. In this case, I open my mouth and nothing more than 
“umm…” comes out, along with a nervous laugh, seeking understanding. I pause 
awkwardly, trying to arrange my thoughts, knowing it seems odd that I don’t 
seem to know what my own thesis is about. Eventually I say, honestly, “I never 
know how to answer that question!” He continues to smile politely, but with 
eyebrows raised.  
Why do people ask this question anyway1? Don’t they know how difficult it 
is to sum up one’s research in the 30 seconds or so that someone’s polite, cursory 
interest usually lasts? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Following authors such as Newman (2012) and Ellis (2009), I use italics here to 
explore the possibilities of polyvocality for capturing the process of self-
reflection, in this case in the moment of interaction. 
	   2	  
 The scholar I’ve just met is still looking at me expectantly. “Just describe 
it in a nutshell,” he says, not unkindly.  
Willing myself to say something that makes sense2, I venture: “Okay, well, 
my thesis is about a few different things.” He glances briefly elsewhere, so I try to 
hurry. Speaking a bit too quickly for my liking, I say: “It’s about the history of 
early liberal feminism and nation-building in Canada, and how that history is 
connected to contemporary American white nationalism.” He nods, tentatively, so 
I press on: “But it’s also about what it means to interrogate and construct these 
histories – the most important parts of my thesis involve questions about 
epistemology, and the process of being called into subjectivity through research.” 
Being asked what my thesis is about almost always starts me thinking about it in 
general, about what I want it to accomplish and how I have gone about doing that. 
As I think about what I just said, I expect to become part of the background again, 
relieved that attention will no longer be squarely on me.  
 He doesn’t yet look away: “Is that what you are presenting here?”  
 “Yes,” I say, now beginning to worry about the possibility that someone 
might actually attend my session. I feel like I should pre-empt my talk by 
admitting that it might not be what anyone is expecting: “Yes, but it’s been 
difficult to turn into a twenty minute presentation.” Seeing his eyebrows lift at 
this, I feel compelled to elaborate: “It’s not a very traditional thesis. It attends to 
and makes room for disjuncture, incoherence and imagination, both in terms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The phrase “make sense” appears throughout this thesis. As elaborated upon in 
chapters four and five, the idea of making sense, and my reliance upon it, 
becomes particularly significant. 
	   3	  
the research itself and my own role as researcher. The fact that there is, on the one 
hand, a substantive discussion about race and nationalism, and on the other hand, 
a discussion about what it means to make knowledge claims about those issues 
has made it difficult for me to know which train of thought is most important.”  
In other words, I mean to say that I don’t know how to describe this 
research in a way that I feel captures it. Using vague terms like “race,” 
“nationalism” and “subjectivity” is dissatisfying. Have I bored him? 
 He simply says, “good luck with that,” as he turns away to chat with 
someone else. 
 What did I mean when I said I didn’t know “which train of thought is most 
important?” Really, I suppose it’s not a matter of ‘which is most important,’ but a 
matter of doing both in a way that won’t confuse the audience or the reader. But 
then again, if there are moments of confusion or contradiction, isn’t that part of 
the point? Isn’t the experience of being disoriented amongst competing knowledge 
claims a productive one, particularly if these competing claims can be brought 
into, indeed invite, conversation with one another3?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   In order to engage with others’ stories I have included throughout the thesis 
comments taken from a personal email correspondence with Dr. William Ramp 
over the dates of June 25 to 27, 2012 (these occur in footnotes indicated by an 
asterisk). I made the decision to include these comments for three reasons: first, as 
a way to include and offer to the reader an alternative version of the history of the 
United Farm Women of Alberta (UFWA) that I construct here. Including Dr. 
Ramp’s voice, and the voices of others who speak through him, goes some way 
toward fostering an exchange between the ways in which each of us have drawn 
upon UFWA memories. Second, some of his comments toward this end refer to 
groups, places and memories that are in danger of being forgotten; while they do 
not figure into the thesis outside of these comments, perhaps they will incite the 
reader to wonder about these (near) losses. And third, I have included some of the 
questions he posed to me after reading my thesis, questions that encouraged me to 
	   4	  
 My thoughts turn to conversations I’ve had about my research with my 
parents. They don’t quite seem to “get it,” mostly because I never know quite how 
to put it. When I say, “I don’t know how to describe my thesis! It’s about what’s 
there, but also what’s not there4,” it is usually met with laughter, on all of our 
parts. But maybe their response to my words, which don’t make sense to them, 
provides an interesting way for me to understand my research.  
Maybe it’s okay that I have no solid frame of reference with which to 
describe my thesis. When dad asked me if my degree was in “Paranormal 
Studies,” maybe he wasn’t too far off the mark – after all, Wikipedia defines 
paranormal events as “phenomena [that] are inconsistent with the world as 
already understood through empirical observation coupled with scientific 
methodology5” (Wikipedia, 2012). And that may be precisely what I am interested 
in investigating here. If I have conjured the sensation of something not quite being 
right (such as a “researcher” who doesn’t know quite how to articulate what her 
research is about), then I think I may have already gone partway to explaining 
what it is I hope to have done here… 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reflect further upon the relation between my construction of this text and the 
people, past, present and future, whom I speak to and “for” within it. While I hope 
that this project will enter into dialogue with others, the inclusion of Dr. Ramp’s 
voice directly within the text has provided me with a way to present readers 
directly with this exchange, and may draw their attention to the way such an 
engagement shaped the thesis itself.   4	  My use of these phrases will become clearer throughout the following chapters.  5	  I cite Wikipedia because I am interested in the “common sense” version of what 
paranormal means. That is the version I imagine my dad is drawing upon when 
he interprets what I say as being outside the realm of “real knowledge.”	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Chapter 1 
American Renaissance, The United Farm Women of Alberta, and Race- and 
Nation-Making in North America 
 
Studies of the meaning and effects of race have increasingly understood 
racism not simply as a matter of prejudice, but as a systematic pattern of exclusion 
that persists today in part because it is foundationally important to the 
maintenance of discourses of modernity upon which nations and their supporting 
institutions have been built (Goldberg, 1993; Hall, 2007; hooks, 1992; Omi & 
Winant, 2006; Said, 1979; Thobani, 2007; Winant, 2006). In the contemporary 
United States, there exists a monthly publication entitled American Renaissance 
that calls for the raising of white consciousness in the belief that white culture is 
under threat from inherently degenerate and dangerous non-white groups, both 
within and external to the nation. Founded in 1990 by Jared Taylor and published 
out of Virginia, this magazine makes clear in no uncertain terms the authors’ 
beliefs in the meaning of race and nation, and people are listening; Taylor himself 
has appeared multiple times on Fox News, Cable Network News (CNN), The Phil 
Donahue Show and CTV News, amongst others. Their positions on whiteness and 
the rigidity of cultural boundaries requires and reproduces a particular framework 
of nationalism and the ontological existence of cultures as discrete entities, a 
common (or perhaps “common-sense”) idea that is evident in a variety of 
discourses, including nationalism, multiculturalism, and the value of cultural 
“tourism”. Whether one takes a multicultural (such as the celebration of cultural 
	   6	  
diversity) or monocultural (such as a belief in racial or national superiority) 
position, the assumption that culture is essentially attached to particular races or 
ethnicities, or is bounded by national borders, is necessary in order to make these 
claims tenable. What I find particularly interesting about American Renaissance is 
that they seem to occupy an uncertain position between being seen on the one 
hand as hateful and unacceptable, and on the other as a logical (and perhaps 
desirable) reaction to a set of social problems that are described as stemming from 
natural racial differences (examples of these two positions, though not mutually 
exclusive, will be elaborated upon in later chapters). The logic of race provides, as 
I elaborate on below, a framework for thinking about and evaluating the concepts 
of citizenship and personhood that are fundamental to the modern development of 
imperialism and liberal nationalism. 
 The authors of American Renaissance (AR) write about the crime rates, 
disease rates, and standardised test scores of whites versus blacks. They routinely 
refer to violence and political unrest in African nations as proof that black people 
are not capable of rational government. They publish dehumanising photographs 
of black and Hispanic people along with anecdotal evidence that whites are 
naturally disinclined to associate with non-white individuals. Their primary 
concern, however, is to point out that attempts on the part of white people to 
celebrate white culture, self-segregate, or publicly identify non-whites as the 
source of crime, poverty, and irresponsible citizenship are described at worst as 
hate speech and at best as politically incorrect. The authors and editors of AR feel 
racially oppressed within what they believe is their own nation, a nation that was 
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founded for whites. AR does not conduct its own research; they publish studies 
from the medical and social sciences that have already analysed data for racialised 
trends. They hold conferences, sell issues, publish books, and are interviewed on 
popular news networks. If AR’s claims are at all recognisable and intelligible, 
even if one disagrees with them, what is it about them that renders them so?  
 To (very partially) begin to address this question I have turned to history. 
The significance and differential evaluation of racial categories is an effect of 
particular knowledges, and all knowledge has a history. There are an infinite 
number of possible places from which to begin tracing a history of American 
racism and nationalism, but none of them are “origins” in the traditional sense of 
the word (this will be explored further in Chapter 3). For the purposes of this 
project I have chosen to begin a historicisation of contemporary racism and 
nationalism with a very particular group of women who settled the Canadian 
prairies in the early twentieth century6.  
The United Farm Women of Alberta (UFWA) was the women’s branch of 
the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA), a politically active group that constituted a 
powerful part of the agrarian democratic movement, forming as they did the 
government of Alberta for the years between 1921 and 1935. The women’s 
branch of this organisation is particularly interesting in relation to AR because, in 
a time when women were often barred from participation in the public or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The first three chapters of this thesis were originally written before any archival 
research was begun. I have modified the language to reflect present rather than 
future tense in order to render it more intelligible. However, as will be explored in 
later chapters, many of these early claims about what I “do” in my research are 
eventually thrown into serious question. 
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economic realms, its members were formally charged with the task of attending to 
issues of “social welfare” (Langford, 1997). This meant that they were responsible 
for weighing in on a very broad range of issues that were defined as matters of 
women’s concern. From curriculum development, to arranging get-togethers that 
relieved the social isolation of farmers, to lobbying the Alberta government to 
pass the Sexual Sterilisation Act in 1928, the UFWA were active across the 
province in their attempts to shape the social development of their local 
communities, the province at large, and ultimately, I argue, Canada as a nation.  
 There are several reasons why I have chosen to study AR as part of the 
legacy of the UFWA. On a pragmatic level, both may be described as relatively 
discrete entities that produce(d) comparable publications that can be studied 
textually. On a personal level, the UFWA form an important and problematic part 
of the history of racism and ableism in Alberta, and it was the history of Alberta 
eugenics programs that first interested me in my graduate program. As this history 
is still relatively unknown, and as members and associates of the UFWA such as 
Irene Parlby, Louise McKinney, Nellie McLung and Emily Murphy are still 
venerated as heroes for their role in obtaining suffrage for Canadian women (see, 
for example, Famous 5 named honorary senators, Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, October 10, 2009), I believe it is important to complicate this history 
in order to avoid rendering invisible practices of racial violence (both physical 
and discursive) that accompanied it. More particularly, however, the UFWA 
existed during a time that was fraught with intertwining discourses of 
imperialism, colonialism, liberalism, feminism, and nationalism (amongst 
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countless others). As early settlers of a burgeoning nation, these women were 
subject to an immense number of ideals for the future and were well positioned to 
play a part in shaping it. As women of primarily British origin, they occupied 
positions of power within a colony that privileged whiteness, and within an 
imperial project that privileged British rationality, civilisation, and good 
government. Their authorial position on issues of immigration, citizenship, 
culture, and the future quality of Canadian generations, as evidenced in their 
textual record, allows me to draw a connection between their articulation of race 
and citizenship in the early stages of North American nation-building and the 
contemporary white nationalism of AR.  
While there are certainly important discontinuities in the discourses of 
these two entities (an issue that will be addressed in later chapters), the existence 
of prominent similarities between them challenge a traditional view of history as a 
series of progressive events that lead to an ever-closer appropriation of truth and 
enlightenment through discovery. That is to say, while it is commonly believed 
that things such as overt racial prejudice and the ideology of eugenics were 
problems that ended along with World War Two and the fall of the Nazi regime 
(Kevles, 1995), the ongoing presence of racist ideology as the basis for creating 
nationalist identities calls into question the “we know better now” rhetoric that is 
commonly employed in metanarrative histories of Western progress (Brown, 
2001). In the following section I will explore the history of early liberal feminism 
and its intimate relationship with imperialism and race production in order to 
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make the case that this history is important for understanding the perpetuation of 
racism in claims of national citizenship and culture today. 
 
Imperial feminism and the early race-making project 
For this project I am particularly interested in tracing the seemingly 
obscure discursive connections between the UFWA and AR, as well as 
interrogating their discourses in terms of the way they construct “Othered” bodies 
on the margins of proper, responsible citizenship (de Beauvoir, 2011; Hall, 2007). 
Both AR and the UFWA can be understood in terms of the history of colonialism 
and imperialism, as both are concerned with issues of nationhood, nation building, 
the preservation and dissemination of particular cultures, and race. Here, I reflect 
on my decision to compare the UFWA with AR by exploring two avenues of 
analysis that are directly related to the history of feminism and feminist thought. 
First, I outline an approach to this study that understands the links between early 
feminism and imperialism as contributing to the embededness of race and 
racialised subjects within modern North American nations (hooks, 1992). As I 
argue here, the discourses of feminism and imperialism in Canada in the early 
twentieth century were inextricably linked, most evidently within discourses of 
feminism that explicitly take up the aims and values of the British imperial 
project. This had the profound effect of reinforcing and embedding within the 
discourses of personhood and citizenship the exclusionary practice of race-making 
(Henderson, 2003). This practice is still very much a significant part of 
contemporary nationalist discourses (Gardiner, 2005/2006; Goldberg, 1993). 
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Second, I situate my project more broadly within contemporary theories of race, 
racial (racist) knowledge, and racialised subjectivity in order to make clear the 
theoretical position that elucidates important connections between the UFWA and 
AR. In my discussion of the discursive structures of race and racism, I explore the 
practice of othering that necessarily occurs within the production of racial 
knowledge, knowledge that is necessary in the maintenance of modern nationalist 
discourses (Goldberg, 1993). I will also outline some of the theoretical concepts 
that I draw upon in my investigation, including the belief that the process of racial 
othering and its underlying assumptions persist across time and provide a 
framework that links the discourses of the UFWA to those of AR while leaving 
room to accommodate discontinuity. Both groups engage in practices that serve to 
make coherent the meaning of race, nationhood, citizenship, and progress, which 
in turn allow them to delimit the boundaries of the One in relation to the 
(despised, feared, racialised) Other in ways that ultimately (re)produce a culture 
of white supremacy (hooks, 1992). 
I am predicating my investigation on a belief in the ongoing presence and 
profound effects of racism as an organisational force of Western epistemology 
and social practices (Goldberg, 1993; Omi & Winant, 2006). Omi and Winant’s 
(2006) definition of racial projects is an important concept that allows for a link 
to be made between the discourses of the UFWA and AR: “Racial projects 
connect what race means in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which 
both social structures and everyday experiences are racially organised, based upon 
that meaning” (p. 199). In the case of these particular groups, the racial project 
	   12	  
they take up is one concerned primarily with nation building on the premise of 
inherent, differentially valued racial attributes. They both define the limits of 
citizenship in ways that are fundamentally racialised.  
The issues that I have proposed to interrogate in this comparison are 
closely related and implied by one another. The constitution of the threatening 
non-white Other provides an overarching link across discourses of race and 
citizenship. The process of othering is both an instrument and an effect of 
(post)colonial power and racial knowledge, the existence and theorisation of 
which is (partially) bound up in the histories of feminism and feminist critique. To 
that end, the Foucauldian concept of governmentality (Michel Foucault, 1984, 
1991a; Smart, 2002) can be used to explicate the links between early liberal 
feminism, race-making, nation building, and contemporary scientific racism, all of 
which are situated within a framework of liberal individualist ideology, by 
attending to the ways in which women as governmental agents constructed their 
claims to personhood.    
 
Settler women as governmental agents 
There have emerged contemporary feminist critiques of earlier feminisms 
and their role in perpetuating, or failing to account for, the experiences of women 
who do not exist within the white centre (although the existence of such a centre 
and its implied cohesiveness may be thought of as imaginary). One set of critiques 
has been aimed at reinterpreting the history of early liberal feminism by 
identifying and theorising its contribution to the histories of imperialism, racism, 
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and ableism (Carlson, 2001; Crenshaw, 1989; Henderson, 2003; hooks, 2000; 
Mohanty, 2006). This look at history focuses on who was left out of, 
marginalised, or seriously harmed by the early articulation of rights for women as 
legal persons in a context that systematically privileged white, middle-class, 
English-speaking women. At the beginning of my own inquiry into the UFWA I 
had intended to treat their feminist politics separately from their involvement in 
racism and the eugenics and institutionalisation movements; in fact, I thought it 
ironic that feminists were active in the reproductive control and dehumanisation 
of other women. However, as I explore here, the co-existence of the UFWA’s 
feminist and racist politics was not at all ironic. Feminism, racism and 
imperialism in Europe and North America were always already in conversation 
with one another and relied upon each other to facilitate particular, co-constitutive 
claims to truth (hooks, 2000). 
Henderson (2003) discusses the history of feminism, imperialism and 
race-making in Western Canada in the early twentieth century in order to 
complicate interpretations of this history that articulate it in primarily celebratory 
ways. The history she constructs is directly related to that of the UFWA as she 
focuses on the life of Emily Murphy7, magistrate of the first Women’s Court in 
Alberta and associate of Irene Parlby, the first president of the UFWA. Henderson 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Emily Murphy was not a member of the UFWA, and while she was closely 
involved with several prominent UFWA members it is important to note that her 
politics were not necessarily embraced by the organization as a whole. My 
concern with Murphy has to do with illuminating a particular set of discourses 
and practices that were actualized within already existing discourses of British 
superiority, morality, nationhood, citizenship and responsibility. The UFWA 
operated and came into being within the same (and more) sets of discourses, but 
the way individual members took them up did, of course, vary greatly.  
	   14	  
argues that Murphy’s discursive practices articulated feminist and imperialist 
ideologies and served to actively construct notions of personhood, womanhood, 
citizenship and race in Canada. This work represents the taking of a particular 
ontological position; rather than viewing women’s rights and concepts of race as 
reflecting pre-existing truths, Henderson describes how these ideas are socially 
constructed through discourse. In this view, women’s status as legal persons was 
neither a discovery nor an enduring fact that simply required legal recognition; 
through her practices, both official and personal, Murphy herself produced and 
defined women’s qualities as the basis for the rights to which she believed they 
were entitled. 
Emily Murphy’s concern with personhood was directed almost solely 
toward Canadian society, which was at the time a Dominion of the British 
Empire. However, the production of the identity of Canadian women was bound 
up in discourses of race and imperialism that were prevalent in Britain and its 
diverse colonies and ex-colonies, including the United States. Murphy was not 
acting in a vacuum (although she was acting in a “New World”, a site that was 
seen as holding the potential to engineer anew the perfect nation), nor was she 
acting out of pure innovation. She acted “within a governmental machinery for 
operating on the psychophysical life of the population” (Henderson, 2003, p. 160). 
In other words, she was embedded within discourses of imperialism and nation 
building as well as a governmental system of administration that categorised and 
regulated the bodies of its citizens for the purpose of imperial expansion and the 
constitution of a new nation with a strong population. Thus, Murphy’s claims 
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about women’s rights and responsibilities in terms of racial propagation reflect 
her engagement with other discourses; women’s citizenship in Canada was made 
possible by appeals to an imperial and national project that already took for 
granted ideas of racial and cultural superiority.  
 Henderson chose to study Emily Murphy because of her position that 
“transformations in the machinery of government … are accessed not by means of 
a global analysis but rather through the scrutiny of particular scenes” (2003, p. 
160). Understanding Murphy’s role as a governmental agent involved in the 
surveillance, judgment, discipline, and education of the population can help to 
explicate the political context of early feminists*, as well as illuminate the concept 
of governmentality. The term governmentality refers to the management and 
control of a population in such a way as to produce subjects that fulfil the policies 
of the state (Smart, 2002). This process involves the concert of various institutions 
and disciplinary/productive systems of knowledge, all of which operate within a 
system of administration to achieve the goal of a well-managed population 
(Michel Foucault, 1991a). For settlers in Western Canada in the early twentieth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  “Murphy's ‘governmentalist’ vision was not entirely in tune, [however], with the 
many United Farm men and women who saw their civic efforts as aimed at 
constructing a Canada consciously opposed to the imperialist project of the 
Ontario/Quebec financial and political elites, consciously opposed to a 
patronage/dependency system of politics, consciously opposed to the 
manipulation of ‘masses’ by political party elites, consciously opposed to 
militarism and nationalism, consciously opposed to sharpening class divisions in 
Canadian society. These are all prominent and recurring themes in UF/UFW 
discourse. Yes, they articulated this in a language of Britishness and settlement, 
but that terminology did not bind them into a unitary political consensus that 
would ally them with, for example, the federal Conservatives of the time, the 
Anglo industrial elites of Toronto & Montreal, the financiers of London, or the 
Orange Lodge.”	  
	   16	  
century, governmental concerns were centred on the building of a new nation, the 
founding of which was thought to require the building of a strong population of 
rational citizens who upheld the values of nationalism and the responsibilities of 
good citizenship. Murphy’s disciplining influence, particularly through her work 
in the Women’s Court, allows her to be understood as a governmental agent, an 
individual through whom are transmitted the goals of the state, in this case the 
goals of the British imperial project.   
Burton (1994) also discusses the relationship between feminism and the 
imperial project within Britain, which serves to contextualise the ideas and values 
that were transported to Western Canada along with British immigrants in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to Burton, feminists in Britain 
were successful in their campaign for women’s legal personhood due to an 
articulation between traditional female roles and dominant ideas of the nation. 
British citizens prided themselves on their perceived cultural superiority, both in 
terms of morality and the maintenance of social order through good government; 
both of these ideals served as part of the justification for British colonialism 
(Burton, 1994; Thobani, 2007). Women were already conceived of as bearers of 
the race, mothers of the future generations of British citizens. Thus, they already 
occupied a highly moralised position, as they held a responsibility to propagate 
the race/nation both through physical reproduction and by providing moral 
guidance for future citizens. This role was traditionally relegated to the private 
sphere; however, British feminists argued that the imperial project of Britain 
would be best advanced by the presence of women, whose moral superiority 
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would benefit both the public and colonial realms (Burton, 1994). This discursive 
reframing of a “separate but equal” role for women in the advancement of the 
nation, which was also the official tenet of the UFWA on issues of sex difference 
(Langford, 1997), was present in the discourses of feminism engendered in 
Canada by women such as Emily Murphy. The particularities of the Western 
Canadian context were different, however, because it was a new nation, the 
quality of which would be determined by the quality of its future citizens. This 
was a concern that seemed to be amenable to biopolitical control of reproduction, 
a domain that was seen to be under the purview of women, through discourses of 
race, morality and reproductive “fitness,” and practiced in law and through 
institutionalisation and sterilisation.  
 Attempts to ensure that the quality of the new race of Canadians would be 
high were focused on women’s bodies as the bearers of reproductive 
responsibility. Henderson discusses the young woman’s body as one of the 
primary sites of biopolitics and the wielding of reproductive control, as it was 
seen as both “vulnerable and dangerous” in terms of the risk of temptation and the 
threat of “degenerate” traits being passed on to future citizens; hence, Henderson 
understands the girl’s body as “the point of expansion for race-making strategies 
predicated upon maternal authority” (2003, p. 163). She describes Emily Murphy, 
both in terms of the literary character Janey Canuck (a pseudonym under which 
Murphy published travel writings and stories intended to provide moral guidance) 
and in her official role as magistrate, as taking up a supervisory and disciplinary 
role in the governance of society and the production of race. As an agent of 
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governmental authority, Murphy was able to participate in the discursive 
construction of womanhood and its relationship to personhood and citizenship 
responsibilities within the Canadian West. Examining the “connection between 
[the] historical moments” (p. 163) of feminism, colonialism, and the 
developmental of administrative government allows for an analysis of history that 
challenges the naturalness of categories and identities that emerged from it. In 
terms of my own research, choosing to examine the UFWA, a group of women 
who operated within the intersections between feminism, colonialism, and nation 
building, requires that I start from a position that acknowledges the complicated 
interdiscursivity of historical events and their legacy. Because I am interested in 
interrogating imperialism and its contemporary manifestations in the concept of 
citizenship and its relationship to the physical body, an analysis that draws on the 
concept of governmentality, including the supervision and regulation of bodies 
and the construction of race categories to both justify and advance imperialism, is 
a prudent strategy to take.  
 Burton’s (1994) and Henderson’s (2003) investigations of the 
interconnectedness of early British feminism and imperialism* can be understood 
as providing one part of the history of imperialism, colonialism and racism that 
sets the stage for “the conditions of possibility” (Smart, 2002) of the emergence of 
American Renaissance, as well as of other forms of racism that are (arguably) less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	   In terms of UFWA members, “one women's organization that explicitly 
embraced and promoted the British imperial project, and Canadian patriotism in 
relation to that project, was the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire 
(IODE). Louise McKinney, [for example], was a member of both the IODE and 
the UFWA. I suspect, though, that other UFWA members, such as Amelia Turner, 
would have found the IODE highly problematic.”	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overt. In the same vein, other feminist theorists have elaborated upon the 
relationship between feminism and colonialism and its historical legacy in 
contemporary society. As bell hooks writes, “America was colonised on a racially 
imperialistic base and not on a sexually imperialistic base” (2000, p. 375). The 
development of North American feminism has occurred, and is occurring, within 
an already existing structure of racism and colonialism; thus, Western feminisms 
are always already implicated in the perpetuation of these structures. In particular, 
white feminists have always operated with imperialist knowledge as a taken-for-
granted truth. In the case of the UFWA, we can see how feminism was advanced 
at the expense of people whose bodies did not measure up to the normalised 
bodily standards that feminists were active in defining, as this expense was 
physically manifested in the bodies of forcibly confined and sterilised “mental 
defectives,” who were most often poor, women, non-white or of Eastern European 
descent, and deemed threatening to the morality and quality of the nation8.  
 
Racial subjects: The legacy of colonialism 
My interrogation of the histories of the UFWA and AR depends upon, and 
demonstrates, the existence of racialised bodies, an existence that is both 
culturally constructed and historically contingent, but also very real in its 
embodied effects. The discourses of race, along with the related discourses of 
nationalism and imperialism, have remained prominent features of North 
American society; indeed, the epistemology, politics, and lived experiences of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For a more thorough account of the history of eugenics, see Grekul (2004), 
Kevles  (1995), Dowbiggin (1997), Wendel-Hummell (2009), or Gould (1996). 
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racialised subjects/objects are colonised by knowledge and assumptions about the 
realness of race, assumptions which are still foundational to the discursive 
structures that organise social life (Carby, 2009; Miguel, 2009; Newman, 2010).  
In other words, the coming into being of the colonised/coloniser binary and its 
necessary exclusions has had profound effects on identities and bodies as it has 
continued to exist within and between the various discourses that shape how and 
what we know about our world, including discourses and practices of history. The 
presence of racialised subjects today is a testament to the ongoing 
contemporaneousness of colonialism, although “the multiple ways in which 
[their] creation and re-creation is haunted by and dependent upon the invention of 
the black other has been forgotten, repressed and denied” (Carby, 2009, p. 625). 
The construction in Orientalist (Said, 1979) and subsequent colonialist discourse 
of the black Other has continued to be reproduced in various sets of scientific, 
moral, and historical discourses, all of which serve to make real the black (or 
otherwise non-white) Other and reconstitute whiteness as the frame of reference 
to which all Others are held.  
The histories and effects of (re)producing and/or being the Other have 
been theorised by the mid-century writings of de Beauvoir (2011) and Fanon 
(1967). Both of these theorists refer to an historical construction of subjectivity, 
part of which involves placing limits upon what can be meaningfully thought and 
said, a process that is played out in everyday power relations. However, this is not 
to say that the history of marginalised subjects has been unilaterally and passively 
shaped by the powerful. Through the construction of the racial Other, the meaning 
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of whiteness is also invented and sustained. Historicising bodies by understanding 
them as effects of power relations and as pedagogical instruments for displaying 
and reinforcing (or perhaps deconstructing and challenging) the naturalness of 
racial categories (Newman, 2010) exposes the perpetuation of colonialism and 
colonised identities that exist within the (re)constitution of the black/white, 
Orient/Occident, East/West, colonised/coloniser oppositions.  
  The process of othering is not in and of itself to blame for racial 
inequality and racialisation. In order for racial otherness to remain meaningful, a 
supporting body of knowledge and truth claims must exist that both makes 
possible and limits certain ways of thinking (although these “ways of thinking” 
are not always coherent and are often contradictory, despite the fact that 
contradictions are often made or perceived as invisible). Stuart Hall (2007) draws 
on the Foucauldian concept of discourse to describe the relationship between 
power and knowledge that gave rise to Orientalist discourses of the black other. 
Hall writes: “Not only is discourse always implicated in power, discourse is one 
of the ‘systems’ through which power circulates” (p. 57). The practices to which 
particular sets of knowledge give rise, such as colonialism or scientific racism, 
bring particular subjects into being by identifying them within texts and practices. 
The “truth” about those particular subjects is therefore reinforced by dynamic 
textual and embodied practices; within a particular epistemological framework, 
statements begin to take on truth status simply because they fit a particular way of 
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knowing that “makes sense9” regardless of their accuracy or validity (Mills, 
1997). Through the work of writers such as Burton and Henderson, we can see 
that race-making projects in Britain and Canada were bound up in very particular 
ways of thinking about the individual and the nation; early feminists framed their 
arguments in ways that “fit” this already existing knowledge.  
Thus, one legacy of colonialism is the perceived naturalness of the 
categories of race and racial difference, a naturalness that is reconstituted in every 
text and practice that reproduces rather than (or even as it) challenges this 
“common sense” way of knowing, classifying and hierarchising. For example, the 
writers of AR draw upon these “natural” categories in ways that accept and 
reinforce the non-white Other as being inherently different, deviant, and 
dangerous. This “makes sense” when supported by (selectively interpreted10) 
statistics on SAT scores, crime rates, teen pregnancy rates, etc. The genetic and 
social sciences take the place of colonialism, Orientalism or eugenics as fields of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	   I use the phrase “make sense” many times throughout this thesis in an 
intentionally open-ended way. My understanding of what it means to “make 
sense” of something is informed on the one hand by Foucault’s theory of 
discourse and the relation of knowledges to each other in such a way as to 
produce statements that are understandable (Michel Foucault, 1979, 1991b, 
1991c), and on the other hand by Avery Gordon’s discussion (elaborated upon in 
later chapters) of literally making something sensory, or perceivable. Making 
sensory something that was previously inaccessible because of the ways in which 
we understand things to make sense in the first meaning of the term can be 
thought of as unmaking sense if it disrupts the framework of knowledges that 
seem to make everyday understanding a seamless process (2008, 1999).  10	  Because I am focusing on AR’s production of particular discourses, I have not 
looked specifically into the production of the scientific studies they draw upon. 
While I say that the results of such studies have been “selectively interpreted” in 
AR’s use of them to produce secondary claims, I am not assuming that the 
original studies were not borne of similar, though perhaps differently articulated 
or not consciously acknowledged, concerns or knowledges about which kinds of 
people are desirable and which are not. 
	   23	  
knowledge that take up racial difference and construct it as truth; scientific 
knowledge is now the coloniser of the racialised bodies it constructs (through its 
own reliance upon assumptions about the naturalness of categories of race, 
ethnicity, desirable people versus undesirable people, as well as through the ways 
in which these claims are taken up in other ways by people and groups who put 
them to use in their own complicated political lives) but it is founded upon the 
same modern notions of the individual, culture and the nation as its predecessors.   
 Linking the UFWA and AR is the historical emergence and maintenance 
of the racial subject and racialised knowledge, both of which are tools and effects 
of the perpetuation of racial nation-making projects. Ultimately, it is the 
(re)construction of racial knowledge that continues to produce the meaning of 
race in ways that justify inequality. Goldberg (1993) argues that “we have come, 
if often only silently, to conceive of social subjects foremost in racial terms” (p. 
1).  In his view, the prevalence of the racialised subject is tied to the history of 
liberalism, an ideology that reinforces the notion of the individual and the 
democratic nation state in ways that are predicated upon the existence of racial 
difference. The early history of eugenics in the nineteenth and first half of the 
twentieth centuries11 is an example of the ways in which liberalism converged 
with both positivism and imperialism (Gould, 1996; Kevles, 1995) to bring race to 
the fore as “one of the central conceptual inventions of modernity” (Goldberg, 
1993, p. 3). In order to maintain the meaning of the racialised subject across time, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Eugenics is an ongoing contemporary practice. See, for example, Brady (2001), 
Ekberg (2007), Goodey (2003), Kallianes (1997), Lemke (2002), Morita (2001) or 
Rembis (2000). 
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an authorial body of racial knowledge that supports the categories and meaning of 
race must also be maintained. In the words of Bruno Latour (2000), a considerable 
amount of “work” must be done in order for existing knowledge to continue to 
“make sense”; dominant epistemology must be maintained through a plethora of 
institutions and discourses that (seem to) operate in concert in order to continually 
(re)produce it.   
 Racial knowledge, then, is constructed through powerful practices of 
“naming and evaluating” (Goldberg, 1993, p. 150), practices that construct an 
epistemological framework in which the concept of race and its associated moral 
and biological attributes count as truth. When a statement begins to take on 
common-sense status it also takes on an illusory cloak of neutrality that masks the 
politics and power relations of everyday experiences and practices. The 
construction of racial knowledge is always a circuitous and ongoing process, 
which means that it is always open to contestation and reinterpretation; however, 
this is not to say that power relations are equal or that resistance is always 
possible. Because power is inherent in every discursive formation, racial 
knowledge is bound up in necessarily exclusionary practices; the establishment 
over time of dominant knowledge systems makes certain ways of thinking about 
or challenging race unlikely, if not impossible. These systems of racial knowledge 
have provided the very foundation of modern nationalism upon which entire 
networks of institutions have been built. As hooks elaborates, this has given rise 
to a powerful culture of white supremacy that systematically controls and 
devalues non-whiteness (1992). 
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The classification and hierarchisation of racialised bodies is an effect of a 
particular deployment of power within a particular framework of racial 
knowledge. The persistence of the non-white Other and projects of racial nation-
making (conscious or otherwise) in North American society are (in part) what 
allow me to draw a comparison between the UFWA and AR as two groups that 
operate(d) from sites of racial privilege, both drawing upon and constructing 
discourses of nationhood, citizenship, and race that reproduce and reinforce racial 
inequality in their respective cultural frameworks. The historicisation of racial 
bodies, including the history of the white, privileged body, involves the highly 
political project of seeing the past in the present. This is an important way to 
deconstruct the perceived naturalness of our physical bodies and subjective 
identities, as well as the structures of inequality that arise from them. 
Historicisation also involves tracing interdiscursive practices, power relations and 
effects that are much more complicated than a traditional categorization of eras 
and social movements, or a description of historical tragedies that drive progress, 
allows. The project of race-making and the nation-making practices that are 
predicated upon it provide one of way of developing a theory of history, power 
and subjectivity that can explain contemporary racism and racialisation in terms 
of the past. However, understanding race as historically and politically 
constructed is not to deny the very real embodied and affective experiences of 
being situated as either the dangerous Other or the privileged One. The project of 
historicising race must attempt to “avoid both the utopian framework which sees 
race as an illusion we can somehow ‘get beyond,’ and also the essentialist 
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formulation which sees race as something objective and fixed, a biological 
datum” (Omi & Winant, 2006, p. 199). The profound writing of Fanon, for 
example, continues to remind us of how real race is. It is not merely an idea that 
exists in the realm of thought; it is a base upon which identities are formed, 
resources are distributed, nations are founded and borders are drawn. Racial 
knowledge is present as each of us walks down the street and engages in everyday 
activities with either the invisible privilege of racial neutrality, or the burden of 
racialised difference. Thus, the project of linking the histories of feminism and 
colonialism with contemporary nation and race-making practices is to expose the 
ongoing presence of racism in every structural and personal aspect of social life. 
Both the UFWA and AR (re)produce racial inequality and attempt to regulate 
racialised bodies, effects of systematized racial knowledge operating within a 
fundamentally racist culture (Goldberg, 1993). 
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Chapter 2 
Researcher Embodiment and the Ethics of Writing 
 
Questions of researcher subjectivity are important in any critical study that 
attempts to interrogate the authority of knowledge production. When investigating 
issues of embodiment, as this project inherently does through an investigation into 
embodied categories of race, nation and citizenship, the embodiment of the 
researcher also becomes an important site of critical reflection and experience. In 
this chapter I explore the relationship between my research questions and my 
particular ontological and epistemological position, as well as the ways in which 
the related concepts of ethics, praxis and reflexivity can be understood in terms of 
this research project and the theoretical paradigm I use to explore it.  
 
Ontological and epistemological considerations 
I have given great consideration to the ontological position I hold while 
thinking about how to do, or make, this research. In many ways, my research 
constitutes a critique of scientific and positivist social discourse, and it has been 
guided in part by the following questions: how are bodies and subjectivities 
constructed and naturalized by scientific and historical discourses, as well as by 
discourses of nation and citizenship? In what ways are the body and mind 
historically contingent? What are the histories of how the body and mind came 
into being, and are maintained as, objects of scientific inquiry? How have the 
shifting conceptions of both the body and mind reflected shifting scientific and 
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historical language and sites of inquiry, as opposed to reflecting an increasingly 
“True” apprehension of reality? In making this project I am attempting to explore 
the relationship between ontology, epistemology and history, and the formulation 
of these questions stems in large part from theorists who challenge the notion that 
knowledge claims transparently reflect reality (Foucault, 1979; Latour, 2000). The 
acknowledgement that language, historical circumstance, politics and individual 
and disciplinary interests influence which objects “come into being” or “pass 
away” as foci of scientific inquiry (Daston, 2000) requires that one explore the 
possibility that dominant ways of thinking about reality and its relationship to 
knowledge can be severely limiting. In terms of this particular research, it requires 
that I explore the ways in which a scientific (or modern, more generally) ontology 
can have seriously harmful effects on individuals whose bodies and/or minds 
become defined as “abnormal,” “undesirable,” or outside the realm of real 
citizenship. 
 Lincoln and her colleagues (2011) discuss the (im)possibility of 
converging paradigms, arguing that while there may be considerable overlap in 
non-positivist paradigms at times, a fundamental divide exists between positivist 
and non-positivist positions in terms of the ontology-epistemologies of each. The 
idea that truth is “out there” waiting to be discovered through rigorous, objective 
and empirical research is in full opposition to conceptions of truth that are more 
fluid, relational and interpretive. This relativist approach to truth and knowledge 
allows for researchers to redefine and “resituate” (p. 119) themselves, their 
research subjects, and the ways in which knowledge is constructed and 
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deconstructed as ongoing processes of (re)production, reformulated moment to 
moment. For this project I have analysed particular sets of texts in such a way as 
to deconstruct categories and claims to truth that have, through a loss of their 
historicity, come to be seen as unhistorical and natural rather than socially 
constructed. My ontological-epistemological position allows me to critique the 
metanarratives of scientific and historical progress, but this is not to say that I 
replace one version of history and truth with another. To hold a belief in the 
contingency and relativity of knowledge is to recognise that every version and 
articulation of knowledge is dependent upon the subjectivity of the inquirer and 
the particular limitations of history, language and circumstance that exist at a 
particular moment. Acknowledging the mutually co-constitutive relationship 
between subjectivity and knowledge is an important difference between scientific 
epistemology and what Lincoln et al. refer to as “new-paradigm” epistemology 
(ibid.). This notion is expanded upon by Slack (1996): “The context is not 
something out there, within which practices occur or which influence the 
development of practice. Rather, identities, practices, and effect generally, 
constitute the very context in which they are practices, identities, or effects” 
(quoted in Newman, 2010, p. 315).   
 In a similar vein, Ellis (2009) writes about the multiplicity of truths that 
stem not only from different individuals but from one individual over time. 
Although the following quote was taken from a section in which she speaks 
directly about autoethnography as a method, it applies as well to the study of 
history more generally, as both require an understanding that “to story ourselves 
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is not to describe the way it ‘really’ happened … it means to ‘see and rediscover 
the past, not as a succession of events but as a series of scenes, inventions, 
emotions, images, and stories’ rewritten by the author within the conditions set by 
the author” (Ellis, 2009, p. 16, quoting Benjamin, 1968). In terms of my own 
research, to replace one metanarrative of history with another would go against 
the political aims of the project. To do so would be to contribute to the kind of 
rhetorical strategy of naturalising and universalising truth claims that I attempt to 
challenge. Like our individual life stories, the histories of the body and of 
subjectivity have been told and re-told to reflect and justify changing knowledges 
and the powerfully compelling metanarrative of human progress. However, it is a 
conscious awareness of this re-telling of history that is quite often missing when 
we speak of our bodies and the bodies of Others, for what could be more 
materially real and unchanging than our own biological, directly observable 
bodies? And although the history of the mind is in many ways easier to 
acknowledge as non-scientific and therefore less certain, we still believe that we 
know a “disabled” or “abnormal” mind when we “see” one (Goodey, 2003).  
 Lincoln et al. (2011) explain that dominant beliefs in the natural categories 
of human science are in many ways the products of texts. Scientific texts “lead us 
to believe the world is rather simpler than it is, and they may reinscribe enduring 
forms of historical oppression” (p. 124). While I have described my research as 
constituting a kind of challenge to scientific authority by offering an alternative 
interpretation of history, it is important to remember that I am not analysing 
scientific texts directly. Rather, I am examining how other social groups have 
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interpreted scientific and historical (as well as moral and political) discourses in 
ways that reflect their own particular cultural and historical contexts, and how this 
interpretation forms the basis for them to construct and reinforce particular ways 
of thinking about bodies, minds and national identities. This is a kind of second-
order effect of scientific and historical texts that are re-presented as political and 
moral rhetoric (which is not to say that politics are not already present in all 
scientific inquiry). Lincoln et al. call for texts that “break boundaries” (p. 124) by 
disrupting the illusion of neutrality and enduring truth. Such texts offer alternative 
ways of understanding the human subject-object as the site of a struggle over 
knowledge that is politically and historically informed. We may ask the question: 
while it is one thing to scientifically categorise humans as objects according to 
biological “difference”, what does it mean to actually live within these often-
untroubled categories? Ingham (1997) writes: “all of us share genetically 
endowed bodies, but to talk about physical culture requires that we try to 
understand how the genetically endowed is socially constructed, as well as 
socially constituting and constructing” (quoted in Newman, 2010, p. 316).  While 
this quote does not go far enough in terms of troubling the notion of genetics, it 
certainly captures the relationship between discourse and embodied practice that I 
have drawn from Foucault and use as a basis for analysing the discourses of the 
UFWA and AR.  
 These epistemological and ontological considerations, which Lincoln et al. 
(2011) convincingly collapse into one question of paradigm, are central to the 
questions of ethics, praxis and reflexivity that I explore in this chapter. While I 
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discuss these issues separately for the sake of clarity, I also endeavour to 
demonstrate that the boundaries between these concepts are rapidly blurring as 
there comes into being an increasing number of what may be called “postmodern” 
texts that further open up the possibilities of multiple, partial truths rather than a 
universal truth (Hall, 1996; Hutcheon, 1989; Jameson, 1991; Lyotard, 2007; P. 
Smith & Riley, 2009). Lincoln et al. discuss this new “era” by arguing that “the 
slippage between signifier and signified in linguistic textual terms creates 
representations that are only and always shadows of actual people, events, and 
places” (p. 125). This position has helped remind me that my own research, being 
confined to the analysis of two particular sets of discourses, constructs a very 
partial, contingent understanding of history, as well as an important articulation of 
my own subjectivity with “corporeal power-knowledge structures” (Newman, 
2010, p. 316).  
 
Ethics and writing 
Ellis (2009) proposes that the question of ethics be rephrased from is this 
particular approach/practice ethical or unethical to what is the right thing for me 
to do right now? While my own research does not involve direct interaction with 
other living subjects, it is still inquiry of a profoundly social nature and must be 
approached ethically. Below, I explain my understanding of ethics not as a formal 
practice but as an ongoing personal reflection and conscientiousness that has 
guided and shaped my thinking and the way I choose to transform it into text. 
There comes an important time when the amorphous flow of thoughts and ideas 
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inside a researcher’s mind must be crystallised into text of some form, and while 
that crystallisation can provide a relieving sense of articulation it is always 
important to ask oneself why it was articulated this way and not that; what are the 
constructive implications of this particular articulation for myself and for others? 
 One idea that is central to Ellis’ approach to ethics is her insistence upon 
placing the subjectivity of the researcher squarely into the ethical questions. It is 
not enough for a researcher to stay “outside” of the research and ask questions 
about the research subjects, a point that is emphasized in Librett and Perrone’s 
critique of institutional review board (IRB) ethical guidelines (Librett & Perrone, 
2010). While IRB reviews of research are important for protecting the basic rights 
of research participants, their rigid formality places restrictions upon qualitative 
social research. IRB guidelines are not designed to accommodate research that 
does not involve human subjects; these formalized ethical guidelines send the 
message that adherence to an institutional document can mitigate ethical concerns 
about research with human subjects (which is already far too simplistic), but they 
also send a message that research that does not involve human subjects exists 
entirely outside the realm of ethical consideration.  
 Librett and Perrone make the important connection between one’s 
research paradigm, or ontological-epistemological position, and the articulation of 
ethical concerns and questions (2010). Ellis addresses this issue when she asks: 
“What do we owe those we study? [Should we] honour blurred boundaries rather 
than build concrete ones, respect contradictions rather than reify patterns…?” 
(2009, p. 78). Her stories show the reader that ethics is a continual, fluid process 
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that does not end along with the research; thinking about ethics can (indeed, 
should) be revisited and re-interpreted, and it has continued effects into the future. 
The ethical choices we make moment to moment reflect our life experiences and 
knowledge, and as we change we have every right to return to those choices and 
reflect upon how we may have done things differently. The simple acceptance 
that the ethical choices we make will change over time and that we can in fact 
reflect upon them in such a way as to trace their development and criticise 
ourselves is liberating as it transgresses the boundary of the ethical/unethical 
binary by changing the language we use to speak about ethics as a process. When 
ethics becomes doing what we think is right, right now, with the full knowledge 
that that choice is contingent upon a multitude of dynamic forces and that “doing 
what is right” is always informed by relationally constructed notions of morality, 
we can see how the relationship between epistemology and ethics can become 
ambiguous and how unsatisfactory it is to simply judge a particular choice or 
practice as “ethical” so long as it meets institutional criteria. Doing what is right 
right now is not an invitation to disregard ethical obligation altogether; it is quite 
the opposite, in fact, as it is a call to think carefully about what our practices mean 
for both ourselves and others, in research and in daily life, and to think about 
them in an ongoing, critical way.  
 Although my own research does not involve human participants, questions 
about what and how to write, keeping in mind the question of what I owe to the 
people and histories I write about, are extremely important. The history of the 
UFWA is a significant story for the histories of Alberta, women’s rights in 
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Canada, and the attempt to develop strong agrarian communities*. Posing an 
alternative version of this history, or choosing to highlight only certain aspects of 
the story that may be seen as morally reprehensible, is a direct threat to the 
integrity and sacredness of these women (that is, as representations of women 
which are set apart, not to be defiled or tampered with) who figure prominently 
into the stories of rural farmwomen and men even today (Langford, 1997). Do I 
owe it to them and their legacy to write about them in a way that preserves their 
dignity and is mindful of the important contributions they made to society? Is it 
wrong for me to directly link them to a white supremacist, paleoconservative 
group of American men whose ideology is morally questionable in ways that are 
much more direct than the UFWA’s ideas ever were? Does this comparison 
denigrate the history of rural women in ways that are harmful? On the other hand, 
do I owe anything to AR in terms of how they are represented in my writing?  
 I have remained mindful of these questions and have tried to write in a 
conscientious way throughout this process. As I discuss more fully in Chapter 5, 
my own politics and aspects of my identity will be formed and re-formed as I 
write, and my immersion into the texts of the UFWA and AR will elicit emotions 
and thoughts that may challenge my intent to write about them in ways that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  UFWA members may be saddened to hear that “many of the communities [they] 
resided in have been erased from the map or reduced to shells, and their farms 
erased when folded into larger agribusiness concerns.  Surviving rural 
communities face constant crises over depopulation, disappearing services, 
political impotence, environmental degradation and the intrusion of capitalist 
extractive industries (oil, gas, mining, etc). Agrarianism as a feature of rural 
culture has largely ceased to exist except for the odd nostalgic remnant, as likely 
to be held by an urbanite as a rural dweller. Rural dwellers are [now] largely 
urban-oriented consumers of material and symbolic goods.” 	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respectful, but that still convey the message I believe is important. This leads me 
to the last point about ethics that Ellis has opened up for me. She writes about the 
researcher as a person whose interests are just as important as those of the people 
he or she studies; the need of the researcher to convey their story or their own 
thoughts and opinions on a subject that is meaningful to them is an important part 
of making the everyday ethical decisions and reflecting on why we are interested 
in something and how it is that we are going to textualize our stories/thoughts. 
Negotiating and balancing these concerns will require mindfulness, but in 
articulating here some of the main ethical concerns about my writing, they have 
remained present throughout my research and have guided me in making and 
thinking about my choices.  
 
Politics and ethically guided practice  
Politics are an inescapable fact of any research, despite positivist claims to 
neutrality and objectivity in positivist research. Denzin and his colleagues 
(Denzin, Lincoln, & Giardina, 2006) write about competing paradigms of 
research, knowledge and truth as a political struggle. Because a positivist 
paradigm is socially and politically privileged, producing qualitative research that 
is received as “valid” and valuable is both problematic and essential for 
challenging dominant epistemologies and opening up new ways of thinking and 
doing. Quoted in Denzin et al., Lincoln and Canella write: “multiple kinds of 
knowledge, produced by multiple epistemologies and methodologies, are not only 
worth having but also demanded if policy, legislation and practice are to be 
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sensitive to social needs” (2006, p. 770). Denzin et al. also describe how 
qualitative research within the academy is severely restricted by the 
“methodological fundamentalism” of politically sanctioned epistemology (ibid.). 
According to the authors, critiques of dominant epistemology as colonialist, 
oppressive and interested in the maintenance of status quo power relations have 
already begun to seriously challenge its hegemonic status. All qualitative research 
that stems from alternative epistemological positions is therefore engaged in a 
political struggle over truth.  
 The very existence of alternative knowledge allows for new ways of 
thinking that were previously relegated to the realm of the unsaid (Smart, 2002). 
However, for Giardina and Denzin (2011), critiques of “right-wing ideologies 
[and] neoliberal economics” (p. 3), for example, are not enough because they do 
not give us a way to move forward with practices that will actually elicit and 
encourage political change. They outline the ways in which their activist politics 
provides a pedagogical foundation, including the hope that this new pedagogy 
will foster an “ethical self-consciousness that is critical and reflexive”, and that 
this self-consciousness will in turn “[shape] a critical racial self-awareness” (p. 4). 
Although I struggle with thinking of how my own research engenders praxis of 
this nature, I do believe that it can contribute in some small way to these aims in 
two ways: first, as a qualitative piece of research that is founded upon a non-
positivist epistemological standpoint, which, in a world where positivist research 
is politically and institutionally privileged, constitutes an offering of an alternative 
epistemology from which an alternative pedagogy may emerge; and second, as 
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research with a political agenda to historicise, without relying upon traditional 
conceptions of history, the racial, ethnic and disabled body, which in turn 
historicises white, English-speaking national identities (including my own, which 
is perhaps most important). 
 Newman engages directly with body politics by drawing upon 
Foucauldian theory as a tool to create “historically-grounded theories of 
subjectivity” (2010, p. 6), an approach that I believe also articulates my own. His 
goal is to “understand and disrupt [the] modern axioms of representation” (ibid.) 
by analysing and deconstructing the discourse of dominant pedagogies. For 
Newman, praxis is always already intertwined with bodily existence; our bodies 
are sites of knowledge inscription, therefore our existence in the world is 
necessarily pedagogical; they represent to ourselves and others the political 
circumstances in which they were inscribed, and they teach us something abut 
how to exist in the world. Perhaps, then, what needs to be called for first in 
developing a theory of praxis is an awareness of our pedagogical bodies: that our 
bodies are inscribed with the histories of race, gender, and ability, and that a 
critical self-awareness of this can help mitigate and challenge the oppressive 
effects of these histories.  
 There is quite clearly an easy transition from thinking about praxis in this 
way to thinking about reflexivity as a researcher, including acknowledging one’s 
identity and body as historically, culturally and politically contingent constructs. 
There is no real demarcation between praxis, reflexivity and ethics, as all are 
informed more broadly by the ontological-epistemological positions taken up by 
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particular subjects, and through which these particular subjects are themselves 
formed. An awareness that there exist concomitantly multiple truths, that 
knowledge constructs and is constructed between individuals, or networks of 
individuals, moment to moment, that this knowledge changes over time and can 
be reflected upon critically – all of these epistemological considerations lead to 
certain questions about how to navigate ethics in research and praxis, and how to 
acknowledge our own partial truths at each fleeting moment of our lives in order 
to make room for others’ truths, as well as for our own knowledge claims to 
change.  
 Reflexivity, the practice of thinking metanarratively about research, 
values, choices, ethics, and identity is yet another dynamic process that is difficult 
to formally define. Guillemin and Gillam (2004) attempt to define it loosely as an 
ongoing process of reflectively acknowledging the researcher’s role in “actively 
construct[ing] interpretations” (p. 274). They go on to say that reflexivity is a 
component that, when included in research, contributes to more “rigorous” and 
“ethical” practice (p. 278). While this conception provides an easy way to think 
about reflexivity in a kind of “add and stir” way, I do not believe that it captures 
the ongoing, fluid process that other authors such as Ellis and Newman describe. 
Reflexivity, like ethics, does not end with the final draft of an article. Rather, as is 
evidenced throughout Ellis’ meta-autoethnographic writing and reflection upon 
her work, reflexivity involves a level of critical self-awareness that stays with us 
every moment throughout our lives.  
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 This process of reflecting upon and reinterpreting one’s knowledge and 
practices (Ellis, 2009) is not one that leads to an increasingly accurate 
apprehension of one’s “real self;” rather, one’s identity is dynamic and 
historically contingent, shaped by experiences that are later examined in the 
context of new ones and, perhaps, by the writing process itself. Newman (2010) 
describes the process reflexivity similarly by acknowledging its role in shaping 
and articulating his own changing but historically grounded identity. His 
ethnographic engagement with the southern United States has made him “aware 
of a habitus-based, contextually-important, historically-constituted performative 
politics” in reference to his own body and history as well as those of others (p. 
308). His reflection also brings him back to his childhood, tracing connections 
between diverse life experiences within the confines of an historically inscribed 
body. He links the study of the body, as I hope to have done in my own historical 
and at times biopolitical research, with a project that is necessarily political 
through its attempt to deconstruct the discursive power relations that define 
bodies and give rise to bodily identities. His own body is implicated, as is mine, 
within this discursive web of knowledge and power: “those corporeal power-
knowledge structures that I was attempting to situate in context were ultimately 
articulating me” (2010, p. 316).  
In many ways, Newman’s description of his epistemological, 
methodological, and reflexive positions describe my own. He navigates the 
connection between discursive deconstruction and praxis as existing in the 
opening up of possibilities to disrupt “existing regimes of power” (p. 14), and I 
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hope that my research will contribute in some small way to this disruption12. As 
Newman notes, any inquiry that attempts to locate power within individual bodies 
requires that the researcher locate his or her own body within that particular 
context, understanding that articulating the discursive dimension of bodies 
(fleetingly) crystallises them at the same time that it makes room for transgression 
of their limitations. My own bodily history must come to light as I attempt to 
historicise the bodies of others. This will form part of my life story as I reinterpret 
and reflect upon my own bodily experiences. As Ellis (2009) writes: “who I am is 
unfinished and in motion” (p. 350). Ellis also captures the danger of articulating 
into text what are but momentary conceptions of our identities; that is why 
resisting the forms and metanarratives of ethics and knowledge that constrain us 
by embracing a fluid, ongoing story of making, re-making and reflection is so 
appropriate for understanding lives that are both fragmented and continuous. I can 
always return to my stories, my choices, and my articulations of knowledge from 
a new context in the future, reinterpreting them for myself and for others.  
Finding a way to articulate the contradictory experiences and sets of 
knowledge that emerge out of the “postmodern moment” has been itself a feature 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  My commitment to both an ontology-epistemology of subjective contingency, 
as well as a belief in the use of such a position toward the troubling of power 
relations (conceived very loosely as those events, texts and relations that 
systematically assert the dominance of one way of knowing over others) is taken 
up as a politics of possibility that is rooted in the belief that systematic 
inequalities, violences or marginalizations must be contested. This represents a 
site of convergence between epistemology and morality; inequalities must be 
contested, in my view and perhaps in the views of others, simply because there 
are other possibilities for those subjects rendered as Other, as outside of, or as 
lives that do not matter, a consequence of which is that certain lives are lived in 
fear, under constant threat of exclusion, denial, violence or disappearance, both 
physical and mental. 
	   42	  
of “a history marked by multivocality, contested meanings, paradigmatic 
controversies, and new textual forms” (Lincoln et al., 2011, p. 125). In terms of 
my own research on bodies, it is important to understand how they are both 
historical and continuous at the same time that they are contingent upon 
circumstance and discursive construction at every moment. Acknowledging the 
fluid boundaries between all of the issues discussed throughout this chapter and 
understanding how they operate to inform my research questions, analytic 
approach(es), and exploration of my own bodily history is essential if I am to 
produce research that challenges the natural, ahistorical body while remaining 
mindful of the potentially harmful or constraining ways that my own articulations 
construct (bodily) histories. 
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Chapter 3 
The Concepts of Discourse and Method 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, categories of race and their attendant 
inequalities are part of the foundation of modern social organization, and racial 
knowledge places limitations upon what can be meaningfully thought or said 
about identity, nationhood, or citizenship. Perceived “progress” in eliminating 
racism, including efforts at decolonisation, formal racial equality in law and the 
black liberation movement, makes unapparent the dynamic and shifting power 
relations that continue to impart great privilege upon subjects who adhere to white 
ideology and who perform whiteness in particular ways. Certainly race “makes 
sense” within a set of scientific and (inter)nationalist discourses that bear a 
striking resemblance to (although are in some ways very different from) the 
discourses of race that existed one century ago. The categories and ontology of 
race and the inequalities that arise from them/it remain very much the same and 
continue to act in ways that are both productive and limiting; productive in the 
sense that certain meanings, subjects and events are made possible by their 
existence, and limiting in the sense that many alternative ways of thinking, being 
and knowing are closed off and rendered unsayable, or unimaginable. 
 In order to investigate the proposed link between past and present, 
articulated by the United Farm Woman of Alberta and American Renaissance 
respectively, my exploration of the discourses produced by, and producing, these 
groups draws primarily upon the relationship of discourse to history, and concepts 
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of power-knowledge relations that stem in large part from the work of Foucault. 
In this chapter I define (without closing off other possible interpretations) and 
elaborate upon the concept of discourse as I intend to use it, as well as outline the 
ways in which I approach research into the UFWA and AR (and of racial politics, 
history, knowledge and subjectivity more generally) methodologically (but not 
necessarily methodically). The concept of discourse may aid in the interpretation 
of history as a series of discursive events and linkages (or breakages) that change 
the ways in which we think and act, but do not significantly change or “improve” 
relations or operations of power, nor the inherently exclusionary (as well as 
inherently productive) effects of discourse and knowledge production (including 
the knowledge this text produces). Because questions of methodology are 
inherently tied to one’s position on epistemology, ontology and axiology (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln et al., 2011), my approach to the study of history as a 
series of discursive events13 requires that the categories of race, and indeed, our 
very physical bodies, be understood not as objects of discovery, but as objects 
made through an ongoing negotiation of power and claims to truth.   
 
Discourse, power and subjectivity 
In the words of Stuart Hall (2007), discourse is “a group of statements 
which provide a language for talking about – i.e. a way of representing – a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  History as a series of discursive events is a useful framework, but one that I 
fear is too simplistic. This particular point will be elaborated upon in later 
chapters but for the purpose of laying out some of the important features of 
poststructuralism now in order to expand upon them later, the idea of discourse is 
an important one. 
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particular kind of knowledge about a topic” (p. 56). Rather than understanding 
language as a transparent signifier of a pre-existing reality or as a reflection of the 
inner reality of some autonomous subject, it can be understood as a symbolic 
construction of particular ways of thinking about and interpreting the world that 
are historically and politically contingent. In this view, meaning is dynamic and 
unstable, reflecting cultural and historical shifts rather than an increasingly 
accurate apprehension of reality (Barthes, 1977; Hall, 1996; Hutcheon, 1989; 
Weedon, 1987); language shapes our consciousnesses and our perception of 
ourselves, Others, and the world around us.  
Discourse can be thought of as producing, or operating within, a set of 
rules that govern language and what/how things can be meaningfully said; these 
limitations (alternately conceived of as possibilities) are placed, though not 
incontestably, upon the ways in which we think, speak, and act, as well as the 
ways we experience our own bodies and identities as they come to be known in 
particular ways. Discourse is always both open-ended and limiting in its 
production of meaning, and an interrogation of discourse, from a poststructural 
perspective, does not concern itself with the truth or falsity of representations of 
knowledge, social relations, or truth claims (Mills, 1997). Instead, the concept of 
discourse requires that we see truth as the product of ongoing negotiations of 
power relations through the production and reproduction of various competing 
and interlocking discourses; a statement is true if it constructs truth status for 
itself; an effect of this truth status is the production of real effects in the world 
(Hall, 2007). My investigation and critique of national and racial categories does 
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not, therefore, assume that these categories can be done away with simply by 
exposing them as historical and social constructs; the limits of language, and the 
force of everyday practices that assume the truth of these categories, are very real 
in their effects.   
This view also rejects an understanding of history as being determined, 
even if only partially, by particular material forces. The words of Terry Eagleton 
(2011) sum up an anti-traditional view of history as “just one damn thing after 
another. [History] does not have the consistency of a fairy tale, or form a coherent 
narrative” (p. 110). Ideas linger and haunt us when we thought they were gone, 
and they disappear unexpectedly and in rapid succession during historical shifts; 
these continuities and discontinuities occur in the realm of discourse and cannot 
be reduced to a purely material matter, nor to a matter of essential humanness. 
For the purposes of this research, I understand discourse to include sets of 
statements and knowledge claims that are both productive and limiting in terms of 
what sorts of things are knowable, and how and what we can know about them. 
Discourse is how certain knowledge claims “make sense” within a broader 
context of interlocking discourses, or ways of knowing, thinking, and acting. The 
inclusion of bodies (M. Foucault, 2007; D. E. Smith, 1993) as discursive texts is 
particularly important when attempting to theorise knowledge claims that have 
direct effects on the meanings of our physical bodies, such as medical discourses 
or discourses of race or sex. While I have examined texts for this project as 
opposed to real human subjects (a distinction that is actually troubled by the 
notion of discourse), I am mindful of the effects that discourses have on the 
	   47	  
bodies and subjectivities of those they construct and control. The body as a site of 
discursive conflict (and as a discursive tool) has figured prominently into 
contemporary discussions of discourse. For example, Newman (2010) has 
described the physical body as a pedagogical tool for reinforcing or, perhaps less 
often (or perhaps simultaneously), challenging the historical construction of our 
bodies as raced, gendered, classed, or otherwise constituted in unequal ways. 
Bodies are sites of discursive representation and the accompanying power 
relations thereof; they are both instruments and effects of power struggles.  
Foucault was particularly concerned with power relations and the 
constitution of subjectivities through knowledge claims: “it is already one of the 
prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, 
certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals” (Foucault, 
1980, quoted in Mills, 1997, p. 19). Individual subjects are constructed by 
discourse, but they are also the media through which discourses are made and 
transmitted. As Hall explains, when knowledge about Others “is exercised in 
practice, those who are ‘known’ in a particular way will be subject (i.e. subjected) 
to it” (2007, p. 58). In other words, discourses construct the realm of subjectivities 
that are possible at a given time and place; certain subject-positions, as objects of 
knowledge, “come into being” and “pass away” as discursive frameworks, or the 
conditions of possibility, change (Daston, 2000). The textual articulation of 
knowledge, and the processes of subject formation therein, is particular in that it 
represents a fleeting crystallisation of meaning and calling into being of 
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subjectivity that is immediately open to interpretation and contestation, and is 
always in danger of becoming meaningless.  
Both the UFWA and AR can be understood as participating in the 
production and reinterpretation of discourses of racial nation-making through 
their (conflicted and often contradictory) engagements with race, racialised 
bodies, and nationalist/imperialist rhetoric, issues which have been theorised 
extensively as the legacies of colonialist and imperialist histories. The histories 
and legacies of colonialism have provided important sites of knowledge and 
subject formation around which many discourse and cultural theorists have 
converged. Goldberg (1993) is one theorist who understood “racist culture” as an 
effect of practices of colonialism and imperialism; in this view, racism, or 
representations and interpretations of race that serve to justify certain knowledges 
and inequalities, is part of the foundation of all structures and practices in 
“Western” society: “racial thinking and racist articulation have become 
increasingly normalized throughout modernity”, a result of which has been the 
increasingly common conception of subjects “foremost in racial terms” (p. 1). 
There is an ongoing production and reproduction of racial knowledge that 
changes in relation to shifts in “modernity’s self-understanding and expression” 
(ibid.), but the ultimate meaning of race as both an essential quality and as the 
basis for social and biological inequalities is never eliminated. Goldberg discusses 
racial discourse as the accumulation of a body of knowledge (and, I may add, of 
bodies themselves) that is both open-ended and severely limiting (p. 42). 
Discourse is fluid and productive at the same time that it places concrete 
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limitations upon subjectivities and the meanings and experiences of their physical 
bodies.  
 Exploring the ways in which racial knowledge interacts and intersects with 
other discourses in dynamic ways requires an attempt to understand, if only 
partially, “relations between statements, between groups of statements and events 
of a quite different kind (technical, economic, social, political)” (Foucault, 1976, 
quoted in Newman, 2010, p. 25). To that end, racial discourse has been linked in 
some instances to the emergence of imperialism and liberal individualism, and 
they have remained closely tied together (Burton, 1994; Comack, 2010; Goldberg, 
1993; Henderson, 2003). For example, Comack’s research into the construction of 
race in public responses to the murder of an aboriginal man by police investigates 
how the discourses of individualism, “responsibilization” and formal equality are 
imbricated with racism. She writes: “those who refuse to become responsible, to 
govern themselves, therefore pose a ‘risk’ to be managed, and readily [sic] made 
subject to condemnation” (p. 43). She further complicates liberal discourse of the 
rational, culpable subject by showing how it is taken up in ways that reinforce 
representations of First Nations people as both incapable of living up to the liberal 
definition of personhood and personally responsible for this shortcoming. Racial 
Othering, in this case, effectively occurs at the intersection between different sets 
of knowledge and truth claims; we cannot know the responsible and good citizen 
without simultaneously defining the irresponsible and the bad.  
  The contributions of (post)colonial and poststructural theorists provide 
useful “tools” with which to interrogate the contemporary discourse of American 
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Renaissance by following through one chain of racial logic transmitted through 
the colonial and imperial legacy of the UFWA. The ways in which the UFWA 
was engaged in practices of race-making (Omi & Winant, 2006) can be usefully 
understood in terms of discourse and its relation to issues of power, subjectivity, 
and ontology; it allows one to theorise racialised subjects as cultural productions 
rather than as victims of oppression who are divorced from their “true 
subjectivities,” and it allows those subjects who are implicated in race-making 
practices to be understood as conjunctures around which certain conditions of 
possibility converge and are transmitted. Subjects are formed in relation to one 
another and through the mediating force of discourse. This view is concerned as 
much with what discourse says and who it names (and how) as it is with who it 
does not name. Newman (2010) discusses the white body as a power-knowledge 
nexus, though its discursively constructed naturalness as a neutral frame of 
reference makes it unnecessary to directly name. This has the effect of 
reproducing a systematic denial of the white subject’s implication in “the 
structures and discourses which create ideological power for the ‘invisible 
centre’” (p. 18). Thus, the historicisation of bodies does not merely apply to those 
racialised subjects who constitute the borders of such a centre; the white subject’s 
position within a perceived centre must necessarily be troubled as well, as both 
are always already discursively articulated in relation to each other.  
The project of studying the UFWA and AR as analogous responses to, and 
sites of convergence around, colonialist and racist epistemology is not an attempt 
to uncover the singular Truth of race as a socially and politically constructed 
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category; it will, however, offer an alternative “truth claim” that will enter into a 
power struggle with the claims of other truths, including those of the human 
sciences, liberalism, individualism, traditional history, or the grand narrative of 
modernity. 
 
Method? 
One possible way to investigate the discourses of the UFWA and AR 
would be to approach them from a perspective of critical discourse analysis, 
which Mills (1997) defines as the “integrat[ion] [of] Michel Foucault’s definition 
of discourse with a systematic framework of analysis based on a linguistic 
analysis of the text” (p. 131). My own research involves public discourses that are 
issued in non-conversational ways, cloaked in the appearance of science, neutral 
fact, or moral claims that attempt to make criticism or dissonance nearly 
impossible. My approach to these texts must take two things into account. First, 
the individual contexts of the UFWA and AR must be accounted for, however 
selectively; this requires identifying other discourses that are drawn upon, though 
not necessarily in entirely cohesive ways, in the production of racial nation 
building discourse (although, for my current purposes, I am not necessarily 
concerned with a thorough excavation of the local circumstances surrounding 
particular knowledge claims, a task that would be beyond the scope of this thesis). 
Second, the texts themselves must be understood in terms of their effects and the 
(already existing) systems of inequality that they produce and reproduce, and 
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which must have already existed in some form in order to make their claims 
intelligible.  
But while discourse analysis as a method stems directly from the concept 
of discourse, my particular project is not conducive with a “systematic” approach 
to text that stems also from a tradition of linguistics. My concern is less with the 
details of word choice, arrangement and context, and more with the 
understanding, specific as it is to both the discourses I have chosen to study and 
to myself as mediator and constructor of the relationship between them, of 
particular histories, ideas, and power relations, and of the effects of knowledge 
upon subjectivities that are produced though and by various texts that “make 
sense” in dynamic relation to others. But while I have not taken up a discourse 
analysis for this project, understanding AR and the UFWA as discourses has 
helped me to think through the broader questions of subject formation, knowledge 
and history that my investigation into these groups gave rise to. 
 Carby’s work on racialised subjectification (2009) is more closely aligned 
with how I understand my own methodological approach to the historicisation of 
racialised bodies, as well as to the act and idea of historicisation itself. She draws 
upon both Stuart Hall and Foucault to analyse narratives of racial subjectification 
by taking the concept of discursive subjugation, or the incomplete constitution of 
subjects as an effect of discourse, and using it to “investigate the production and 
reproduction of unequal power relations and the ‘manufacture of subjects’” 
through such relations (p. 625). For this project, I examine two (seemingly) 
historically distinct discourses in order to articulate structures of racism with 
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practices and histories of colonialism and as important, indeed prominent and 
foundational, within contemporary discourses of race, nation, and the human and 
social sciences. Carby also identifies European “exclusionary” history by taking 
the position that “the multiple ways in which its creation and re-creation is 
haunted by and dependent upon the invention of the black other has been 
forgotten, repressed and denied” (ibid.). A critical interrogation of the past in 
terms of its implications for the present (and future) allows us to forge new 
discourses, practices and subjects that, through disruption, may begin to 
ameliorate the violent history of racism in the building of nations.  
 Examining the texts of AR and the UFWA specifically may allow me to 
make connections between statements, their effects, and broader concerns about 
nation, race, subjectivity and the ways in which these ideas are imagined in 
relation to past and future. If we view the histories of colonialism and racism as 
discourses that have been taken up and reproduced in various ways throughout 
history rather than as ideas that we have transcended as part of the progress of the 
West, then it becomes possible to understand a magazine like AR as taking a 
logical position on the meanings of race and nation (Gardiner, 2005/2006), 
understood as foundationally important to the maintenance of contemporary 
culture, as opposed to representing an aberration or anomaly.  
 
Making a genealogy 
Linking the discourses of AR to the legacy of the UFWA is an example of 
the historical continuity of discourses of race in relation to shifts in other 
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discourses, such as justice, science, multiculturalism, formal equality, etc. 
Discourses do not die along with the individuals who iterated them; they continue 
to exist in ways that shape our social lives and inner consciousnesses, albeit in 
fluid, open-ended ways. The history of the constitution of racialised subjects 
cannot be traced to one moment in time, but we may trace, or perhaps actively 
make, connections between moments of racialisation and racial knowledge by 
investigating particular historical practices (i.e. colonialism, racism) and the 
legacy they have left behind (i.e. in the social and human sciences, neo-
imperialism). Both the UFWA and AR contribute to the production of racialised 
subjects as objects of colonial knowledge because they operate within, between 
and as transmitters of discourses of modern progress, liberal individualism, 
nationalism, racism and science (amongst others); colonialism lives on in the 
bodies and subjectivities of the racial Other, and its presence may be challenged 
through the construction of alternative histories – histories that pay attention to 
things that challenge rather than (or even as they) reproduce familiar ways of 
thinking, knowing and doing.  
 Such a concept of constructing an alternative history can be thought of in 
terms of Foucault’s genealogy, a methodology that is built upon the notions of 
discourse, subjectivity and power relations. The making of genealogies is a 
practice of historicising ideas and subjects, and is an attempt to describe history in 
such a way as to abandon the problematic search for “the essence of things” 
(Smart, 2002, p. 56). The idea that social life is constituted through and by 
discourses requires that notions of the originary be rendered senseless; from this 
	   55	  
perspective, it is impossible to locate and describe the source of things, and the 
moments at which they occur, because sources and origins do not objectively 
exist. Any sense of an unbroken, unidirectional connection between events, ideas 
and people is the result of an active, constructive process, itself informed by 
particular historically contingent values and politics. Traditional histories, in their 
identification of historical origins, invoke acts of power that are in accordance 
with dominant ways of thinking, in place of what may more critically be 
described in terms of “complexity, fragility and contingency” (ibid.). The value of 
constructing such a history lies in its potential to open up possibilities in the realm 
of imagination in order that inequalities, acts of power, violence and subjugation 
might be reconceived: “it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it 
fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was 
thought consistent with itself” (Foucault, quoted in Smart, 2002, p. 56). It is a 
practice that requires the abandonment of systematicity with the aims of logical 
consistency, order, universality and verification or with the assumption of coming 
to know in concrete, incontestable ways, and is in favour of an acceptance of the 
vastly complicated experiences of social life and the ways in which they are 
affected by particular constructions of history, including those things that seem to 
be without any history at all.  
 In rejecting (for my current purposes) any formalised method or analysis 
that relies upon a positivist paradigm (but in so doing is not necessarily capable of 
leaving it behind entirely), I would like to describe my aim here as one of 
constructing a genealogy of (or constructing an unsettling relationship between) 
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two moments in time. This is a task of producing alternative stories and of 
embracing the enormous complexity of social life, both mine and those of others; 
the moments I attend to and piece together are as much a product of myself as 
mediator between them as they are emergences of and from the convoluted set of 
circumstances that surround them.  
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Chapter 4 
Alternative Histories and Haunting 
 
In the last section of the previous chapter, I claimed that alternative histories 
must be constructed in order to challenge the production of racialised subjects as 
objects of colonial discourse. I have also claimed that both the UFWA and AR 
exist within and contribute to the ongoing reproduction of categories of race and 
nation, and I have suggested that I am analysing both the UFWA and AR as 
discursive formations in a Foucauldian sense; that is, as a collection of statements 
and thoughts that correspond with one another in such a way as to (re)produce 
particular ways of thinking, seeing, speaking, and being called into subjectivity. 
Beyond that, though, I have not provided a clear-cut description of the way in 
which I will make a convincing case that they are connected to each other. The 
notion that they are “connected” in some way, as well as the question of method, 
which I specifically left unresolved in the previous chapter, are further 
problematised in this one. My central interest lies not in a systematic, positivist 
approach to texts in order to analyse them and then refer to them as empirical 
evidences of a point I am trying to make. Rather, I am interested in telling a 
version of a story, or, in Walter Benjamin’s terms, looking at an image of history 
(1974), that helps me, and perhaps others, to imagine other historical possibilities, 
the process of which may illuminate the contingencies of discourse, knowledge 
and power.  
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However, Wendy Brown (2001) points out that theoretically and 
philosophically, the work of exposing contingency has already been done by a 
number of people. The problem now is that “we have ceased to believe in many of 
the constitutive premises undergirding modern personhood, statehood, and 
constitutions, yet we continue to operate politically as if these premises still hold” 
(2001, p. 4). In much of the social sciences and humanities, many scholars already 
operate upon the premise that language is not transparent, that metanarratives of 
progress create certain historical blindnesses, and that all representations are 
bound up in relations of power, their veracity being directly tied to how well they 
correspond to epistemologies of rationality, order and classification; systems, 
meanings, categories, our very bodies – all are contingent upon historical 
circumstance, language and power. We “know” that the status of truth is always 
shifting, “not simply because philosophy says so or because evidentiary rules of 
validation are always inadequate,” but because objects of inquiry themselves 
possess no stable or transparent qualities that make the abstract concept of truth 
possible (Gordon, 2008, p. 20). We don’t tell partial truths because the “real 
truth” is always inaccessible; we tell partial truths because that is still the only 
language we have that makes sense in the wake of modern stories and values that 
have been thrown into serious question, but which, as Brown suggests, have never 
been replaced with an alternative convincing enough to re-organise the bases of 
political life. So how can one approach social research in a way that does not rely 
on the language of those systems that have been rendered problematic and unjust?  
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Both Brown and Gordon take the importance of history to be a starting 
place, not only for research, but also for living in and coming to terms with our 
own everyday lives and politics. In “doing” this research, I have worked toward 
articulating the importance of historiographical social research using the language 
of haunting and spectral presences, taken primarily from Brown (2001) and 
Gordon (2008), rather than the language of evidence, empiricism, linearity, 
coding and analysis14. The idea of haunting requires that we abandon, at least to 
some extent, the idea of method. “Method” implies that there exists some way for 
a researching subject to go about finding a social reality, problematic and partial 
or otherwise; haunting allows the researcher to locate herself as an affectual 
subject who is always already part of an extremely complicated, not always 
rationally cohesive, social world. The way that we construct knowledge of the 
present and the past is more akin in this view to fictive storytelling than it is to 
traditional concepts of “science” (although this distinction has perhaps always 
been imaginary). Gordon’s theory of haunting describes research in a way that 
requires the use of fiction, imagination, affect, and the freedom to piece together 
parts of stories in ways that “make sense” of our intuitions and feelings about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  There are several claims within this thesis that seem to construct a false binary 
between research that is on the one hand positivistic, logical and evidence-based, 
and on the other hand critical and fluid with a reliance upon the rejection of 
foundationalist epistemology, ontology and axiology. I read the works of Brown 
and Gordon as attempts at a real rejection of foundationalism, but with the 
acceptance of the fact that it is impossible not to rely in part upon the language, 
ideas and familiar patterns of foundational epistemology. It is a uniquely difficult 
task to attempt to undermine such ideas and remain intelligible without having 
access to alternative, more imaginative language. But while the binary that I have 
constructed serves my political aims for this project, I acknowledge that important 
critical work is done from a variety of epistemological positions. 
	   60	  
ideas, events, images or objects that are uncanny – that is, both familiar and 
strange at the same time, the reasons of which not necessarily being identifiable or 
immediately evident. These are grounded in the claim that the past always bears 
upon the present, that what is invisible is not necessarily “not-there” (Gordon, 
2008, p. 17). Inquiry into that which seems to be not-there, requiring as it does 
that the researcher (for lack of a better term) investigate those aspects of the social 
world that arouse a feeling that something is not quite right, allows for a departure 
toward a new methodology that does not rely upon (but does not, or cannot, 
necessarily abandon) internal logic or consistent presuppositions about (and 
evidentiary support from) social reality. A person who is haunted, or who 
recognises a haunting, is simultaneously always already a product of that history, 
as well as imbued with the capacity to make sense of it in varying ways. And 
beyond that, we also have the ability to encounter and make sense of, or be made 
sense by, histories, even if they are not ours or we think we have no real 
connection to them: 
[I]n [the] moment of enchantment when you are remembering 
something in the world, or something in the world is remembering 
you, you are not alone or hallucinating or making something out of 
nothing but your own unconscious thoughts. You have bumped into 
somebody else’s memory; you have encountered haunting and the 
picture of it the ghost imprints. Not only because this memory that is 
history is out there in the world, playing havoc with the normal 
security historical context provides, but also because it is not over, it 
will happen again; it will be there for you. It is waiting for you. And 
therein lies the frightening aspect of haunting: you can be grasped and 
hurtled into the maelstrom of the powerful and material forces that lay 
claim to you whether you claim them as yours or not (Gordon, 1999, 
p. 117, emphasis in original). 
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The above passage makes clear that haunting is ongoing, occurring 
whether or not you choose to recognise or ignore it; it is a way of understanding 
(in always limited ways) history, social life, my life, the lives of people I know 
and people I don’t, as well as of being understood by others in temporary and 
unsettling ways. In this sense, referring to haunting as a “concept” or a “theory” is 
already problematic in terms of Gordon’s own critique of the 
compartmentalisation of research into/theories of the social into temporally, 
spatially and linguistically bound categories. Haunting is not a theoretical 
“framework” to be picked up and used here and there, though it is conducive to 
such use. I have found in Gordon a way to begin to articulate everything 
differently, a way to imagine possible ways of thinking about and understanding 
the social world(s) that does not necessarily rely upon the concepts and narratives 
that, though they have been rendered fragmented and problematic in the wake of 
poststructuralism, persist as foundationally important frames of reference for all 
knowledges, identities, life stories, migrations and politics. I also agree with her 
that imagining history differently is essential in order to begin to imagine both a 
different present and a different future. This is where I believe Gordon’s call to 
listen to and take notice of ghosts, the missing, the eerie and the unusual 
incoherences we encounter as researchers may help to address Brown’s question 
of what to do when everyday politics and knowledges operate upon an “I know, 
but still…” logic (2001, p. 4).  
 Writing alternative stories about the ways in which the past bears on the 
present, as Foucault suggested with his idea of genealogical history, can be done 
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most imaginatively with an attentiveness and sensitivity to who or what is 
excluded, or rendered missing, from narratives of the past. Foucault’s genealogy 
is not incommensurable with the notion of haunting; both require a rejection of 
progress and teleology, as well as a rejection to some extent of the modern, 
coherent and autonomous subject in favour of a focus upon the complicated and 
sometimes illogical or seemingly unimportant circumstances surrounding 
knowledge and subject production across time. Both see the present as necessarily 
in complicated relation to the past, but neither views history as a purely 
determinative force. Traditional history requires consistent empirical evidence 
and facts, and views historical events and epochs as singular, bounded entities; the 
practices of making traditional histories arose as both instruments and effects of 
particular racial and national knowledges and are thus intimately bound up in 
matters of modern politics and racialisation (Said, 1979). Alternative histories, 
such as histories that account for spectres, ghosts, non-linearity and confusion, do 
not assume to collect the facts of the past, or to make logical, incontestable links 
between past and present events: “To write stories concerning exclusions and 
invisibilities is to write ghost stories. To write ghost stories implies that ghosts are 
real, that is to say, they produce material effects” (Gordon, 2008, p. 17). This is a 
call to write histories that do not rely upon modern ontological and 
epistemological positions, the practice of which has the potential to disrupt the 
inherent connection between racial knowledges and modern histories and politics. 
In order to begin to see who or what is missing, and to actually recognise and feel 
the depth of that loss, we must encounter moments that call our attention to the 
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past; in other words, we must see a ghost before we can begin to wonder about the 
effects it has had on the way we know, how we feel and who we are.  
 Brown, in her investigation into the historiography (“hauntology”) of 
Derrida, claims that the very existence in everyday language of a vocabulary of 
ghosts, spectres, and haunting is an acknowledgement that the distinctions 
between living and dead, past and present are not clear. However, Derrida, whose 
reference to Marx’s description of the “spectre of capitalism” looming over 
Europe in the introduction to The Communist Manifesto, also shows that not only 
does the past bear upon the present in ways that are mysterious and often 
unacknowledged, but the future does as well (Derrida, 1994). The “spectre 
reverses the usual understanding of history as origin (and the present as the 
teleological fruit of the origin) by virtue of its always being a revenant, a coming 
back” (Brown, 2001, p. 149). We can be haunted by spectres from the future 
because “the future is always already populated with certain possibilities derived 
from the past” (p. 150), and these possibilities, conjured in our imaginations, have 
material effects on the both the present and the present’s conversation with the 
presence of the past. Furthermore, while ghosts and spectres from both past and 
present make themselves known in ways that are without pattern or logic, we, as 
subjects of the present, can conjure ghosts in the act of looking for them, or 
banish them in the act of refusing them acknowledgement. With this in mind, it 
would be senseless to search for such things as origins, as the processes by which 
we come to know and understand past, present and future are so fleeting and 
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inconsistent that they can only ever be grasped incompletely, and they certainly 
cannot be organised temporally into unidirectional causal order.    
 My look into a history that includes both American Renaissance and the 
United Farm Women of Alberta is therefore an attempt to challenge a particular 
concept of history with one example, one “snapshot”, of a possible configuration 
of the meaning of, and relationship between, two (non-discrete) historical events: 
“Grasping the constellation that our own era forms with an earlier one entails 
grasping the extent to which (selected elements of the) past and present ignite 
each other, resemble each other, articulate with one another, figure meaning in 
one another” (Brown, 2001, p. 165). There are numerous possible ways that we 
might produce such an “image” (Walter Benjamin’s term to replace the more 
cohesive “story”) of history, because the order in which meaning is made, or 
resemblances are ignited, is not already determined. This historical study of the 
UFWA and AR, understood as producing, and being produced by, particular 
discourses, begins with a belief that the each one haunts the other – the ideas 
developed by prairie women in the homesteads and meeting halls of agrarian 
towns echo in the present in ways that inform (postcolonial and nationalist) 
practices and ideologies, and the spectre of the politics that AR engenders in the 
present loomed over the UFWA in their time. But perhaps most importantly, the 
ways in which the two haunt one another is mediated and brought into existence 
through my particular encounter with each – my presence.  
Gordon reminds us that ghost stories involve the missing and the 
excluded. The solidification of citizenship as a category of utmost modern 
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importance, in which the UFWA had an active part and to which AR is clinging in 
light of rapid transformations in everyday meanings, economy and politics, means 
that there exists an indeterminable number of people who could have been 
otherwise, but who, because of the limitations and privilege of citizenship, have 
been living, or who have died, without being acknowledged as subjects whose 
lives matter. The haunting presence of these missing subjects and these powerful 
discourses also includes colonial and imperial practices, a reiteration of the 
goodness and progress of the West, subjects who are classified by race, sex, and 
intelligence, and the particular ways that we have defined nation, democracy and 
culture. The idea of haunting allows me to look at American Renaissance – some 
members of which were recently involved in a white identitarian conference in 
Paris that attracted record attendance and occurred days before a series of murders 
targeting black and Jewish minorities in France – as one nexus around which 
racism and latent colonialism continue to form and re-form, always informed by 
the haunting presence of early nation-building discourses. And to understand this 
in relation to the UFWA requires a recognition that racism was just one of many 
complicated factors that gave rise to their discourses, but one that, in my version 
of this relationship, is important to follow through as a “condition of possibility 
for future constructions of racism, a condition of possibility (whether or not 
consciously intended as such by those who articulated it) for the systematic 
violation of embodied but de-voiced persons” (William Ramp, personal 
communication, June 27, 2012). 	   Haunting presences are “unseen” (Gordon, 
2008) because they are systematically rendered invisible; in this view, we cannot 
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successfully address racism, and its attendant epistemological concepts, without 
“reckoning” (Rosenberg, Dean, & Granzow, 2010) with the ideas of nation, 
citizen, and culture that are assumed to have a natural existence, as well as with 
the lives and deaths of people who could have been otherwise. This requires a 
critical de- and re-construction of important historical moments, as well as the 
practices of knowledge production that made their existences possible in 
particular ways, that helped to crystallise (however fragile) the meaning of 
modern nationhood. No matter how problematic or involved in the production of 
systematic injustice the discourses of AR may seem from a particular perspective, 
they are in many ways the logical extension of “racist culture” (Goldberg, 1993). 
The ghosts of history must be made visible within these discourses in order that 
they may, one day, be laid to rest with an ongoing attention to the ways in which 
“laying them to rest” are themselves haunted.    
 The idea of haunting requires that we think of the past as a kind of dream, 
the lingering remnants of which act, albeit imperceptibly, in “a violent or 
disturbed manner” (Coddington, 2011, p. 748) upon the present. Few people may 
agree, at first glance, that the friendly, co-operative meetings of the UFWA 
constitute a violent or disturbed historical presence. This analysis, however, is 
concerned with the UFWA as discourses rather than as individual actors. Their 
ideas, themselves haunted by particular histories, have had an insidious presence 
that remains masked in large part due to a particular construction of the identities 
of the women themselves within a discourse of liberal personhood, as well as the 
ongoing celebration of their political achievements toward liberal personhood as 
	   67	  
an end. In the historical (re)construction of early liberal feminism in Canada many 
important events, ideas and perspectives were left out because they are 
inconsistent with a particular representation of progress and human rights – the 
desire to celebrate could not be realised if these ghosts were present. But the 
things that were left out were never truly erased “precisely because their shadows, 
imprints and traces remain and speak out” (Gordon, 1999, p. 97), and have been 
doing so since, and prior to, the patterned solidification of discourses of racialised 
nationhood. I am not concerned to treat the women of the UFWA as sources of 
knowledge that gave rise to a racist culture; rather, I imagine their seemingly 
light-hearted meetings and documents as momentary crystallisations of already 
existing, already circulating, and already problematic discourses that were 
informed and shaped by the various histories of war, colonisation, imperialism, 
slavery, feminism and science (amongst infinite others, a full articulation of 
which would be impossible). The violences they produce and enable is epistemic, 
and is visible in the construction of particular abject subjectivities through which 
the rest of the nation could come into, or maintain, existence. Because of the 
discourses circulating at the time of the UFWA, the future was always already 
populated with certain possibilities derived from the past. We may conceive of 
AR as one such possible constituent of that once-imaginary future, which exists in 
our present, and which “came back” in spectral form to the UFWA, prompting 
and haunting their fears, anxieties and hopes for the future.  
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The melancholia of American Renaissance 
Although there are many ways I could begin this analysis of a particular 
case of haunting, I have chosen to start by situating American Renaissance within 
the field of contemporary politics. Again, Wendy Brown’s description of the state 
of politics now that the narratives of progress, increasing freedoms, rights, quality 
of life, and Western rationality are in the process of “passing away” as ontologies 
helps us to understand the violently reactionary force of AR politics: “That 
intellectuals and politicians are now gazing backward to glimpse better times 
suggests an important destabilization of the presumption of progress” (Brown, 
2001, p. 7). Furthermore, she writes that “when a disintegrating political or 
cultural narrative seems irreplaceable, panicked and reactionary clutching is 
inevitable; when this perceived irreplaceability refers to a narrative or formation 
actually lost, melancholy sets in” (p. 4). Using the idea of melancholy to 
understand AR helps to situate them within an impossibly broad set of competing 
discourses and histories in a way that I find fruitful, as it allows me to keep the 
history of modernity in focus as a point of departure from which I can enter into a 
conversation with a particular past.  
 Racial politics aside momentarily, AR is an example of the kind of politics 
to which Brown is referring in Politics Out of History (2001) because they seem 
to be reacting, though not necessarily cohesively, to the loss of some of the 
fundamental categories around which modern history was organised, and the 
uncertainty and unsatisfactory alternatives that accompany that, in a way that 
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could be described as melancholic. They15 affectively perceive the failings of the 
modern, American promise because they understood themselves as subjects of 
that promise, and that story. Promises of equal rights have left them feeling 
oppressed and marginalised: 
Prof. Ellis’ The Damned and the Dead paints a harrowing picture of a 
nation under a cruel, mentally shackled regime that was at the same 
time fighting for survival against a terrifying enemy. The Soviets got 
the army they asked for …  
What army do we get? Although we do not have commissars 
who make political speeches during combat, we certainly have 
orthodoxies that weaken our forces. Blacks and Hispanics are less 
intelligent than whites or Asians, yet they must be promoted in equal 
numbers. Just as giving commissars influence over military decisions 
hurt the Soviet Army, promoting incompetents hurts our army. Dozens 
of studies have shown that women are physically weaker and more 
susceptible to post-traumatic stress disorder than men, and yet no one 
dares decry the folly of putting women on combat ships (Taylor, 2012a, 
pars. 30-31).  
 
Promises of progress have left them feeling as though history has failed: “Today’s 
‘anti-racists’ share the mental outlook of Soviet commissars, and would probably 
be just as brutal if they had the power” (par. 4); and promises of sovereign 
subjectivity have left them feeling as though they are voiceless and powerless 
actors in a world whose internal logic seems unpredictable and confusing: “Plenty 
of officers know that ‘diversity’ is a weakness on the battlefield but just like the 
Soviet officer corps after the purges, they are paralyzed by fear, and dare not say 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	   I am not suggesting here that I have the authorial capacity to speak to the 
affective responses of AR authors. Instead, I am using this voice as a tactic by 
which I can situate them as engendering the type of melancholy politics Brown 
describes. This is, I believe, in keeping with the idea that social inquiry is a kind 
of fictionalizing process that stems from the researcher’s encounter with the social 
world and often occurs in the moment of writing (Gordon, 2008). Gordon uses the 
notion of fiction to contest the idea that research can ever reflect an enduring, 
non-constructed reality.   
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so … [W]hite men … remain silent while every once-white institution plunges 
deeper into the insanity of ‘diversity.’ Whites are silent because they want to 
survive the purge, but it is silence that permits the purge, and even if they survive, 
their children will not” (par. 25). The article I have quoted here is particularly 
interesting in that it directly defines (what was supposed to be a) progressive 
democracy in opposition to the Communist regimes of the twentieth century, a 
story that Brown identifies as fundamental to stories of Western rationality and 
progress. According to AR, they live in a nation that is little improved from what 
is assumed to be the oppressive, irrational ideology of eastern communism, and 
this is in part due to the irrational pursuit of equality where none naturally exists.  
In light of these confusing and disappointing political times – Jared Taylor 
ended Ideology and Armed Men with a quote from Frank Ellis: “Modern 
liberalism is truly depraved. Even now I am staggered by its boundless capacity 
for hypocrisy and lying” (2012a, par. 6) – AR clings to the better times gone by, 
which invariably include eras of pre-immigration, pre-racial integration, and 
sometimes include eras of pre-Abolition or pre-colonisation, an imagined world in 
which Western European governments had the forethought to avoid altogether 
extensive economic, cultural and governmental contact with non-white people. 
Their reactionary desire to reclaim the ideas of progress, freedom and individual 
sovereignty for themselves, to the exclusion of all racial and national others, is an 
attempt to maintain the integrity of the story of modernity by blaming its failings 
on, in this case, the inherent inferiority of certain races and cultures to live up to 
the responsibilities of modern citizenship. The “strenuous legal and political 
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efforts to distinguish, for example, ‘true Americans’ … from alien others can only 
be read as a symptom of th[e] disintegration of sovereignty, this erosion of inside-
outside boundaries around a state or people presumed unified, cohesive and 
sovereign” (Brown, 2001, p. 10). AR’s efforts to reclaim and refortify the 
boundaries of the inside-outside binary represent a fear that the modern promise 
may be lost – “university literature departments would run out of things to do if 
they stopped writing papers about ‘race, class, and gender’ in books written 
before the current reign of terror” (Taylor, 2012c, par. 17) – but also a 
hopefulness that it can be revivified.  
 Despite the problems that AR recognises in the way the story of modernity 
played out, they are unable to let go of the ideas that are fundamental to it. 
Headlines read: “The Decline of the West: A century of genetic deterioration” 
(December 29, 2011), “Who are the Haters? The American Way of Crushing Free 
Speech” (December 29, 2011), “Race and Literature: Why is it always Liberal?” 
(January 30, 2012), “Clamping Down on Free Speech on Campus: Creative ways 
to muzzle students” (February 3, 2012), “The Islamic Threat: Filip Dewinter on 
Europe’s fight for survival” (February 28, 2012) and “A Radical Left Plan for 
Racial Survival: An alternative racial politics?” (March 30, 2012): 
Yes, Western Man may have once been King of the World, but today 
he is being erased from the pages of human history. He is the subject 
of a Great Erasure—the erasure of whites and whiteness worldwide … 
his homelands are being colonized by settlers from the Third World, 
who do not look like him and do not like him …  
It is he [Western man] who embraced the values of the French 
Revolution (the psychopathology of the terrorist Left), he who became 
a true believer in the proposition nation, he who opened his borders to 
the rest of the world, he who passed the laws that dispossess him. 
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Western Man sponsored his own decline (Kurtagic, 2012, pars. 5-6 & 
8). 
 
Calls for “survival” through a return to constitutional rights, appeals to American 
identitarian politics, and finger pointing at the dysgenic immigrants that have 
rained on the parade of progress represent a clear attachment to modern values 
and inventions, despite the authors’ beliefs that these values failed. They are 
haunted by the hopes for Western progress that were once promulgated in 
discourses such as those produced by, and producing, the UFWA; they cannot let 
go of their nostalgia for the past, even though the story is fragmented and, as 
Brown might argue, actually lost to them forever.  
 I theorise the politics of AR as melancholic because, as with much 
contemporary politics and political critique, they are reacting to the cracks in the 
foundation of modern politics by attaching themselves firmly to one way of 
remembering what used to be. Brown describes Benjamin’s notion of melancholia 
as an “attachment to the object of one’s sorrowful loss [that] supersedes the desire 
to recover from this loss, to live free of it in the present, to be unburdened by it” 
(2001, p. 169). AR cannot let go of the past because for all of their 
disappointment and impotent anger at the course of Western history, understood 
to be monolithic, they cannot reconcile themselves to leaving behind the concepts 
that were most foundational to the modern project (and by extension the basis for 
the constitution of their own subjectivities). To leave behind the notions of 
sovereign personhood and nationhood, progress and freedom would be to come 
fully to terms with the past through recognition of the contingency of subjectivity, 
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but because of the addition of racial politics to these ideas which remain central to 
almost all current political possibilities, to come to terms with the past would be 
to lose that aspect of identity, that inside-outside distinction, that they most dearly 
long to hold on to. Melancholy involves a “mournful, conservative, backward-
looking attachment to feelings, analyses, or relations that have become fetishized 
and frozen in the heart of the critic” (Brown, 2001, p. 170). Thus, the desire of 
AR to uphold the naturalised meanings of race, nation and citizenship in 
particular ways, despite the fact that they identify problems with these notions and 
despite foundational critique being lodged from many different sides, stems from 
an inability to let go of a certain haunting modern sensibility: 
It is … true that Western Man faces competition: his homelands are 
being colonised by settlers from the Third World, who do not look 
like him and do not like him. They come looking for his money, they 
breed competitively, they think and act as a group, and they are 
aggressive and ruthless… 
And when we look around and see what they [members of the 
Liberal Left] have done, and we analyze the implications of their 
actions, the magnitude of their crime is so staggering as to defy 
comprehension. You would think that individuals of such mind-
blowing immorality would have been thrown into a lake full of 
piranhas long ago. But that is not what we see (Kurtagic, 2012, pars. 6 
& 16).  
 
The writers of AR see in the present a kind of disastrous rendering of the ideology 
that was not supposed to fail them, but they continue to evoke the concepts and 
logic that gave rise to this perceived disaster in the first place. 
 The focus on race that accompanies AR’s fundamentally modern politics 
is, as discussed in Chapter 1, not an anomaly but one possible political position 
that makes sense according to an internal logic that relies in part upon systems of 
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racism. However, I argue that AR is haunted not only by a history of racialised 
concepts of progress, freedom and sovereignty, but also by a history of such 
persuasive promise. The immense hopefulness of nation-building in the early 
twentieth century is not an easy desire to let go; the story was not supposed to 
disappoint, the realities of race and nation were not supposed to be thrown into 
question, and the politics of national citizenship, which govern every aspect of our 
lives despite their problematic nature, were supposed to provide a basis for 
identity that would enable progress to continue. AR identifies “social issues” that 
echo, as we will see, some of the great fears of the UFWA. Thus, to begin to 
construct the image of history that (perhaps temporarily) links the UFWA to AR, I 
am going to begin by reversing the notion of history as origin. 
 
The spectre that looms  
Jared Taylor, in response to comments on his article A Radical Left Plan 
for Racial Survival (2012d), wrote: “No self-consciously white nation that 
manages to emerge from the wreckage of the present will make the mistake of 
empire-building or ethnomasochistic exhibitionism. Nor will it permit mass 
immigration.” What will happen in the future? What has happened in the past? 
And how do past and future bear upon the wreckage of the present? These 
questions that conjure an affectual response to, and demand an engagement with, 
the future, and by extension the past, of the “White nation” are important because 
they call our attention to history; we, as subjects of modernity, are not supposed to 
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be fearful of the future. What happened along the way that transformed the telos 
of modernity from something utopian to something frightening? 
At a recent white nationalist conference in Paris (attended by key-note 
speaker and founder of AR, Jared Taylor), Fabrice Robert, founder of France’s 
Bloc Identitaire party, is quoted as likening attempts at establishing equality 
through immigration, social welfare programs and multicultural politics to the 
production of systems of white slavery: “Against this new age of slavery that has 
laid waste to the world for 30 years, against this crime against humanity that is the 
denial of identity, against this mentality that would transform humanity into a 
uniform mush, we call for a return to reason, a return to who we are” (Taylor, 
2012b). Because we are familiar with stories of Western progress and versions of 
history that describe an ever-increasing apprehension of a “better” way to live, 
stories that seek fault with the modern project and advocate a return to a better 
time do not align themselves with this history. These are literally politics out of 
history, to quote the title of Wendy Brown’s book, as the adherence to a concept 
of modernity that no longer exists (if it ever did) in the present gives rise to a 
sense of being out of place or time. There is a break away from the metanarrative 
of modernity occurring within AR that simultaneously evokes and relies upon 
those very modern values and concepts. Recognising this break allows one to 
begin interrogating the gap between one story and another, which in this case is 
one version of history as progress and another of history as failure: 
[C]onservatism is as much our enemy as liberalism, if not a worse 
one. Conservatism defends the previous revolution, which makes 
conservatives irrelevant, thus providing a rationale for liberalism. We 
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could even say that conservatives are liberalism’s best ally, because 
they offer respite before the next wave of liberalization. 
Ultimately, conservatism and liberalism are both about death: 
while a conservative complains that things are dying out, a liberal 
complains that they are not dying out soon enough. One is a 
necrophile, the other a murderer. 
By contrast, tradition is about life. It is about an idea that has 
roots in the distant past, but which is constantly renewing and 
regenerating itself. And that’s very different from conservatism… 
Thus remaking Western Man also involves a Great Erasure—
one where we are the erasers, where we erase the negativity among us 
as well as the negation of us. 
The remaking of Western Man is not a defensive response; it is an 
offensive action. It is not a pathetic struggle for survival, but a heroic 
struggle for glory. And it’s not about embalming the man who was, 
but about creating the man to come… I say let Western Man die so he 
may be reborn, twice as strong and masterful as before (Kurtagic, 
2012, pars. 64-66 & 86). 
 
A promise failed, a Man lost, a path not taken. The language of the above 
quote seems to represent a desire to shed those things mourned, but is the path 
that AR readers are called to embark upon now really so different from the path of 
their perceived loss? Is it a sense of the immensity of that loss that propels this 
language of glory, creation and heroism? Western Man sponsored his own 
decline, so why renew him? This piece of text appears to be focused on moving 
forward rather than dwelling in the melancholic despair of an encounter with loss; 
but if not for the experience of that loss, and if that experience was not haunting, 
motivating this AR author, the desire to craft “anew” the ideal Western Man 
would not be stated in terms that acknowledge it as a loss in the first place. AR is 
engaged in a conflict between a desire on the one hand to conjure and to celebrate 
a history lost, and on the other a desire to denounce “Western Man’s” failures and 
imagine new ways to obtain the old goals. 
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If we imagine AR – and the politics they engender – as the future from a 
perspective of the past, we can imagine that it represents in some ways the future 
that the UFWA, if we can speak of them as a singular entity, imagined and 
perhaps feared. The writers and readers of AR are concerned about improving the 
(White race and the) nation, as if these ideas have not always already been 
engrained in “Western” history (Goldberg, 1993; hooks, 1992). The absence of 
any acknowledgement that these ideas have had an ongoing, foundational 
existence throughout Western history raises questions. Why is this part of history 
rendered invisible in AR narratives? Why is the modern story that we are 
comfortable with being called into question? How does this (sometimes) 
unfamiliar version of history allow us to interrogate other possible histories and 
pasts? What stories and subjects are missing from AR’s story? This is the point at 
which we can actually begin to conjure alternative versions of the past by looking 
into a story that AR left out of its narration of history, but which nonetheless 
haunts it. What happened in the early settlement days of Canada that certain 
subjectivities, events, knowledges and ideas became possible while others were to 
be lost? Can attention to lost possibilities – in this case the ghosts of those 
subjects who were, and continue to be, disappeared from the category of good 
citizen on account of the solidified fissures between what were once only 
imaginary concepts of race – help us to imagine a future where those losses are 
reckoned with, where the exclusionary practices that systems of nationalism, 
racism and capitalism rely on no longer have meaning and ghosts disappear in the 
wake of new imaginary forces?  
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By turning to the UFWA, whose trace remains (for me) most directly in 
the texts they left behind but also in the annual and ongoing celebrations of 
Canadian women’s history and in legal records, we can bring into the present 
words and ideas that have mostly been contained within archives16, largely 
inaccessible to those marginalised subjects who may most benefit from their re-
emergence and critical interrogation. The history of modernity has rendered 
absent the more unpalatable, or even violent, aspects of this history in favour of a 
tale of progress and enlightenment*. How interesting, then, is the mourning of 
modernity’s failures by AR and its contributors; when and where ghosts from the 
past do make an obvious appearance, AR is there to lament the tragedy of 
modernity in order to keep those ghosts silent in their disappeared state.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  However, it is only through text that I have encountered the women of the 
UFWA; no amount of attentiveness on my part will conjure for me their specific 
names, faces, voices, who their loved ones were or what they did and thought in 
their daily lives. In fact, in this case my attention to these texts has been bound up 
in the temptation to (mis)appropriate their lives, their unheard voices, for my own 
purposes. And while I speak “for” and of them in this text, they were and are far 
more than an abstract concept of “early Canadian imperialism and racism.”  *	  But there are memories that are neither publicly celebrated nor violent: “My first 
formative instance of anti-racist pedagogy, along with my initial guidance in the 
art of being suspicious of rhetorics of power, glorification, superiority, 
triumphalism, sectarianism, came to me through my mother, who learned them 
from the side of her family populated by United Farmers and United Farm 
Women, and persisted in holding to them despite a lack of encouragement to do 
so from another side of her family. My great-aunt was president of the United 
Farm Women of Ontario and provincial leader of the United Farm Young People 
of Ontario. My great-uncle ran for the United Farmers in two elections, led the 
anti-conscription March on Ottawa in 1916, and was president of the United 
Farmers' Co-operative Company. A friend of mine who died about 5 years ago at 
94 was a United Farm Young People activist who later collaborated with Graham 
Spry in the initial formation of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. But more 
important than all these identifiers is this: the voices of the UF women and men I 
once knew are voices I ‘miss’ in the sense that I don't find them in much that is 
written about the UF, and not in your thesis -- and also, they are voices I ‘miss’ in 
the sense of an attachment to actual persons now severed by loss.”	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 Pursuing this story of haunting requires that I delve into some of the 
important texts of the UFWA as a(n arbitrary) starting point, particularly given 
that I have no other, more personal, way in which to begin. I did not know them, 
and UFWA history has not, until now, figured into my personal narrative (and 
even now it does so in both unsettling and self-serving ways). Because of this I 
have chosen to focus on one annual publication from the year 1925 that attempts 
to summarise the year’s work of the UFWA into distinct categories such as 
Education, Immigration, or Health and Hygiene. These reports from the annual 
UFA/UFWA conventions contain, in their own words, the ideas and practices that 
the members themselves most valued, and from this text various insights can be 
constructed to serve particular ends. We can imagine that these women were 
engaged in a variety of practices and had varying, and likely contradictory 
thoughts on these topics that were, nonetheless, translated into text each January. 
Whether or not these convention reports actually represent the thoughts, feelings 
and actions of the organisation’s members is not an issue that I explore further – 
for the purposes of this study,17 what matters is that, when the various writers 
were pressed to solidify thought into text, certain patterns emerged along with the 
authority and self-validation that long, professional-looking documents seem to 
possess*. At some point in the early 1920s, the convention reports of the UFWA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  This demarcation of what matters for this particular text is itself haunted. Have 
I banished the ghosts of UFWA members because they unsettle my position? If I 
acknowledge them, does that attendant uncertainty undermine my attention to 
other ghosts? *	  “Unlike your encounter with the United Farm Women, mine was personal in a 
way that invokes in me both a sense of loss (now) and loyalty.  That loyalty could 
easily go the way of nostalgic defensiveness, but instead, I've chosen, with more 
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condensed into a set of discrete topics, and this format appears more or less the 
same in each year of the 1920s and into the 1930s. In the year 1925, the topics 
were, in order: young people’s work, education, marketing, laws concerning 
women and children, immigration, health and child welfare, diet in health, the 
library and the community, and educating our children.  
 These convention reports are particularly interesting because they open up 
many possibilities for interpretation; in my reading, the UFWA authors combine 
at the same time quaint utopian ideals, fuelled by an engaged hopefulness, with 
classifications and demarcations that, while they may have seemed natural or 
benign to the authors, are an emotionally detached exercise in power – 
emotionally detached because of an unawareness of the possibilities such 
statements open up. The reports allow us to glimpse critical moments in time, 
where the what could have been grapples with what already was. But the ideas of 
the UFWA were not necessarily coherent, depending upon how you view them. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
or less success, to engage with the UFW legacy -- which is also my legacy -- both 
critically and appreciatively.	   I've chosen to do that because of a double moral 
sense: on the one hand, a moral imperative to be loyal to people who formed me -
- as actual people rather than ‘things to think with’.  But the other moral 
imperative I try to follow is to be loyal to them truthfully; that is, not to 
appropriate them to a process of defensive self-construction, but to be attentive to 
who they were and what they stood for 360-degrees ... in the round, good and 
bad. So, for example, recognizing that my mother's anti-racism was lodged in a 
context of whiteness which (I can now see) limited it, though without entirely 
negating it. This is not a process of turning my mother and the other UF people I 
know into theoretical abstractions, but the opposite -- adding to my memory (and 
memorialization ...) something that, even after their deaths, liberates them from 
the clutches of my memorialization to be more dimensionally the human beings 
that, as a child, I knew and did not know. Human beings who were intimate and 
nurturing and loved -- and also flawed and contradictory and (increasingly) 
remote in time and ideology. I learn(ed) to allow them their remoteness to and 
allow myself to become remote from them, as a way of being critical but also of 
honouring their once-actual personhood.” 	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These women were busy imagining a future of equality, cooperation and trust that 
was, in many ways, an exercise (perhaps even a radical one) in thinking outside of 
certain modern (liberalist) limits – not against the modern, but in the name of a 
different modernity. They provide, therefore, a particularly poignant window into 
a conflict between past and future, and their politics are in some ways ironic, 
because the effects that imagining such a utopia has had on the ways in which 
subjects are formed (and inhabited and experienced) have been grave. The system 
of racial classification that the UFWA gave (one) voice to, predicated and 
imbricated as it was upon and with capitalism and imperialism, contributed in part 
to a history of racialised hatred, enacted through the classification and privilege of 
citizenship, that is still actively reproduced today* (in part by the work of AR to 
reclaim and reinvigorate it). These histories, which include a wide range of 
eugenics programs (Kevles, 1995), the enactment of the Jim Crow laws, and the 
systematically violent assimilation and simultaneous isolation of First Nations 
individuals into/out of  “Canadian” society, have been actively described in the 
present as matters of the past. This type of description is an attempt to maintain 
the familiar story of modernity and the rational, democratic West, as well as to 
contain the fissures in the story that systematised hatred have created. In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* However, UFWA politics were more complicated than this: “Before 1945, the 
key organization in Canada which supported the British imperialist project and 
the notion of a white Protestant Canada, was the Orange Order -- now almost 
forgotten, but once enormously politically powerful: they propped up the 
MacDonald government, and fed the violent put-down of the Riel provisional 
government in Manitoba. Before 1945, membership in or alliance with the 
Orange Order was essential to becoming mayor of Toronto, and many other cities 
in Ontario. The United Farm Women were sworn enemies of the patriotic 
jingoism of the Orange Order, and of its militant anti-Catholicism. They also 
resisted the growth of the Ku Klux Klan in parts of Saskatchewan.” 
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present, ideas such as those presented in American Renaissance make the 
profundity of racism and hatred known in ways that are deeply disturbing, 
particularly to those subjects most affected by it. American Renaissance makes us 
uncomfortable (or, perhaps, at times comfortable) precisely because it calls on us 
to regard those aspects of the past that have been discounted with “we know better 
now” rhetoric as moments where certain possibilities were lost to us. They call 
these stories into the present in ways that simultaneously mourn and celebrate.  
 Thus, AR can be understood as a ghost, a social figure that reflects the 
past to us in a way that allows us to probe the question of missing histories, as 
well as a spectre from the future that came to bear upon the present of the UFWA. 
“The ghost is just the sign, or the empirical evidence if you like, that tells you a 
haunting is taking place” (Gordon, 2008, p. 8). What is haunting us all is a series 
of events, people, ideas and feelings that are too numerous and too diffuse to be 
fully apprehended; put simply and in a way that we can begin to “make sense” of, 
we are haunted by those moments in time during which certain paths were taken 
to the exclusion of, or to the opening up of possibility for, others. In all of their 
attempts to repress those missing stories and subjects that are missing even though 
we never had them (ibid.), AR provides a window through which we may glimpse 
one possible beginning of a story, or image of history, that simultaneously closed 
off particular paths while making other paths possible. The particular possibilities 
that came into being were formed in part because of the looming presence of the 
future; the women of the UFWA may have asked themselves, what do we owe the 
future? What importance will these moments of early Canadian history have for 
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future citizens? In asking these questions, and in actively working toward creating 
future subjects through such things as education and the constitution of a United 
Farm Young People branch, the UFWA were both “a practical vehicle for the 
possible transmission of ghosts as well as partakers in broader discursive politics” 
(William Ramp, personal communication, June 27, 2012). The motivation to both 
ask and attempt to answer these questions would have taken into account a variety 
of future possibilities, one of which would surely have been noted to include the 
possibility of dysgenic populations, loss of freedoms and rights, a diffuse and 
diverse national identity held together by little more than convention, fear, crime, 
economic stagnation, and extreme poverty. AR was the spectre from the future 
that heralded these dangerous possibilities in terms that would have made sense to 
the UFWA, and AR authors are no strangers to the idea of future spectres 
themselves:  
Naturally, we cannot step into a time machine, travel to the twenty-
second century, beam back a picture and proclaim, ‘This is what our 
world looks like!’ (We are not there yet.) But we can evoke what our 
world could look like, and what kind of people will be running it, 
through the way we imagine it (Kurtagic, 2012, par. 72).  
 
A United Farm Women of Alberta ghost story  
On International Women’s Day 2012, the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation ran a program to commemorate the history of women’s rights in 
Canada (Rewind, March 8, 2012). This history invariably involves reference to the 
“Famous Five”: Irene Parlby, Henrietta Edwards, Emily Murphy, Louise 
McKinney and Nellie McClung. Irene Parlby was the first president of the United 
Farm Women of Alberta, a group whose politics were closely associated with the 
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other four women. This is the part of UFWA history that is continually told and 
retold because the Famous Five are known for their involvement in the 1929 
Persons Case, that moment in history when women became legal persons under 
Canadian law. Parlby and the other women of the UFWA knew that women were 
just as capable as men of being upright, moral citizens. And who better than the 
UFWA to speak to this issue? They were, after all, engaged tirelessly in the 
pursuit of good citizenship for a nation so new in its constitution, and with such a 
seemingly hopeful future. 
 
It is January 1925, and Mrs. Clarke Fraser is presenting to the annual 
UFWA convention, of which you are a member, a report on the involvement of 
young people in the UFA and UFWA. This is the first report on the first day of the 
convention; it likely took you hours to arrive here by sleigh in the biting wind and 
cold of the Alberta prairies*. You listen attentively, as it is the first report of the 
convention and it concerns a topic that interests you: the work of young UFA 
members in establishing their own branches – the future of the organisation. Mrs. 
Fraser’s report includes a list of objectives for the establishment of youth UFA 
branches, the first one being “to train for citizenship” (Fraser, 1925, p. 3). 
“Citizenship is something real,” she says, “not something of which they [youth] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* “Sometimes, even ghosts can die ... in your story here, something has ceased to 
haunt.  Unless they lived in rural areas very close to Edmonton, most delegates 
would have come not by sleigh, but by train. But today, the dense web of rail 
lines, the hundreds of small rural stations, elevators and flag stops, the love-hate 
relations that rural people had with the railways, many of the villages where the 
stations were located ... and the farms these women came from ... have 
disappeared both from the physical landscape and even from memory.” 
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have read or heard … It is not a theory to them … [T]hese young people in 
working for better conditions in their schools and communities will form the habit 
of co-operation, and working for the public good at all times will be the natural 
outcome” (ibid.). This statement does not tell you directly what citizenship means 
according to Mrs. Fraser, but you feel as if you already know the importance of 
being a mindful and proper citizen. Her description does tell you that the idea of 
cooperation for the public good is central, and this is a point you certainly agree 
with. This theme of cooperation comes up frequently at the local meetings, and in 
your daily life on a farm that could not survive without help from neighbours, and 
is a feature of your specifically agrarian politics. It is not surprising then, that 
cooperation is used to describe the kind of citizenship that young people, who are 
the future of the nation, should strive towards. In fact, you know that cooperation 
for the public good is a “natural outcome” of work towards “better conditions,” 
work which the UFA and UFWA locals are always engaged in. Mrs. Fraser 
elaborates upon her statements: “[T]he young people of the community may come 
to know each other better, to enrich the social life of the community and to make 
life happier and better, so that the young people may serve their homes, their 
communities and their nation more efficiently” (p. 4). This remark conjures in 
your imagination the necessary opposite – without cooperation amongst citizens, 
and especially amongst farmers, your life as a farmwoman would grow isolated, 
bleak, and heavy with the weight of insurmountable work, likely poverty, and 
hopelessness. Your involvement with the UFWA has made you cognizant of the 
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great possibilities for this young country, if only the responsibility of citizenship is 
appropriately taken up.  
 
This description of citizenship that Mrs. Fraser offers, including such 
vague things as efficiency, work toward “better conditions” and cooperation, does 
not explicitly tell a reader (particularly one in another century, or one who has 
travelled back a century) what is meant by the idea of good citizenship that the 
UFWA regularly invoke. Irene Parlby herself is quoted at the end of Mrs. Fraser’s 
report in reference to her idea of citizenship: “[I]f we are to rebuild our social 
structure so that it shall come nearer to the high ideals of a Christian democracy, 
the bricks with which we build must be the minds and spirits of the young of the 
nation. We have to develop in them a higher sense of the moral obligations of 
citizenship. We have to show them that true patriotism does not consist alone of 
dying like a hero but also in the much more difficult task of living nobly, of 
facing moral issues like a hero” (quoted in Fraser, 1925, p. 7). This gives a 
slightly clearer version of ideal citizenship; citizens are Christian, support some 
concept of democracy, and face moral decision making like “heroes”. 
Furthermore, she clearly defines citizenship as a process in ongoing relationship 
with the future; a citizen, we may assume, asks him or herself what kind of future 
is desirable and works toward attaining it. But we may still be left to wonder what 
exactly is meant by some of these undefined terms as we encounter them from our 
own interpretive subject-position, knowing that their meanings may have been 
obvious to the UFWA delegates. Can anyone be “trained” for citizenship if these 
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are the criteria? We know that the farmwomen themselves considered women in 
general to be capable of upholding the values of citizenship, but could any 
woman? The answer to that comes from a more (in)direct look at what the UFWA 
convention report authors have to say about a variety of social issues that were 
important to Albertans during the 1920s.  
 However, before looking further into some of these other social issues, it 
is worth noting that the brief statements about citizenship above already produce 
and reproduce particular classificatory demarcations that carry significant moral 
weight. As discussed in Chapter 1, settler women of primarily British origin were 
already operating within particular discursive frameworks of imperialism, 
democracy, nationalism and rational modernity. Thus, as mundane as it may 
seem, the very category of citizen and the importance attached to it indicates that 
where there are citizens, non-citizens may also be found. In order to demarcate 
the proper citizen, one must also be able to identify the individual who is 
improperly, or incapably, attempting, or not attempting, to become a citizen. 
Within a relatively new nation that is part of the British dominion, taking up the 
role of citizen in an attempt to contribute to the building of that nation is afforded 
a certain amount of privilege. The fundamental importance of this category 
already constitutes a point, though we cannot definitively locate it, of departure 
from a host of potentials and possibilities toward a path of building a culture, a 
nation, and a body of national identities upon a discursive foundation that always 
already relies upon the concepts of geopolitical borders, cultural and national 
essentialism, and the privilege of citizenship in order to make sense.  
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 So who is the citizen, according to the UFWA, and what sorts of 
privileges are they afforded? The women of the UFWA should know, for they 
interested themselves greatly in the 1929 Person Case and have had an ongoing 
relationship with the various discourses of citizenship that may, I speculate, have 
figured into the case itself. What kind of future were they hoping to conjure, ripe 
as it was with innumerable possibilities, some frightening and some utopian? 
Is there in Canada today, a more interesting national problem than this 
one of Immigration, and is there one of which the two opposing 
positions are more pronounced – one deeming it a mistake to induce 
settlers to come to Canada under present conditions, the other thinking 
an aggressive Immigration policy a necessity (Price, 1925, p. 19). 
 
Mrs. Price succinctly defines the topic of immigration as a “national problem”, 
clearly weighing various potential futures in her statement. Is she weighing these 
possibilities while the spectre of racial and anti-immigration politics looms? She 
continues: 
The foundation stock of the Canadian people is French and British. It 
is eminently desirable that that foundation stock be maintained. France 
has no surplus population. Great Britain has a surplus population and 
is anxious to settle them in the dominion overseas … Then let us 
begin in Britain and as we gain experience extend to other countries. 
Americans make splendid settlers, also many of the European peoples 
(Price 1925, p. 26).  
 
The connection to the future here is clearer; Mrs. Price already knows that 
immigrants of a non-White, non-European race do not make “splendid settlers.” 
In addressing the issue of immigration she is perhaps imagining a future where 
diverse “races” live together, and has an idea of the attendant “problems” this 
would create. You, the anonymous audience member, might wonder, what kinds 
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of problems would immigration of undesirable types give rise to? Mrs. J. W. 
Field, along with Irene Parlby, may help you understand:  
Conspicuous in the content of most reports received [this year] are 
accounts of the discussion of the mental defective problem” (Field, 
1925, p. 27) … “[T]here was a [mentally defective] boy of 19 working 
on a dairy farm, who was led on, by the continual suggestions of the 
farm manager, to do for the owner of the farm, of who he was jealous 
on account of some attentions paid to his wife. The boy at the 
instigation of this man attacked and did the owner to death, in the 
most hideously brutal manner (Parlby, 1924, p. 6). 
 
This frightening story is echoed in the future, though in different, explicitly 
racialised terms, in AR’s paraphrasing of a newspaper report on the attack of 
Dennis Watts, a 78 year old white man who was attacked by a “gang” of black 
youths: “…one of the boys delivered a single blow to the back of [Watts’] head 
during the incident Saturday, knocking the victim to the ground … One boy, he 
said, put his foot on the back of the victim’s neck, while another shout[ed] ‘kill 
him’” (Smith, 2012). Stories such as these make frightening possibilities of the 
future seem extremely personal, and somehow more possible. They conjure 
affective responses that allow listeners to figure particular concerns, as well as 
actions aimed at avoiding or eliminating those concerns, prominently in our 
identities as subjects who do not wish to associate with mental defectives or 
inherently violent races (and may even support legislation that proposes to 
confine the bodies and manage the reproduction of such people*). In the process 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	   “United Farm Women, [however], opposed the religious fundamentalism and 
right-wing paranoia of the Aberhart Social Credit government (which defeated 
the UFA in 1936), and it was United Farm Women who identified proto-fascist 
tendencies in Aberhart's Social Credit. The UFWA did actively advocate for the 
1928 Sexual Sterilization Act in Alberta. But I feel compelled to note that this Act 
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of defining what we are not, we are called into subjectivity as citizens who exist 
within an epistemological framework where ideas such as democracy, nation, and 
sovereign subjectivity are taken for granted as natural truths.  
 To return, then, to the question I posed to the UFWA above, just who can 
take up the privilege of citizenship? Subjects who are called to citizenship in the 
discourses of the UFWA have particular characteristics and hold particular values: 
they are loyal to the nation and contribute economically; they cooperate and put 
the interests of the nation and of the local community ahead of their individual 
interests*; they are, specifically, of good “stock”, which usually means white and 
of Western European descent; they are intelligent; and they are neither threatening 
nor dangerous. Defining citizens in these terms necessarily defines the non-
citizen, who is dangerous, frightening, lazy, black or otherwise racialised, 
mentally and genetically defective. The non-citizen, in other words, does not 
advance the agenda of progress in the pursuit of an increasingly “better” nation, 
with an increasingly better population. However, the UFWA seem to suggest that 
citizenship is a matter of training and education that should theoretically be 
available to anyone; on the topic of education for “all” youth, Irene Parlby stated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was replaced by a more draconian one by the later Aberhart Social Credit 
government, and that it was the medical and social-service practices to which 
these acts gave cover, once they came into force, that activated the connection 
between racism and eugenics.”	  *	  “The political legacy of the UFW crops up in the Co-Operative Commonwealth 
Federation (later the New Democratic Party) which many of its members joined, 
and in the later population of the Canadian left, including the anti-imperialist left, 
by ex-members of the United Farm Young People -- which the UFW effectively 
ran. [It is also present] in various internationalist movements (which started as 
pacifist movements and became over time a seedbed of anti-imperialism): 
throughout its existence, the UFW was explicitly internationalist.”	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at the 1925 convention that “the boy or girl who can find joy in the sunset, 
revelation in the dawn, whose heart holds the key to nature’s music, whose 
friends are in the books of all ages, and whose soul is in time with the Infinite, 
will find no temptation in beer parlours or gambling dens or other snares of the 
world, the flesh and the devil” (p. 42). Developing a soul that is in time with the 
Infinite is merely a matter of good education, and a belief that education occurs in 
all spheres and at all ages of life. Parlby asks: “Are the modern boys and girls 
who are passing out from our schools all over the western world anything 
approaching the description of human beings fully developed mentally, 
physically, morally, and spiritually?” (p. 43). This is an idealistic question, one 
that is pregnant with hopes and desires, but also one whose purpose is to draw 
attention to the ways in which human beings, or citizens, are falling short in 
developing to the highest imagined degree. We know from their commentary 
elsewhere that in fact, certain people are not capable, or not worthy, of being 
offered training for such a high responsibility as citizenship, which is defined 
most often in terms of what it is not.  
 Parlby’s question calls our attention now, as it surely did the other 
members of the UFWA in 1925, to the imaginative links between past, present 
and future. Interestingly, in the year 1925 the UFWA invited Jessie Montgomery, 
a librarian from the University of Alberta, to speak to them about the importance 
of literature in developing properly cultured citizens. Montgomery chose to 
address the convention with a story by Lord Dunsany; the story is about the Inner 
Lands, the patrons of which are continually hiking over the surrounding 
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mountains only to disappear forever. Athelvok traverses the mountains one day 
and finds the reason why none have returned: “Athelvok, looking on the 
wonderful Sea, knew why it was that the dead never return, for there is something 
that the dead feel and know, and the living would never understand even though 
the dead should come and speak to them about it” (Montgomery, 1925, p. 36). 
The dead (and the imaginary) do know and feel something important that has 
been lost, and the dead do return and speak to the living; it need not be 
acknowledged in order to have an effect. In their concern for the future of the 
nation the women of the UFWA were always already in conversation with the 
past, for the past bears upon the present and “populates” the future with certain 
possibilities. But not only were they in conversation with the past, they were also 
in conversation with future spectres that served as warnings of the paths they 
might begin to pave, or the consequences of failing to take such paths. Their 
existence in the present was always bound up in these complicated relationships 
between past, present and future, and AR, in the contemporary moment, is 
engaged in similar conversations. It is almost possible to hear the voice of AR in 
1925, warning of the possible consequences of the presence of those anonymous, 
undesirable subjects:  
They started out on the margins—a freak show of defectives, 
alcoholics, thugs, and psychopaths, led by tainted geniuses with 
pyrotechnic oratory. First they terrorized, then they marched through 
our institutions, and, for lack of an effective opposition, they made 
themselves masters of our society, able to wrap themselves in the 
cloak of institutional legitimacy. And since people admire and are 
attracted to power, the ideas of the terrorist Left look important to 
many simply because they come from above (Kurtagic, 2012). 
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A conversation with the future 
Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high; 
Where knowledge is free; 
Where the world has not been broken up into fragments by narrow domestic 
walls; 
Where words come out from the depths of truth; 
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection; 
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way into the dreary desert sand of 
dead habit; 
Where the mind is led forward … into ever-widening thought and action – 
Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let my country awake  
 
-Rabindranath Tagore18, Where the Mind is Without Fear, 
 
Brown, paraphrasing Derrida, asks, “are ghosts and spirits what inevitably 
arise at the end or death of something – an era, desire, attachment, belief, figure or 
narrative?” (2001, p. 145). The poem above, quoted by Jessie Montgomery in 
address to the 1925 UFWA convention (p. 40), describes the promise and the 
hope of modernity, and during the time of the UFWA it was likely inspiring, 
though the way in which it was taken up was haunted by the spectre of those 
other, sinister possibilities. Now, the poem above may remind AR of the crushing 
disappointment of that promise. But despite this disappointment, there still 
remains that hopefulness that AR cannot seem to let go, though they may not be 
inclined to explain their longing in those terms. This hopefulness is evident in the 
very fact that AR exists and has a political agenda for reclaiming the future. They 
may be able to recognise that the hopes of the UFWA were not realised, but what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  It is interesting to draw attention to the fact that while I have used this poem as 
an illustration of the UFWA’s belief in the promise of modernity and progress, its 
author was both non-white and opposed to British imperialism in India. This fact 
was, no doubt, known by at least some of the UFWA members present at Jessie 
Montgomery’s presentation. 
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they may not recognise is that those hopes could not be realised because their 
epistemological and ontological foundations never held the telos they thought it 
did; the disappointment was due not to the interference of Liberal ideology and 
non-white individuals, but to failures inherent in the logics of modern nationalism 
and imperialism. If we never conjure up the ghosts of such early moments when 
the concepts of nationalism and race became so thoroughly embedded into the 
history of North American development and politics, then we can never reckon 
satisfactorily with the “untenable predicates” (Brown, 2001) of such a modern 
project.  
 Thus, AR remains haunted by this history that they cannot name in order 
to critique, or to realise that what they thought was possible never was. They 
cling, in their melancholic state, to that missing thing that they feel has been lost, 
but which remains unidentifiable and out of reach. If progress failed somewhere 
along the way, if something else other than “what is” should have existed, then 
what is it? Their memories cannot conjure an answer to this, but history may 
provide it. Without fully acknowledging that history and its particular 
contingencies, however, they are condemned to mourn the dead who haunt them, 
and to attempt to imagine a future despite the narrow limitations that remain in 
their refusal to give up a story they feel is rightfully theirs. They have traced a 
modern history, using the logic they believed it inherently possessed, to particular 
points where it all went wrong; if history is monolithic, and progress, freedom, 
and autonomous citizenship exist ontologically, then sources must exist that can 
be located. Continuing this logic of modernity, they call upon empirical evidence 
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from the present to convince themselves that they have indeed discovered the 
Truth; progress ceased to occur where non-white people intervened. Now that the 
source has been identified, steps can be taken to set the course of progress right 
again. 
 This kind of conversation with the past, however, only allows a particular 
type of imagination for the future and for the past. So long as we continue to rely 
upon the logic, laws, language and linear histories of modernity, we cannot 
imagine a future that does not interminably reproduce the same haunted 
experiences. AR continues to misplace the unacknowledged object(s) of their 
criticism – the ideas and discourses that gave rise to a particular metanarrative of 
modernity – in order to replace them with fears and stories of racial inequality. 
For instance, in a recent article entitled The Battle over Photo IDs for Voters 
(Kay, 2012), the opening line reads: “The right to vote has always been central to 
the black civil-rights movement.” Conspicuously absent from this statement is 
mention of the concept of civil rights as foundational to liberal individualism, 
western democracies and nation-states, the existence of which is necessary to 
AR’s politics. Instead, the idea of  “the right to vote” is attached to a particular 
social movement on the part of people whom AR’s authors do not believe deserve 
status as citizens. In the construction of this article, Joseph Kay invokes an order 
of power that allows him to draw upon concepts of universal humanity and rights-
based democracy while simultaneously restricting the application of these 
concepts from whole groups of people on the basis of a perceived link between 
corporeality and politics. The operation of power in this particular case is an 
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example of Foucault’s concept of political rationality (Smart, 2002), which 
emphasises that governmental power does not occur within a coherent system 
organised around a consistent set of internal logic. Instead, acts of political power 
are often illogical in and of themselves; they have powerful effects because 
particular orders of discourses, histories and practices align in such a way as to 
make them make sense, if only momentarily (Brown, 2001).  
 Attempting to undermine AR’s politics by discovering flaws in the logic 
of what are sometimes conceived as overarching systems (of positivism, 
imperialism, racism) will not, as Foucault (1991a) and Brown (2001) point out, 
reduce contemporary politics, with their reliance upon stories of modernity, to a 
flawed premise that we can simply abandon and move forward from. It is more 
effective to examine history in the hopes of revealing the particular contingencies 
of certain political moments upon histories that are often lost, incomplete, or 
unrecognisable. This is how linking the case of AR to the history of the UFWA, 
and vice versa, as a “case study of haunting” (Gordon, 2008) aids in the 
articulation of contingency. “[A] case of haunting [is] a story about what happens 
when we admit the ghost – that special instance of the merging of the visible and 
the invisible, the dead and the living, the past and the present – into the making of 
worldly relations and into the making of our own accounts of the world” (Gordon, 
2008, p. 24). When we see, for instance, the ways in which the poem quoted 
above can be similarly understood in two different histories, or when we can 
understand the easily-vilified racial politics of one group in terms of the 
celebrated, and seemingly distant, history of another, or when we reverse the 
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typical order of causality and see the present as the imagined future of the past, 
then we begin to apprehend the contingency of rationalities and politics that have 
real, embodied consequences for subjects both included and excluded.  
 I have asked myself, how can the future of politics be imagined 
differently? Can I imagine myself living in a future where the meaning of race no 
longer carries the weight of histories and ideas that fell into particular patterns of 
repetition and formed the basis upon which our entire experience of the world and 
our own bodies is shaped? With this small foray into approaching two moments 
of history the answer to this remains unclear. However, putting together a view of 
the social world that takes into account the importance of ghosts and the 
experience of being haunted, both by the past and the future, may allow one to 
make sense of the present and its relationship to the future in fundamentally 
different ways. Most importantly, and most simply, it allows one to make sense of 
the present in ways that acknowledge how complicated and ungraspable social 
life is in the face of accounts that simplify, claim to know in incontestable ways, 
or reduce politics to the taking of one side over another (Gordon, 2008). I have 
tried to write about AR’s politics by making their position understandable as a 
conflicted reaction to a perceived version of events/politics, and I have tried to do 
something similar with the UFWA because I do not believe that discounting their 
ideas as outdated remnants of a monolithic epistemology, or as simply wrong, 
does them, or the reality of being produced as a marginalised subject within their 
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discourses, justice*. Instead, I have attempted to see both past and future in the 
present in ways that I hope unsettle the concepts I have aimed to critique, as well 
as the language and concepts upon which this critique relies.  
This type of history does not necessarily rely only on narrative devices 
such as linearity, unilateral causality, progress or individual autonomy. In fact, as 
I wrote the early chapters of this thesis it began to feel like the practice of writing 
what I thought would be seen as most “legitimate” (with a reliance upon these 
abovementioned concepts) was itself a technique in perpetuating the problematic 
systems and exclusions that I wished to critique. Are not the histories of writing 
practices, of institutionalised knowledge production, and the modern study of 
history itself intimately bound up with the earliest emergences of “exploration,” 
colonisation, imperialism, Orientialism (Said, 1979)? Specifically, how can we 
“understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was 
able to manage – and even produce – the Orient [or the racialised Other more 
generally] politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and 
imaginatively” without implicating standardised, authorised modes of 
communication and their role in making possible particular productions of racial 
and colonial knowledges, particular imaginaries and visions of both past and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  “Parlby and McClung were avid eugenicists. And the language of 'race' (though 
it meant something rather different in the 1920's than now) does run through the 
discourse of a wide range of UFWA voices… [But] on the other hand, other 
discursive possibilities also existed among UFWA members, and some of these 
were also activated, in the name of the UFWA, or as later extensions and 
modifications of UFWA discourse. These other possibilities undermined 
nationalism, imperialism, liberal individualism (UFWA members condemned 
"competitive individualism"), capitalism and even racism. Undermined them in 
limited ways, sure. But still undermined them.”	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future (Said, 1979, p. 3)?  It is therefore imperative to come to terms with the 
ways in which “the especially crude and reductive notions of culture that form the 
substance of racial politics today are clearly associated with an older discourse of 
racial and ethnic difference which is everywhere entangled in the history of the 
idea of culture in the modern West” (Gilroy, 1993, p. 7), and to imagine ways to 
subvert this entanglement.  
The idea of creating such subversions does not, therefore, lose reference to 
the individual as conscious actor. The very fact that I have referred to my study as 
an intentional construction of an alternative history means that I am constructing 
myself with the individual agency to undertake such a task, and this is what I 
believe Gordon means when she says that life is complicated and not always 
coherent; I cannot write this account, this critique, of modern history outside of it, 
for I am a subject whom it has constructed in particular ways and I understand 
myself in its terms. However, it is my hope that this discussion of history helps 
readers to see how the past and future always impose themselves upon the 
present, and that it is possible to actively conjure these impositions and construct 
them in various ways, but the version of the histories I have looked at here is not 
complete, in the sense that it does not account for all of the complexities of AR, 
the UFWA, myself or the subjects excluded from citizenship, nor is it a substitute 
for other versions19. There is always room for other dimensions of the story, or 
angles of the “image”, that may or may not include countless other facets, “as 
much [from] our unpredictable future as our memorable and unspeakable past” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  What this incompleteness means in terms of research, social justice, ethics and 
politics is discussed in Chapter 5.  
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(Gordon, 1999, p. 121). What makes an understanding of social life as haunted 
most valuable “is this claim to our willful consciousness and to our imaginative 
capacity to change course to make the future ours” (ibid.): 
Current distortions of history imply that today’s ‘celebration of 
diversity’ was inevitable, that with a few regrettable exceptions, 
Americans have always yearned for the racial mish-mash this nation is 
becoming. This is deceitful nonsense designed to cut Americans off 
from their racial roots and to make today’s race realists seem ‘un-
American.’ The opposite is true. A sound understanding of race has 
always been part of our nation, and America cannot endure without a 
return to such an understanding (Sims, 2011). 
 
This quote from an AR article entitled Racial Unity and the American 
Republic calls our attention to the past. From that past (or those pasts) come other 
voices which allow for but do not necessarily affirm what AR hears there; voices 
which imagine a future that AR now inhabits and claims for themselves – 
claiming to speak on behalf of such voices, to speak for them, appropriating them 
to its present fear.  How might we, seeking to make sense of but also to refuse 
AR's fear, imagine those voices imagining themselves, and imagining us? 
 
You, an audience-member at the 1925 UFWA convention, are listening to 
the various reports with great interest, and great concern for the future of your 
nation. Comments on immigration, mental deficiency, crime and illegitimacy 
arouse some of your fears and reinforce the importance of groups like the UFWA, 
who actively remind us of the potential problems we’ll face if we do not call each 
other now to bear the responsibility of citizenship with care and forethought. 
What might happen if Canadians lose sight of a collective goal and a collective 
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identity, or concern themselves with short-term gain at the expense of long-term 
unity and improvement? Should we turn off-course you can imagine some of the 
unfortunate situations future citizens may find themselves in – conflict between 
groups of disparate interests, decline in the quality of citizenship, political unrest, 
perhaps even violence, civil war, national dissolution. Imagining the future, with 
both hopefulness and trepidation, reinforces in the present the purpose for your 
attendance at this convention. Right now, the progress that the UFWA have made 
over the past year is promising, and those vague possibilities that always loom in 
the background seem distant. However, neither you nor your colleagues can 
entirely forget the fact that the politics of your association would have no 
convincing premise if those possibilities, heralded from those future citizens 
within your imaginations, did not also seem to be always on the verge of 
appearing… 
 
Coda 
And what of the appearance of the past in the present? AR’s task is a 
historical, and therefore imaginative, one. Events are taken up and stories written, 
as seemingly singular events “[become] the possibility of writing a story, a 
history; an event is passed on” (Gordon, 2008, p. 152). These possibilities are 
always already effects of past and future, too numerous to grasp, but in the writing 
of histories the past and future are often conceived in natural, rather than 
imaginary, relation to one another. And so AR writes a “ghost story” and I write 
another one, about ghosts both same and different, a ghost story about a ghost 
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story. In both of our cases it is the idea of the future that animates our desire to 
look at the past, to look for things missing, things “gone wrong”, things that are 
forgotten at some times by some people, and things that are never forgotten, never 
let go. We are paying attention to the same sets of memories, future and past, 
whether we know it or not. 
This chapter was written with the idea in mind that both AR and the 
UFWA (and me, as the author of this text) never knew each other but were 
nonetheless entangled in uncanny conversation, fuelling each other’s conceptions 
of the West, of modern nationhood, and of the pasts and futures of their own 
histories. But as wonderfully surprised as I was to encounter the following AR 
excerpt, perhaps bumping into the same memories is inevitable if we are all 
imagining the same sorts of questions. In a very recently published article entitled 
Looking to History for the Way Forward: A Case from Canada, the politics of AR 
and their history- and race-making project are seen in direct conversation with the 
early construction of Canada as a nation founded upon the concept of race, and 
this conversation is propelled by their imagination for the future. Naturally, they 
cannot step into a time machine, but they can imagine, and this article temporarily 
relieves me of my role as mediator between them because AR and the UFWA do, 
as it turns out, know each other: 
  
“It is hard to think of behavior that is genuinely exclusive to one race. 
Naming one’s daughter Quaneesha or leaving one’s estate to the Sons of 
Confederate Veterans are as close as anything I can think of, but there are others 
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that are not far off: having 30 children by 11 women, volunteering for the Red 
Cross, or living under a bridge after a career with the NFL. Certain things just 
seem to be quintessentially black or white. That is why, if we turn to examples 
from history where whites collectively stood up for the preservation of white 
culture with an understanding of what is at stake for its future, we can learn 
something about how to come to terms with the need for white consciousness, 
however “politically incorrect” that may be. Because the staggering differences 
between races are so obvious – we can all name them, regardless of how “anti-
racist” some of us may consider ourselves – it is our job to help people feel okay 
about standing up for white consciousness.  
Part of standing up for white consciousness includes encouraging an overt 
recognition of biological racial differences on the parts of politicians and 
educators, who are only, we can assume, content to ignore these differences for 
the sake of being ‘politically correct.’ We know that race is a good indicator of 
test scores, worker reliability, athletic ability, crime rates, and many other things, 
so it is, of course, foolish to ignore it. Race is also an indicator of the likelihood of 
having certain diseases and/or intellectual deficiencies, but it is not often that you 
will hear someone admitting this. Many of us are aware of the legacies of Francis 
Galton, Charles Davenport, Linus Pauling and Karl Pearson (amongst others), 
but their contributions to the science of racial and ethnic disparities are often 
ignored and feared by those whose cultures and genes are implicated – the 
eugenics/nationalist movement I am about to describe took seriously these 
alarming facts. 
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 It is not often that we can look to Canada for inspiration in how to 
imagine a world where whites do not have to suffer the indignity of racial 
“diversity,” as Canada seems to be equally overrun with Liberal sentimentalism. 
However, I recently discovered in more detail a little-known eugenics movement 
(yes, that historical taboo) that occurred in Alberta, Canada, that I believe 
deserves attention. If for no other reason than bringing to the fore yet another 
example of whites fighting for their right to enjoy the unparalleled cultured 
society they built, this eugenics story, featuring the United Farm Women of 
Alberta, is indeed ‘more fuel for the fire.’ It is my hope that such an example from 
the past will give confidence to those of us who are not content to silence the truth 
when the quality and morality of society is at stake.  
The United Farm Women of Alberta (UFWA) were the women’s branch of 
the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA), a political party that formed the Alberta 
provincial government from 1921 to 1935. The women’s branch took up the cause 
of discussing and managing the morality of the population in general; these 
discussions often centered on the reality of racial difference (especially low IQ, 
criminal and alcoholic behavior, inclination toward poverty, sexual promiscuity, 
and unhygienic living conditions). In fact, the eugenics movement included a 
disproportionate number of women and is one legacy of some early feminists who 
aligned themselves with national concerns (we are willing to concede that not all 
feminists were Liberal sympathizers). This particular group of women understood 
one very important fact: left to their own devices, non-whites gradually corrupt 
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and degrade every facet of society until they have brought it down to their own 
primitive level.  
That is why, throughout the 1920s, the UFWA petitioned the Alberta 
government to open large-scale institutions designed to house the mentally 
defective – and why, furthermore, they understood very well who would be 
populating these institutions (hint: it wasn’t Western European whites). The 
province of Alberta actually passed eugenics legislation in 1928, which enabled 
institutional board members to forcibly sterilize mental defectives who were at 
risk of procreating and thereby passing on their dangerous genetic proclivities. 
What impresses me is that the people of Alberta understood perfectly well that 
things such as alcoholism, poverty, violence and low IQ are clearly tied into race; 
how is it possible that such blatantly obvious facts have disappeared from the 
common consciousness? Moreover, the UFWA in particular understood the grave 
consequences that mental defectives (read: blacks or other non-whites), if allowed 
to propagate freely, would have upon the future of the nation. The question asked 
then that we continue to ask now is: How can a modern, progressive, democratic 
nation exist if the population is intellectually incapable of upholding these 
values? 
For those of you who may not know, Alberta is a province in the Western 
part of Canada that was originally inhabited by several American Indian tribes. 
Large-scale immigration to Alberta began in the late nineteenth century and 
included mostly Western European and American families, with a significant 
proportion of Eastern Europeans as well. Despite knowledge at the time of the 
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intellectual shortcomings of Eastern Europeans as compared to Western, a simple 
shortage of people to farm the land necessitated that other ethnic groups be 
recruited from Europe. In the early twentieth century, with the advent of mass IQ 
testing and in response to increasing rates of crime, illegitimate births and 
alcoholism, it was discovered that the sources of these problems (with generally 
corresponding IQ scores) were disproportionately people of American Indian or 
Eastern European descent. This knowledge, which was appropriately taken very 
seriously, led to concern about the quality of the settlers coming to the Canadian 
West; as we are seeing currently in America, in the early twentieth century whites 
with high IQs were reproducing at alarmingly lower rates than non-whites and 
people with low IQs. Along with the push to institutionalize and/or sterilize the 
people who were most unfit to reproduce (what has been called ‘negative 
eugenics’) came programs and incentives to encourage desirable families to have 
more children (‘positive eugenics’). The UFWA also campaigned hard to curb 
immigration rates and make the immigration process more rigorous for those who 
would be allowed in. I’m sure I don’t have to remind anyone that for most of its 
history the United States had an immigration policy designed to keep the country 
predominantly white, but with gradual changes (which took place without the 
consent of the American people), current Liberal policy is setting us on the track 
to become a Third-World nation, just as early twentieth century leaders feared  – 
the UFWA’s position on immigration remains extremely relevant today. 
The eugenics and institutionalization movements in Alberta were hugely 
successful until, as we are all grimly familiar with, the Liberal Left clamped down 
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upon reason and truth. It also didn’t help that Germany adopted a now-famous 
eugenics policy in 1933, only a few years after leading examples were set by 
Alberta and California. But another lesson that we may learn from early Alberta 
politics is the value not only of ensuring that undesirable races do not thrive 
within our nations, but also of emphasizing the immense cultural contributions 
that whites have made, and continue to make where they are not maligned and 
marginalized, throughout history. In addition to the abovementioned projects, the 
UFWA campaigned for reformed education and for a collective appreciation of 
Western culture (including literature, theatre and philosophy). They knew 
perfectly well due to their contact with American Indians that European culture 
was something precious to be protected and revered; it is not surprising that 
within a few years of arriving in the Canadian prairies, European settlers had 
turned what was a veritable wasteland in the hands of the native population into a 
thriving agricultural economy and beacon of Western civilization.   
Americans (and, though I am less able to speak for them, Canadians) have 
long had a less national and more broadly racial sense of identity. This is because 
European quarrels were far away, and Americans married across national lines 
and lost their European identities. But most importantly, it is because they lived 
with blacks and American Indians that they developed a racial sense of unity that 
transcended national borders. Unlike Europeans who rarely saw a non-white, 
Americans knew that while they might be of British or German or Dutch stock, 
what united them was that they were white. The UFWA knew this as well. They 
knew that white culture was to be valued and collectively maintained, and that 
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this could be accomplished on the one hand by discouraging undesirables from 
invading and degrading their societies, and on the other by encouraging whites 
themselves to become aware with pride of the accomplishments of white historical 
figures. But this part of history, when being white was celebrated and white 
culture was fostered, has slipped through our fingers and been beaten down by 
Liberal propaganda. The eugenics programs of Alberta did not remain popular 
enough to have a lasting impact on the quality or politics of Canadian citizens, 
but by some accounts Alberta has retained more of a sense of what it means to be 
white than the rest of the country (there have been several, albeit relatively short-
lived, white nationalist groups founded in the province) – who knows, Alberta 
may be the source of a white consciousness movement sooner than we think.   
All of these reasons are why, upon my discovery of Alberta’s history, I felt 
compelled to share it here. If it was possible once, it is possible again, both here 
and there. We can all learn a lesson from the women and men who settled the 
Canadian West, because their vision for the future should be our own. It is evident 
that most people in our own nation are fed up with the status quo and that 
something new needs to be imagined. They want to see fundamental change and 
are willing to try radical solutions. That is how the ‘gentleman’ now residing at 
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue ended up there three and a half years ago: in many 
people’s eyes at the time, he represented fundamental (though misguided) change. 
There is evidence, then, that people are willing to try radical solutions, and that 
many white people secretly want a solution like ours – they want to reclaim their 
white identity for the future they know can exist. The problem is that they dare not 
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say it, partly because they do not know who we are, partly because they do not 
know where we are going, and partly because they do not know how to assert 
their identity with a clear conscience. 
We continue to pay a fantastic price because of the fear that we cannot 
afford to abandon the illusion of racial equality.	  And that is precisely why we can 
turn to history to help us describe the way forward. The odds we face are 
daunting, but we must do everything we can to build an America we would be 
proud to leave to our descendants” (Johnson, 2012). 
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Chapter 5 
Feelings of Wonder and Eeriness 
 
Fig. 1: In Passing, Split toned gelatine silver print from series Uchronie 
Fragments, 2008, Osheen Harruthoonyan [www.osheen.ca]. Reprinted with 
permission. 
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Fig. 2: Gudjonsson’s Room, Split toned gelatine silver print from series 
Elephants, 2007, Osheen Harruthoonyan [www.osheen.ca]. Reprinted with 
permission. 
 
I was sitting in my parents’ living room flipping through a magazine when 
an article containing the first photograph above (see Figure 1) caught my 
attention. My thinking had recently been occupied with ideas of haunting and my 
writing of the previous chapter, and the image immediately felt meaningful to me. 
In Passing is a ghostly image; the fact that I found this image in the comfort of 
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my parents’ home and at a moment when I was least expecting it is itself an 
example of the uncanny ways in which haunting is encountered in everyday life. I 
searched for the artist’s name online and discovered the second image, which also 
grabbed my attention and began a process of thinking about haunting and memory 
that surprised me. Would I have noticed these images if I wasn’t already “tuned 
in” to thinking about and acknowledging haunting? Finding these photographs in 
such an unlikely place and at the right time is an uncanny event – my parents’ 
living room, a room I grew up in and feel at home in despite the fact that I haven’t 
lived there for years, became a site where I encountered something that unsettled 
me in its unfamiliarity, yet attracted me because it conjured particular feelings 
about history, memory and subjectivity. I was jolted out of a sense of easy 
familiarity and into a sense of eeriness at a time in which it was least expected.  
 Because of the uncanny timing of my discovery of these photographs I 
thought there might be no better way to begin this (almost) final chapter than with 
a discussion of them. They are interesting for at least two reasons: first, as an 
example of the way in which haunting can be seen in unlikely and untimely 
moments if we allow ourselves to recognise when we are encountering someone 
else’s memories; and second, because they illustrate in a way that words cannot 
the sensation of being haunted, of moving through and within memory in ways 
that are sometimes articulated, and sometimes unacknowledged (or perhaps 
disavowed.) 
The photographs offer a way to sense the haunting experiences of 
memory, both our own and those of others, in a modality other than language. In 
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Passing shows the superimposition of a form photographed from different angles, 
layered on top of itself, facing both forward and backward and giving the illusion 
of movement across both time and place. The figure seems to be bumping into 
itself repeatedly, wandering back and forth, becoming clearer at moments and 
more transparent at others. This seems an apt description of the way in which 
moments replete with memories make us pause, for reasons that are not always 
clear (and not always welcome). It also helps to visualise time as nonlinear, as 
complicated and confusing events that do not only occur in series but also 
simultaneously, blurring the distinctions between past, present and future that we 
problematically rely upon in conveying our narratives. Rendering sensory another 
aspect of the hauntedness of social life, Gudjonsson’s Room (see Figure 2) depicts 
(perhaps ironically) a living room occupied by two subjects who seem to be cut 
out of the image; some objects are clear (particularly the framed photographs, 
which can be taken as transparent reflections of a past that is assumed to be 
knowable), others are blurred, darkened or transparent (the moments of the 
present, which are always uncertain). The dream-like scene evokes feelings of 
wonder and eeriness. Who are these shadowy people? Whose room is this and 
when? Viewing this scene is like encountering the subtly shifting, never entirely 
graspable memories of someone and somewhere else. The outline of two figures, 
surrounded by objects of varying clarity, seems to me a depiction of the fleeting 
fragility of subjectivity – who these subjects are depends upon the particular and 
complicated ways in which their surroundings, their memories, both individual 
and historical, come together moment to moment in order to constitute and re-
	   114	  
constitute their subjective experience. And who they are represented to be 
depends also on the moment to moment (re)constitution of the viewing subject 
and their particular identification with or understanding of the image. The subjects 
of this image, as well as the subject viewing the image, are both there, in their 
edges and outline, and not-there in their blankness, similarly to the ways in which 
memories and histories are always already not not-there in all moments, across all 
places.  
 The direction I have decided to take in this chapter is based upon some of 
the questions to which these photographs – particularly Gudjonsson’s Room – 
give rise. What does it mean to be constituted as a subject in a moment-to-
moment way, contingent upon the kinds of memories we encounter and the way 
in which we piece them together? While this is again an epistemological question, 
an investigation in this direction also allows me to make reference to my own 
subjectivity as writer and the constitution of subjectivity (including embodiment) 
in terms of citizenship that was alluded to, but not fully developed, in the previous 
chapters. Haunting as an epistemology (and ontology, politics, morality) requires 
practices not only of piecing together broader historical moments of social life, 
but also of recognising the things that haunt our very attempts at doing so; it is 
both profoundly historical and political, as well as profoundly personal.  
 Gordon describes haunting as “an experience or a phenomenon in which 
the normal divisions between past, present and future are not holding up because 
things or people or knowledge which were supposed to be gone or not-there are 
making their presence known and felt, almost always in disruptive and unsettling 
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ways” (Gordon, 1999, p. 119). The “missing” subjects from Gudjonsson’s Room 
can thus be understood as ghosts, even if they are only made to be ghosts by other 
ghosts (the photographs on the tables, their memories of Others both known and 
unknown), who render them absent. The artist has reversed the normal way of 
seeing things, and this reversal is what we experience as uncanny. But despite not 
being there in recognisable form, the missing couple does still exist subjectively 
and experientially (perhaps they are the subjects whose invisibility is necessary to 
my, or your, experience as a citizen in a western democratic nation). If we take 
these photographs as visual representations of the kind of approach to history and 
temporality that Gordon suggests, then we might wonder how it is that glimpses 
of, and feelings about, the memories we encounter each day, whether we lay claim 
to them or not, do not always take precedence in our consciousness, even if/as 
they organise that consciousness. After writing the previous chapter, I was left 
with many more questions than answers. To attempt to bring some sort of 
“conclusion” to this study would be in opposition with its aims, but as I am 
writing the near-final chapter of this project I would like to continue to raise 
questions rather than close them off: questions about what it means to produce 
knowledge and to be produced by it in the process; about contradictions, 
invisibilities and sense-making; about the ethics of writing and coming to terms 
with an inability to ever fully know the meanings and implications of crystallising 
thoughts into words; and about removing/replacing limits from imagination while 
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remaining mindful of the ways in which imagination will always but haunted by 
something, someone, or sometime*.  
 
Producing and being produced by 
The subjects missing from Gudjonsson’s Room are similar to the subjects 
missing from the narratives of AR and the UFWA – there, but disavowed, or 
disappeared. How do both the UFWA and AR rely upon this disavowal in order to 
produce themselves as subjects of a particular kind? How has this disavowal 
produced me as a national subject, and as a subject who is in a position to 
“know”? The disappearance of the Other from these narratives occurs within 
already existing discursive frameworks; for instance, the production of national 
citizenship out of “settler society” relied entirely upon the constitution of 
indigenous peoples as Other (the process of which was directly connected to 
Western politics and practices, including “exploration” and the making of 
Western histories), and as capable of citizenship only when that Otherness is 
abandoned or renounced20 (Thobani, 2007). How do my actions and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	   This very project was begun within the context of a larger one, and these 
conditions are reflected in the early chapters. “So you had to struggle, first, to 
make your topic your own. And then, much later, you began a further struggle not 
only to deconstruct the givenness of your topic but also to deconstruct your ways 
of claiming ownership of it.  You are still engaged in that latter struggle. What 
this means is that your suddenly being arrested by the photos in your parents' 
living room is quite a different experience from the hauntings which developed 
through this thesis -- the latter emerged slowly, perhaps even grudgingly, in the 
course of sometimes-frustrating and lengthy reflection.” 20	  While a renouncing of Otherness is constructed as a condition of citizenship, 
even when it is renounced citizenship is still withheld. The case of Residential 
Schools in Canada, for instance, can be understood as an attempt to force a 
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movements of my body on a daily basis reinforce white supremacy and the 
privilege of being a citizen by existing within certain parameters? Who is 
rendered invisible, or missing, because of how I take up the responsibilities of 
citizenship every day, having been called into citizenship in particular ways, and 
because I am regularly complicit in the celebration of, in my case, Canadianness – 
from watching the fireworks on Canada Day while my partner, who is not a 
Canadian citizen, wears as many maple leaves as possible in the hopes of 
successfully performing Canadian identity, to sitting in an immigration lawyer’s 
office and nodding while he tells my partner what a wonderful choice he is 
making in choosing Canada21, I am implicated in the reproduction of the meaning 
of Canadian citizenship. Such acts, which seem like mundane occurrences, are 
significant because they are, in many ways, unavoidably caught up in much 
broader ideologies that have violent effects for the many subjects that they 
exclude; reproducing such meanings is an ongoing process that happens without 
acknowledgement, even when we have had our attention drawn critically the 
meaning of citizenship and the violences it enables.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
renunciation of “nativeness” while at the same time imposing segregation and 
making impossible any acceptable performance of whiteness.  21	   Immigration, for him, is constructed as a choice when in fact it is “Canada” 
who already chose him – he is white, he is already a citizen of a modern, liberal 
democratic European nation, he speaks both French and English, and he is 
educated and employable according to standards of productivity and potential 
contribution to the betterment of society that were established in part by people 
such as the members of the UFWA. He already performs Western national 
citizenship in ways that are familiar and acceptable. It is those racial and national 
Others – primarily members of “Third World” nations – who need to make a case 
for themselves at Canada’s borders (Thobani, 2007).	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 The existences of the UFWA and AR (as well as of myself, and yourself) 
are contingent upon those subjects whom they exclude, both ideologically and 
materially, through simultaneous identification and disregard. The lives of settler 
families on Alberta prairies were made bearable in part by the physical labour of 
those people, mostly Chinese men, who built the railroad but were denied status 
as citizens as well as access to their own families. The ability of settlers to survive 
was augmented by (an) indigenous wisdom, but the givers of this wisdom would 
be required to renounce it in order to be “allowed” the benefits of citizenship 
(which, as mentioned in a footnote above, would ultimately remain unattainable). 
On the other hand, AR’s existence is dependent upon a system of racial slavery 
that gave rise to the institutions, ideas, and physical organisation of the social 
world they now draw upon in order to make claims about racial and national 
superiority. The foundational categories that contain (and construct) who is White 
and who is Black were both the instruments and the effects of building a culture 
and a politics around the exclusion and marginalisation of the other in order to 
maintain the existence of the one (Carby, 2009; Fanon, 1967; Hall, 2007; hooks, 
1992). The missing subjects, then, are those whose invisibility is necessary to the 
maintenance of subjects on the inside, or whose exclusion and production as 
simultaneous objects of hatred and desire are necessary in defining the very 
boundary between inside/outside. Subjects come into being through the practices 
of memory, history, knowledge, and the embedding of these practices into the 
material world around them; in particular, I have been interested in the “creative, 
contested, contradictory and laborious work of constructing racial identities in 
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narrative acts … [and how] the racialised self is invented in the process of an 
encounter, produced, in other words, as a subject dialogically constituted in and 
through its relation to an other or others” (Carby, 2009, p. 625). How is my own 
embodied experience as a (racial) subject haunted by these things – my own 
memories and the memories of others, the knowledges I take up and the 
knowledges I produce, the subjects and stories who remain invisible to me 
because my everyday practices render them so? But importantly (and also 
wonderfully, unsettlingly), none of these invisible subjects and stories are gone, 
despite the fact that they may be temporarily (but never quite) forgotten: “[They] 
will always be there waiting for you” (Morrison, 1987, quoted in Gordon, 1999, p. 
117).  
 They were waiting as the process of writing motivated me by drawing my 
attention to their existence in ways that I had not anticipated, and had an effect on 
the ways in which my everyday existence (thoughts, practices) changed in an 
attempt to become more mindful of their ephemeral appearances. And really, it 
was the act of writing, and thinking through writing, that allowed me to 
interrogate the histories of race and nationalism, evoke ghosts and blur the 
modern concepts that constrained my imagination of these histories, and 
ultimately to attend to the ways in which writing was both an act of knowledge 
production on my part, and an act that produced me as a subject in very particular 
ways. The act of producing text, as one particular practice of knowledge 
(re)production, has multiple, convoluted layers that are ripe with tensions between 
being critical and being intelligible, adhering to particular politics and then 
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writing in contradiction to them, attempting to fragment a familiar version of a 
story and weaving together a new one in its wake. I had to reproduce stories that 
were not my own, but in such a way as to rejoin them into a story I did produce. I 
wondered constantly whether or not my representations of others were just – 
knowing that I owed something both to those subjects harmed by articulations of 
racism with liberal individualism, as well as to those people whose histories are 
thrown into question because of their relationship to these articulations, I 
wondered if I was capable of actually giving it*. I had to reproduce categories of 
subjectivity and temporality in my attempt to critique them; I had to assume that 
the meaning of “race” was evident enough to make my claims intelligible, despite 
the fact that I wish I did not have to rely on this meaning. I had to rely on words 
for past, present and future despite the fact that I do not wish to view time or 
history as composed exclusively of linear, causal events. But most of all, in the act 
of writing and creating knowledge, I had to constitute and re-constitute myself as 
a particular subject, with particular privileges, in opposition to the invisible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  “Is it necessary for you -- as opposed to me -- to go further to highlight or spell 
out in detail the alternative possibilities given by the complex and multi-possible 
aspects of UFWA discourse, for example?  Do I, as a discursive child of the 
UFWA, ‘owe’ it something that you should not be expected to owe it? These 
moral obligations boil down to a question of ‘appropriation’. If I ‘take’ from 
them, do I do so with consideration? Is mutuality possible? Or am I ripping them 
off? What I try to do instead is to pay a sort of anti-appropriative, or anti-
exploitative attention in which UFWA members become fellow-subjects, not only 
the embodied, relational subjects of my memories, but subjects who were, like I 
am today, caught in a discursive web they were only partially aware of, who 
reproduced or left open dark possibilities of discourse and action -- as I myself 
do.  People who, like me, sought to critique and act against their circumstances, 
and to act for something better, but could only do so as always already indwellers 
in regimes of present power.	  But this is all based on my particular relation to the 
UFWA. Yours is quite different, and so is your approach.”	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subjects that I attempted to render visible. Interestingly (but not surprisingly), the 
same ghosts that haunt both the UFWA and AR also haunt my writing and my 
subjective existence.  
There are two features of this text to which I would like to pay particular 
attention in order to further illuminate some of the complications and 
contradictions inherent in producing, and being produced by, knowledge. The first 
is the use throughout the text of the phrase “to make sense,” my reliance upon 
which, I believe, provides some interesting insights into the contradictory and 
multiple meanings of texts, and the often unself-conscious way in which meaning 
is deployed. The second is the order in which the text was produced and the points 
of disjuncture within it that occurred rather unintentionally, yet mindfully on 
some level. The second point speaks very clearly to the first, as the order in which 
things22 are encountered has the potential to either corroborate or disturb our 
sense of understanding whatever thing we are encountering or attending to at the 
time. Put simply, and to be illuminated further momentarily, the order in which 
things are encountered, and whether or not there are disjunctures within/between 
them, has a lot to do with the process of making sense. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	   	  I have used the word “things” at various points throughout this thesis despite 
(or perhaps because of) the fact that it is a very banal word. It would be 
impossible to enumerate and name, without risk in the process of closing off 
meaning, the infinite possible “things” that make up our everyday experience of 
subjective consciousness. “Things”, in this sense, is meant to refer to the totality 
of sensory and conscious experiences in the fleeting moment of sensation in such 
a way as to refute their reducibility to discourses, events, moments, relationships, 
etc. It is in this moment, perhaps, that the potential for sensations to unsettle us 
lies. 	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 The phrase “to make sense” has two contradictory meanings, as discussed 
in Chapter 4. Though I was always aware of my use of this phrase in the act of 
writing, I was not aware of how often it came up and how my intended (and 
unintended) meaning of it shifted from place to place. One meaning, as I 
understand and at times intended it, is the process by which events, ideas, objects 
or subjects take on meaning within a framework of knowledge that renders them 
intelligible according to its own system (fragmented though it may be). In this 
sense, to make some/thing make sense is to impart coherent meaning to it through 
references to other meanings in logical and consistent ways. In the alternate sense, 
the meaning is nearly opposite. To literally make some/thing sensory is to attend 
to the hidden or invisible aspects of social life that are not apparent, often because 
they do not “make sense” in the first meaning of the phrase. In this way, making 
sensory such matters as ghosts is a process of unmaking and remaking what are 
apparently systematically coherent meanings. In my footnote in Chapter 4 I wrote 
that I intentionally left the meaning of my “make sense” phrases open – can 
making sense happen both ways, simultaneously?  
In terms of my own subjectivity, I made sense of, and was made sense by, 
the inquiry involved in the writing of this thesis, in both meanings of the phrase. I 
was imbued with authorial intent and the capacity to write sentences and ideas 
that were intelligible to others because they fit a particular set of knowledges. I 
came to understand myself as the product of a culture of systematic racism, which 
on one hand requires (productively, I think) imagining an exclusively linear 
connection between past and present – in this case, the imbrication of race with 
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settler feminism in the early twentieth century is conceived of as laying a 
foundation upon which a racist culture could be built. This is a sense-making 
project in the first sense of the phrase; I found a way to fit myself into a chain of 
historical events in ways that fit quite readily with modern sensibilities, despite 
their underlying critique. On the other hand, I found myself paying attention to 
ghosts, and not paying attention to the fact that some of my thoughts about race, 
history, politics, the research process and subjectivity were quite incompatible 
with others. This was a practice in sense-making that served to undo the chain of 
logic into which I had fit myself. Attending to the hauntings that I, like the figure 
in In Passing, bumped into when I began to interrogate the memories of others 
required that I also let go of a view of myself as cohesive, or as the simple product 
of a transparent history; as it turns out, things are much more complicated than 
that. Not only are the stories of the UFWA and AR vastly more complicated than 
could ever be satisfactorily (from a positivist perspective) described or accounted 
for, but my attempt to grasp these stories and their meanings could not be entirely 
consistent because of their complexity, and because my own thoughts and 
experiences are complicated as well. This is indicative of the way that knowledge 
production and subjectivity are inextricably bound to one another (Foucault, 
1979; Smart, 2002; Weedon, 1987); not only am I positioned in the act of research 
and writing as a subject who knows, but I also actively constitute both myself and 
others as objects/subjects of that knowledge in the first place. But as Stuart Hall 
points out, subjectivity, despite being fleeting, is not entirely an illusion:  
It is something - not a mere trick of the imagination. It has its histories 
- and histories have their real, material and symbolic effects. The past 
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continues to speak to us. But it no longer addresses us as a simple, 
factual 'past', since our relation to it, like the child's relation to the 
mother, is always-already 'after the break'. It is always constructed 
through memory, fantasy, narrative and myth (1990, p. 226). 
 
And in being some/thing, I would like to claim, as Gordon (2008) maintains we 
can and should, the subjective agency to do with history, and with ghosts, what 
seems the intuitively right thing to do, moment to moment, with an understanding 
that what seems “intuitively right” is arrived at through attention to and 
engagement with other voices, living and dead, past present and future, as well as 
our own. Claiming this responsibility is risky, not only because I am not alone 
and am therefore accountable to others, but because my subjectivity, through 
which I act, has consequences; writing this text opens up the possibility of 
encounters and responses that I cannot anticipate.  
 I wrote the chapters of this thesis in chronological order and have left 
them very nearly as they were originally written. Consequently, there is a marked 
difference that gradually occurred somewhere between the first and second 
halves, and this difference is evident not only in the different theoretical 
approaches toward “understanding” particular sets of discourse, but also in the 
epistemological assumptions underlying such claims and the language used to 
describe them. The first chapter situates the UFWA and AR in linear relation to 
each other; I argued that the discourses produced in the early twentieth century, 
themselves both product and instrument of already existing discourses, laid a 
foundation for a particular way of thinking about, valuing and categorising race in 
contemporary cultures of racism (Goldberg, 1993). I wrote about early liberal 
feminism in Canada as though it is a singular event, relegated to a singular time 
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period – the past, where it is meant to stay. Using this logic to make knowledge 
claims, and using the language of “connections,” “linkages” and “legacies,” 
represented an adherence on my part to modernist epistemology and history; 
events happen in unidirectional order, with causal influence upon one another, 
and in ways that are both understandable and monadic. In a way, it is possible for 
me to understand myself as a ghost in the early parts of this thesis – my presence 
and my identity, itself constituted by innumerable and complicated hauntings, was 
in part (comfortably) constructed into this modernist story without any 
acknowledgement on my part that I was there. It would take many more pages of 
writing before I would be able to recognise that a particular aspect of my 
subjectivity was missing from, but ultimately informing, my early story of the 
UFWA and AR, and that that missing presence would eventually unsettle the 
entire process of inquiry involved in this project. 
 Moreover, my thoughts about the topic of my research changed 
significantly across the time it took to write each section. When it came time to 
write the “analysis” chapter, it turned out quite differently than I could ever have 
anticipated in the early stages of developing this project, and much of this is due 
to the concrete institutional and relational conditions under which I began my 
project. Chapter 4 is an attempt to deconstruct linearity, traditional history and 
modernist logic, not by abandoning these ideas altogether, but by exploring 
alternatives, even if those alternatives occur as well as rather than instead of. It 
does, however, abandon any hope of understanding or explanation, in the sense 
that is commonly employed in positivistic social scientific research. I made a 
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“case study in haunting” (Gordon, 2008) rather than a systematic analysis that 
would rely on a positivist understanding of the transparency of textual “evidence” 
and organised around a consistent internal logic. Is this approach entirely 
inconsistent with earlier chapters*?  
 After writing Chapter 4, I worried that I may have to go back and 
significantly change, or even re-write, earlier chapters in order to give the 
impression that this project was internally consistent, and that I was already a 
“knower” from the very beginning. But it was not written like that, and it seemed 
somewhat of a falsity, and would certainly be at philosophical odds with my 
values as a researcher, to re-construct the project in that way. It would be at odds 
with my values because I do not view my “researching” self as a subject who 
already knows; the process of inquiry happened while I was writing rather than 
before (Richardson, 1988). Leaving the chapters to a large extent as they were 
originally written provides, I believe, a valuable insight into the way that research 
is practiced – where a project begins is not always where it ends up (see, for 
instance, Carolyn Ellis, 2009). The disjuncture between one way of approaching 
this research and another is appropriate because that is exactly what my hope 
turned out to be for this research; as the process of research unfolded, I became 
more clear about wanting to draw attention to things taken for granted and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  “In your proem, the person who asks you ‘What are you doing in your thesis?’ is 
constructed as intimidating, bringing to the fore your own preliminary doubts and 
fears about not making sense. But having written the thesis, having "made sense" 
to yourself in the process of writing it, you now have something to take back to 
that figure -- a figure perhaps now representing your readers. And perhaps you 
might now consider your readers not simply as possible sources of intimidation 
(though they always will be that ...) but as future partners in dialogue. And 
perhaps what you ‘owe’ is less to the UFWA than to them.” 	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unsettle them in the process. Now, I want to show that the social world under 
study and the subjectivity of the person making that study are not consistently 
understandable or stable across time. I did not plan for there to be a disjuncture, 
but its presence coincidentally makes a point that I only realised after completing 
the fourth chapter. This is where it is important to draw attention to the claim of 
authorial intent in the face of tension between intent on the one hand (which is 
often conflated with a position of already knowing), and inconsistency on the 
other; my thoughts about the project were contradictory, but inconsistency is not 
necessarily undesirable, nor may complete consistency actually be an achievable 
quality. I meant what I wrote at every stage and my decision to leave in and attend 
to some of these disjunctures was made thoughtfully*, despite the fact that I did 
not predict their occurrence. 
 Recognising that the later chapters were written from a different 
epistemological position is not to say that the earlier chapters of this work are 
valuable only in that they make a point about the process of inquiry. Any aspect of 
social life can be approached in multiple ways, and I believe that there may be 
great value in occasionally relying on language and concepts that are problematic 
in order to interrogate what it is that makes them problematic in the first place. 
The theoretical work done in the first chapters is important despite (and in certain 
respects because of) the fact that I resort to modernist logic. Its importance lies in 
the use of language such as “systematic racism”, “racist culture”, and “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  “You have given yourself permission to follow your intuitions, and doing so has 
empowered you to write.  But now, do you treat those intuitions as sacrosanct, or 
do you offer them -- and what they gave you -- as an invitation to response?”	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foundational imbrication of racism and imperialism;” these phrases draw attention 
the ways in which violences and injustices are systematically and institutionally 
produced, as well as suffered as actualities, through particular, patterned 
arrangements of power that have undeniably material consequences for the 
subjects of their aim. Using such language and such a concept of the relationship 
of the present to the past is useful for what was an intended purpose. The way that 
that language and epistemology stood in marked contrast to my later 
understanding of the research became useful later for a decidedly different 
purpose: it shows that I, as researcher, do not know in entirely cohesive ways, that 
the issues I am trying to understand are not necessarily better apprehended (if they 
can be apprehended at all) one way than another, at least not in a sense that I can 
ultimately be judge of. At various times throughout the research process my 
subjectivity was constituted differently. Viewing the research process as both a 
production of knowledge on the part of the researcher, as well as the production 
of the researcher as an effect of that knowledge, offers another layer to the 
interrogation itself and gives rise again to some of the metaphysical questions that 
have become so integral to critical, postfoundational research; the asking of these 
questions then indicates the opening up of dialogue, critique and engagement with 
the worlds of others.  
 
The writing and uses of history 
I have described this project throughout the thesis as one of constructing 
an alternative history. As mentioned in the above section, I have wondered about 
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the ethics and potential implications of writing about history, and one important 
issue that arises in all research is whether or not the subjects or groups researched 
have been justly represented. To that end, I would like to disclose an important 
feature of this text; the American Renaissance article “re-printed” at the end of 
Chapter 4 was not written by Thomas Johnson; I wrote it (as you may or may not 
have guessed).  
 The article is composed in part of sentences or parts of sentences that were 
taken from a variety of already-published AR articles. The bulk of it, however, 
was written by me, in the way I imagine it could have been. It is a constructive act 
of imagination that both disregards conventional notions of evidence and serves 
as a parody of a particular, violent history, as well as of the ways in which 
historical claims are understood as intelligible. I tried to inhabit a particular 
authorial voice in order to turn it on itself; the analytic work that I hope this 
accomplishes occurs in large part by delaying this “reveal” (in fact, I 
contemplated leaving only a small disclosing footnote with no in-depth 
explanation at all). Not providing any satisfactory explanation would have forced 
you, the reader, to wonder about it on your own terms, and there is something 
appealing about leaving something so unresolved given the issues I am exploring 
here. However, I decided that an explanation is in order, along with an invitation 
to you to consider some of the following questions: what was your reaction to the 
article when you first read it? Was it believable, surprising, obviously not “real”? 
Were you relieved to find such a bit of textual evidence that made previous claims 
about “connections” more concrete? Or did encountering such “evidence” disturb 
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what was previously described as an imagined, or mediated, relationship between 
AR and the UFWA? What are you thinking now, knowing that I fabricated an 
article and impersonated the magazine it “belongs” to? Is that an injustice to AR? 
To the UFWA*? Is it wrong to create an article that makes such violent claims, 
and makes them in a way that we commonly encounter, a way that seems 
intelligible? 
 In my view, the article serves several purposes. First, it draws attention to 
a number of metaphysical questions about authorship and evidence because it is 
an imitation; it shows that a text may be believable if it adheres to “rules” that are 
familiar. Part of the work of disruption is accomplished through the blurring of 
the distinction between “authentic” AR articles, or evidence more generally, and a 
fictional imposter, as the construction of histories and knowledge claims that lend 
support to AR’s politics is simply a matter of adopting a particular authorial 
position and drawing upon particular techniques for making sense within a set of 
familiar parameters. AR didn’t write it, but they could have. I don’t believe that 
any of the claims in the article would be refuted by AR authors; in fact, I wouldn’t 
be surprised if they considered it publishable material.  
I was encouraged by Gordon’s use of fiction and imagination to disrupt 
the idea of history by simultaneously disregarding as well as adhering to its rules, 
producing something at once fallacious and yet perfectly within the realm of the 
sayable. Must I be concerned about the “accuracy” of my representation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  “I cannot and should not expect you to be bound by the same moral imperatives 
as me, because your encounter with the UFWA was as a dossier, and that is 
something very different from my encounter, and generates different imperatives. 
But can our different approaches and loyalties be brought into dialogue?”	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history, especially given this history’s violences? My answer to that is yes, I am 
concerned about the ethics of doing such a thing, but not enough to leave the 
article out of the thesis. Perhaps I do not owe the UFWA and AR the same things 
that someone else, with a different set of memories and circumstances, might; but 
perhaps those accounts need to be written as well, and most importantly with an 
aim to conversation and mutual critique with, rather than instead of. The imagined 
article is an attempt to subvert the things that brought it into the realm of 
possibility in the first place; if I have succeeded at imitating a certain authorial 
voice by drawing upon its own techniques in order to expose them, then I have 
gone partway toward rethinking, or re-imagining, what it could look like to 
produce knowledge that disrupts as it reproduces.  
 Second, it provides the opportunity to ask readers directly about their 
reactions to, and expectations of, texts that produce, or imitate the production of, 
particular knowledges, and to invite them to engage critically with my story. This 
opportunity is twofold; questions arise about what it means to parody AR using 
their own techniques and to draw the UFWA into a conversation that never really 
took place, but questions also arise about the place of that parody within the larger 
text of this thesis, itself a knowledge-producing text that relies upon its own 
techniques of persuasion. What counts as knowledge? What does “revealing” the 
artificiality of a text accomplish? Can the parodied text be considered artificial at 
all? I am not claiming to have answers to these questions, but I think there is 
something useful, or generative, about the contradiction of writing a critique of 
modern history-making that includes a completely imaginary putting-together of 
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pieces of modern history in a way that reinforces it (it is, after all, a connection 
that AR could very well have made themselves, and it reproduces a familiar 
logic), but disrupts it in its falsity. The potential that this creates for readers to 
think about their own expectations is valuable if it draws attention to the taken for 
granted ways in which we understand knowledge claims. What are your 
expectations of research and knowledge production, particularly as it is made in 
this academic context, and do they always align with your politics? Has what I 
have written here always aligned with mine? 
 This leads me to the third point, which is that the imaginary article draws 
attention to the making and uses of histories. History is always already an act of 
imagination – certain patterns are more likely to be reproduced than others, but 
stories of past and future are always constructed and are always the product of 
particular politics (Foucault, 1979; Said, 1979; Brown, 2008). The ways in which 
certain historical imaginaries become possibilities are, however, closely linked to 
the way in which we perceive historical facts; history is not (usually) open to 
being radically re-invented, despite its imaginary qualities, because imaginary 
representations are still tied in some way to perceptions of what and who really 
happened. Showing how a history can be fabricated in order to make AR’s point 
about racial difference makes obvious the ways in which history is amenable to 
the purposes of the author, albeit within these confines.  
But the rest of this thesis is a fiction as well, and it required that I make 
my own version of history to serve my own purposes, which are also informed by 
a particular politics: “questions of narrative structuring, constructedness, analytic 
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standpoint, and historical provisionality of claims to knowledge … [point] to the 
ways in which our stories can be understood as fictions of the real” (Gordon, 
2008, p. 11). I cannot indict AR’s strategic use of history without also recognising 
my own; my version of history is constructed within many of the same confines, 
including the arrangement of this text into an institutionally prescribed form, the 
institutional context in which it will be read, and the benefit to me from having 
produced an intelligible, academic text that will give me institutional credit. But 
on the other hand, my version is an attempt to explore, however much it wavers, 
an alternative epistemology and politics, a critique of knowledge production 
where knowledge is conceived as fiction rather than truth, and the social world 
under “study” is taken to be more complicated, more intensely personal and 
sensual than could ever be satisfactorily described; the foundation for this critique 
is the discursively violent production of subjects who are systematically subjected 
to other violences, both epistemic and physical.  
My aim, therefore, is to trouble the use of history to justify violence, 
hatred, exclusion, subjection and inequality on the basis of race, and this is 
(partially) accomplished by drawing attention to the frames of reference that make 
such exclusions ongoing, everyday occurrences. Without alternatives to modern 
history-making, familiar venues of knowledge production and dissemination, or 
systems of judging claims to make more or less sense according to how well they 
correspond to modern epistemology, it becomes increasingly difficult to create 
knowledge that disrupts these systematic, but often invisible, modes of exclusion. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, it is not only the content of modern histories, nor the 
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fact that this content takes on common-sense status, that makes them problematic; 
it is the very practice of modern history-making, with its reliance upon modern 
sensibilities (linearity, empiricism, objectivity, distinctions between knowers and 
objects of knowledge, the existence of a stable social reality and stable 
subjectivities, etc.), that makes racial prejudices and inequalities, in their present 
form as foundational to discourses of nationalism and citizenship, possible in the 
first place (Gilroy, 1993; Said, 1979). That is why I chose not only to call into 
question the specific claims and techniques of AR and the UFWA, but also to 
attempt, while still within narrow confines, to write a history that does not always 
adhere to the familiar rules of history-making, imbricated as they are with the 
(re)production of racism. And because I am operating within the limits of 
language and the limited possible ways in which language can be arranged and 
communicated while remaining understandable, a fabricated, inauthentic article is 
one possible way in which the fictional qualities of knowledge production can be 
brought directly to the fore.   
However, just like my critique of AR and the effects of their use of 
history, my own use of history must be done thoughtfully and with a mind toward 
acknowledging who and what is (re)produced through it. This thesis is in many 
ways about voices – voices of the UFWA and AR, voices of those subjects 
rendered missing or marginalized, my own voice in reconstructing (or imitating) a 
version of history that stands in contrast to the versions of others. It is about my 
encounter with them, but it is also about stories, imagination and fictions of the 
real, what it means to write a thesis and what it means for others to encounter it. I 
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have insisted that my version of things is just that: one version amongst many. So 
what about the others? 
 I am left with a conflict between believing in the multiplicity and fictional 
quality of truth claims on the one hand, and feeling as though my version is 
“better” on the other; better because it critiques relations of power and the 
resulting experiences of subjectivity and embodiment that I find harmful, violent, 
falsely unequal and highly problematic. But the grounds of my critique, which are 
rooted in an epistemology of fracture, imagination and multiplicity, actually throw 
into question the critique itself. If my version of the histories of the UFWA, AR, 
nation-making, and my own subjectivity is only one version, and if it shares equal 
claims to veracity as that of AR, for instance, then the question becomes what is 
the relationship between antifoundational epistemology and the politics of 
critique?  
 To fully investigate this relationship would require the writing of another 
thesis. To begin to answer it in relatively simple terms, however, it comes down 
to the questions of ethics raised in Chapters 2 and 5. The practice of knowledge 
production requires asking an ongoing question: what is the right thing to do right 
now? What are my politics right now? How do I feel about what I perceive as an 
injustice right now? I cannot account for all things at once – to do so, or to believe 
that doing so is possible, refers again to the foundationalist epistemology I am 
trying to avoid. And I am trying to avoid it because any attempt imagining an 
alternative epistemology is a fruitful and politically desirable event; alternative 
ways of knowing draw attention to the ways in which we think about and 
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experience the world and our own bodies, and this may perhaps raise the smallest 
doubt that our thoughts and experiences are natural and immutable, the smallest 
hope, or fear, depending upon who you are and the particular circumstances you 
are in, that things can be different. The things we then choose to attend to are the 
effect of our daily lives, the memories we encounter in them and the ways they 
make us feel. But this thesis is not only the result of how I feel; the politics by 
which I am informed rest on a number of assumptions as well, perhaps most 
obviously about the meaning of power, which I have taken for granted as 
something real that exists and operates in ways to produce particular exclusions.  
 It is this assumption that leads me to be concerned primarily with the 
voices of the people whose subjectivities have been violently denied, or confined 
in particular ways, as effects of discourses of the type engaged in (though 
differently) by AR and the UFWA, and this concern outweighs (but by no means 
eradicates), at the moment, my concern for the voices of the UFWA members or 
AR authors themselves, or the people whose lives and experiences rely upon a 
particular conception of their mothers, fathers, and friends, when their mothers, 
fathers and friends write articles for AR or were proud members of the UFWA. 
And if we all have our own versions of things, informed by our own experiences 
and politics, then how can we recognize one another with respect, and recognize 
in one another the indescribably complicated reasons that we write or tell the 
stories we do?  
 Part of the reason that our lives are indescribably complicated is that they 
are complicated in relation to one another and in relation to the various forces, 
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events, things, that make up the world in which we live. Who did I write this 
thesis to and for? Who is going to respond and how? How are their responses, 
imagined or otherwise, and my challenge to them mutually co-constitutive? 
Knowledge and experiences that make or unmake sense do so in relation to the 
knowledges and experiences of others. So in recognizing that I may have not 
delivered what I owe to the people I have (mis)represented or left out altogether, I 
must acknowledge the conflicts that have arisen in, or become apparent through, 
my encounter with them and the various voices, including my own, that are 
struggling to be heard (or to be heard differently) throughout this text, as well as 
in my thoughts as I continue to think about it, in the thoughts of the people who 
read this thesis, and in the daily lives of all people whose embodied existences 
rely on the meanings of race and nation.  
But beyond this process of self-reflection, what is to be done about the 
questions of writing and representation raised here? Part of the answer lies in a 
move to encounter and to engage with alternative versions from people who 
construct what they owe (perhaps to AR, to the UFWA, or entirely different sets 
of memories and histories), and to facilitate a mutual conversation and critique 
between them. The ethical questions concern me, but I cannot come to terms with 
them alone. Perhaps someone will encounter these histories and be motivated, as I 
was, to write an alternative; perhaps I will encounter someone else’s memories 
and be motivated to re-imagine my own account. But it is only through encounters 
with others that these questions may become more thoughtfully articulated, so 
that the responses may be listened to more closely.  
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Subjectivity and corporeality 
In Chapter 2, I stated that “it is always important to ask oneself why [a 
story] was articulated this way and not that; what are the constructive implications 
of this particular articulation for myself and for others?” (p. 24). To return to the 
issues of embodiment and the ethics of writing, which were largely left behind in 
Chapter 4, I believe that asking this question again in this concluding chapter is 
prudent. The question is really threefold: How do categories of citizenship 
construct particular corporealities, and vice versa? How does my re-telling of a 
history serve to unsettle and/or reinforce these corporealities? How is my own 
embodied subjectivity predicated upon both the histories I have interrogated here, 
as well as the act of interrogating them? And lastly, how, in articulating these 
questions, do I now speak and act with a mind toward accountability for the 
people with whom my life is mutually constituted?  
 The category of citizenship is an inherently corporeal one. Producing or 
referring to this category is an act of segregating and demarcating the boundaries 
between who is included within national borders and thus afforded the attending 
privilege of real citizenship, and who remains on the outside of that distinction; 
this demarcation carries real, embodied consequences. Can I physically reside 
within a country, without fear of being forcibly removed? Can I reside within a 
country without fear of physical violence? Can I reside within a country without 
being subject to ongoing questions about where I am “really from” (Thobani, 
2007)? Can I hold the privilege of citizenship without feeling as though I am a 
debtor to some act of benevolence on the part of those who are “really” on the 
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inside (my debt being on the basis of the colour of my skin, the clothing I wear, 
the cultural practices I engage in)? Is citizenship available to me only on the basis 
that I disavow the cultural context in which I came to be an embodied subject? 
And beyond these questions that pertain to the everyday life of subjects, there are 
questions of how citizenship is defined on the basis of international movements of 
bodies. Without the flux of bodily migration between nations there would be no 
opportunity for those very national borders to be continually reinforced, or 
continually re-inscribed with meaning. 
 As I detailed in Chapter 1, “citizenship, as the quintessential hallmark of 
liberal democracy, was … racialised from its very importation into the country” 
(Thobani, 2007, p. 82). In Canada’s case, citizenship has been an endeavour in 
preserving whiteness and the attendant system of white supremacy that has 
(tenuous) roots in modern imperialism. Thus, citizenship is symbolic of already 
existing orders of racial power; it was created with a mind to progress, but who is 
included and benefitted by this story of progress has been severely delimited on 
the basis of racial and cultural essentialism. Where citizenship is evoked (and it is 
evoked constantly in the ways we imagine ourselves to be members of nations, 
the ways we imagine our bodily migrations to be limited and controlled according 
to national borders), a certain epistemic violence is perpetrated; it is a discursive 
act of exclusion, and it is manifest in innumerable ways. From the ways in which 
our bodies are managed, documented and surveilled in travel, to news about 
elections, governments and armies, to national celebrations, to my neighbour’s 
placement of an Iranian flag in his window at a time and place where to be 
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Muslim is often construed as threatening to white, Western values, we are aware 
of divisions between inside/outside and the immense impact of such a distinction. 
And in the singular (but not clearly discrete) example of the UFWA and AR, we 
have seen a very few of the possible ways in which racism and nationalism are 
continually invoked and reproduced through discourse, the telling of histories, 
myths, memories, and imaginations. 
 Thus, language and practices participate in (but do not determine) the 
construction of particular corporealities: “meaningful, textual, sensual, lived, 
performative, fleshed bodies can only exist within and through articulations of 
culture(s). In this way, the body is always already entangled in the dialectics of 
cultural production” (Newman & Giardina, 2011, p. 40).  While my research has 
not looked explicitly at embodiment, it is nonetheless inherently bound up in the 
politics of the production of embodied subjects, particularly and most intimately 
myself. To reiterate a point made in Chapter 2, as hard as I tried to write this 
historical account conscientiously, paying mind to the ways in which my 
representation of particular people, events and subjects could produce harmful 
effects or reproduce knowledges that intrude upon the bodily existences of others, 
I cannot account for the all of the possible ways in which my writing is complicit 
in the politics it attempts to critique, nor for the ways in which “speaking for” 
others entangles me within that complicity in unexpected ways. Because of the 
limits of language and subjectivity, I know that I have relied upon problematic 
ideas. I, like everyone, operate within particular discursive limits (Hall, 2007) that 
define the realm of what is sayable. I have invoked categories of race and 
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citizenship in order to deconstruct them, and I have pieced together histories of 
people who might disagree with my rendition, as well as of people whose material 
lives and self-consciousnesses might be harmed by the perpetuation or 
resurrection of such histories. Translating thought into text requires that I 
participate in the construction of particular corporealities, for myself and for 
others, in ways that I cannot fully imagine now, and which I may see differently 
when I look back at this research in the future. Andrew Sparkes aptly describes 
my own feelings about attending to the processes by which knowledge is made: 
As part of this process, I have begun to recognise the implications of 
Richardson’s (1994) thoughts on writing as a method of inquiry and 
her recent call to extend our reflexivity to the study of our writing 
practices. Here, we are invited to reflect on and share with other 
researchers our “writing stories,” or stories about how we came to 
construct the particular texts that we did (1996, p. 484). 
 
 It is my hope that my attention to the rememories (to borrow a term from 
Toni Morrison that has been used by Gordon in an attempt to think imaginatively 
beyond the limits of history) of the UFWA and AR in the various ways that I have 
done here will leave many more questions open than closed, and will evoke or 
invite response and critique from those subjects in relation to whom my 
subjectivity is constructed. It is certainly the case that I opened many questions 
about my own embodied subjectivity and about the process of knowledge 
production. In acknowledging the oft-concealed histories of what it means to be a 
white citizen of a Western democracy, I have had to come to terms with the fact 
that I am a subject whose existence depends in large part upon the ongoing 
subjection and disavowal of Others who are not like me, who are constructed as 
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embodying the edges of the particular social world to which I “belong.” I have 
had to re-member parts of my own subjective and embodied history in light of 
this, and I have had my attention drawn more closely to my everyday practices 
and encounters because of it. I have become more sensitive to the moments when 
something has eerily reminded me of something else, or when my thoughts turn to 
something unexpectedly in the moment of encountering the memories of someone 
or sometime else. I see in my own body and its practices the presence of such 
hauntings I have investigated in this research, and I am at a loss as to how to 
imagine a different embodied politics despite attempts to become more aware of 
hidden histories and their non-linear relation to one another (and this is where my 
desire to engage with others is felt most keenly). I am a subject of the image of 
history I attempted to capture*, and I am both there, as an effect and instrument of 
it, and not-there, in that I cannot yet know all of the particularities and 
convergences of the memories that operate from moment to moment to constitute 
and re-constitute my subjectivity and the subjectivities of others.  
  To return, then, to the idea of making sense, I wonder about the act of 
rendering sensory the “missing subjects” that I refer to in Chapter 4. If I am re-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	   “In finding yourself ‘at a loss’, in recognizing hauntings in your embodied 
practices, your self-conceptions, your thinking, do you become in a way, an eerie, 
unsettled and unsettling companion (or even daughter ...) of United Farm Women, 
sharing in some way their experience of dwelling in houses they and you wish to 
dismantle, but without knowing quite how, being still half-within?  To push a bit 
further, are you in a process of learning to be critical of the UFWA while also 
learning not to 'other' the UFWA as a convenient means to distance yourself from 
the dilemmas you share (albeit in different ways) with them?  Is it that lostness 
which allows you also now to become more open to wondering about those who 
were/are 'othered' by the discourse that the UFWA statements are implicated in, 
wondering about how they are also other to you?” 	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membered and re-constituted in the act of writing, there might be some way in 
which thinking about alternative histories in ways that account for their vast 
complexity is an act of re-membering other subjects as well – that is, putting them 
together again (as the opposite of dismember) in ways that begin to make them 
visible, or begin to conjure in one’s imagination what they might look like. If 
boundaries between past, present and future are, as I have attempted to describe 
here, unclear (thus making distinctions between them an act in service of the 
politics of traditional history), then we need only make ourselves available to the 
experiences of haunting, and learn to listen for and answer to the voices we hear, 
in order to begin to see what and who are seemingly not-there. Who are those 
shadowy subjects? 
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Coda 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Freg & Oli, Split toned gelatin silver print from series Elephants, 2007, 
Osheen Harruthoonyan [www.osheen.ca]. Reprinted with permission. 
 
In the final paragraph of Ghostly Matters (2008), Gordon writes that 
“ultimately haunting is about how to transform a shadow of a life into an 
undiminished life whose shadows touch softly in the spirit of a peaceful 
reconciliation” (p. 208). When we see a haunting (as in the case of AR and the 
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UFWA) or when we realise that the very same (and more) spectres are haunting 
our thoughts and actions as we go about recognising that case of haunting, it is a 
process of unveiling things hidden. I have not “finished” this process here, but I 
hope I have begun it; just as the image Freg & Oli (see Figure 3) simultaneously 
evokes feelings of nostalgia as well as an eerie sense of discomfort, so too does a 
recognition of the superimposition of past, present and future, or the presences of 
long-forgotten ghosts. Understanding time in this way is both the effect and the 
instrument of a certain kind of sensuous knowledge (Gordon, 2008). Sensuous 
knowledge is embodied, affective; it is a process of animation, both on the part of 
the sign containing the remnants of ghosts (which in this case included texts, 
unself-conscious acts that reproduce notions of citizenship), and on the part of the 
subject who attends to it. The subject who recognises a ghost is animated, 
motivated: “You are already involved, implicated, in one way or another, and this 
is why, if you don’t banish it, or kill it, or reduce it to something you can already 
manage, when it appears to you, the ghost will inaugurate the necessity of doing 
something about it” (ibid., p. 205-206). In coming to recognise ghosts23 in the 
racial politics of AR and the UFWA, I was moved to write about them in a 
particular way, to recognise my own complicity in and dependence upon them, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  The process of recognition, referred to numerous times throughout this thesis, 
may be better described as a process of misrecognition, whereby the act of 
recognition always involves the making of an illusory distinction between the 
thing recognised and others (Helstein, 2007). In recognising a haunting, for 
instance, one must draw arbitrary borders around that thing which haunts in order 
to name it, but it is important to remain aware that such an identification is never 
made transparently. 
	   146	  
and to pay more thoughtful attention to my own embodiment, memories, 
imagination and sense of eeriness, of out-of-placeness, in my everyday life.  
 An epistemology that requires attention to sensualities, corporealities, 
histories and memories will necessarily implicate the individualized subject who 
inquires about, or who encounters, daily aspects of social life that leave him or her 
wondering about possible connections, vague familiarities, what it means to feel 
the loss of something that you cannot identify, or that you would be 
uncomfortable calling your own. Accepting that you are already involved in ways 
that are too numerous and convoluted to describe is an act of vulnerability: have I 
really had a part in this? Which may be followed by: how can I conjure and 
describe this loss, and my part in it, and how can I contribute imaginatively to 
reckoning with it, in part by appealing to an engaged relation with others? But 
beyond what I have so far been motivated to do here, I have yet to see what 
attention to ghosts may mean for me and the future production of knowledge(s) in 
which I may be involved. However, the parts of this thesis that focus on my own 
subjectivity in relation to the subjectivities of others are particularly important for 
opening up further questions about what is to be done; encountering moments, 
feelings or images that speak to us about the complicated interactions between 
past and future that are giving rise to this moment incites within us the desire to 
imagine and do differently (Gordon, 1999, 2008). Imagining differently requires 
also that we imagine ourselves, and do ourselves, differently, as constantly and 
vulnerably coming into being through knowledge, politics and power, with the 
hope that the experiences of ongoing violence and subjugation may be reckoned 
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with: 
How can we organise these huge, randomly varied, and diverse things 
we call human subjects into positions where they can recognise one 
another for long enough to act together, and thus to take up a position 
that one of these days they might live out and act through as an 
identity. Identity is at the end, not the beginning, of the paradigm. 
Identity is what is at stake in any viable notion of political 
organization (Hall, quoted in Giroux, 2011, p. 6).  
 
I do not pretend that this particular case study in haunting points the way 
toward a previously unimagined transformation of some kind, but the above quote 
may point toward some of the possibilities of political and pedagogical action. As 
a study in methodology and epistemology, however, I hope that this text helps to 
evoke imaginative ways of recognising and understanding everyday social and 
historical encounters that are not entirely or fatally limited by modern logic; the 
process of understanding (in very fragmented and fleeting ways) does not have to 
make sense only as enclosed within a dominant system of knowledge, and it may 
very well (un)make sense if it attends to things such as ghosts, spectres, 
imaginaries, intuitive and affective responses. Or, as in this particular case, it may 
do some combination of both. Making a case study in haunting (and I say making 
because it is a constructive process rather than an enactment of a pre-determined 
process, the idea that research is “done” when it is done in institutionally 
acceptable ways) as Gordon encourages us to do, is to open oneself to the 
possibility that (temporarily) unseen, unheard or unfelt presences can be 
illuminated creatively, imaginatively, and, most importantly, critically and with a 
mind toward social justice (which usually involves reflection upon the ways in 
which we are complicit, already involved, and yet capable of seeing or conjuring 
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things in intentionally disruptive ways). It involves an ongoing interrogation – 
what is missing? How can I understand the depth of that loss? And how can I 
piece things together in order to name it and begin to come to terms with it? It 
requires that we welcome feelings of wonder and eeriness as signs that 
some/thing, someone or sometime else is present, acting upon us in ways that we 
can only ever imagine.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Introduction to Chapter 1, Redux 
 
 
We will not cease from exploration, and the end of all our exploring will 
be to arrive where we started and to know the place for the first time. 
 
-T. S. Eliot, No. 4 of Four Quartets, 1942  
 
 
This project began with general questions about the meaning and history 
of race: how has race been historically constructed? What is the importance of 
history for contemporary understandings of race? How have categories of race 
been bound up with other exclusionary categories, such as nationhood or 
citizenship? As particular avenues through which to investigate, or interrogate, 
these questions, I chose to look directly at two particular groups, events, ideas, 
discourses or moments in time (or all of the above). My reasons for choosing 
these two particular groups seemed, at the time, rather arbitrary. In fact, I am 
inclined to say that the specifics about who or what these groups are is not nearly 
so important as the simple fact that they, like innumerable others, have explicitly 
figured the concepts of race, nation and citizenship prominently within their 
concerns. And what is perhaps most interesting is that their concerns, like 
innumerable others, are articulated in direct conversation with the past in the 
hopes of informing the future. So while this is a project about race on the one 
hand, it is perhaps more concerned with examining and re-constructing, or re-
configuring, moments in history in relation to one another. A further set of 
questions may be therefore asked: how have these two groups understood 
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themselves in relation to history, and what informs this understanding? How does 
a modern concept of history contribute to ongoing violences and inequalities on 
the basis of race?  How does the construction of a white, nationalist identity rely 
upon a particular relational configuration between past, present and future? 
 There are infinite ways in which to begin interrogating these questions and 
working toward imagining other possibilities for being. But here is the basic 
methodological problem that arises when one actually begins to make research 
that is critical of broad, systematically (re)produced knowledges of race: how 
have national histories produced embodied subjects whose consciousnesses and 
experiences of the world are bounded by inequalities and violences through their 
continual (re)construction as objects toward which the knowledges that enable 
these inequalities are aimed? To what extent is it possible to work toward 
undermining and destabilising the histories of nations and citizens, along with 
their imbrication with racism, colonialism and imperialism, without reifying, 
reproducing or relying upon the very ideas, language and forms that are 
foundational to these histories/discourses/knowledges? And if it is possible, then 
how, and to what effect?  
 It is clearly not possible to account for all of the effects of one’s 
knowledge claims; nor is it possible, if one holds an anti-foundational 
epistemological-ontological position, to delineate or determine a methodical 
approach to such research that does not rely in some way upon foundationalism, 
or upon traditional understandings of history, or of what it means to write 
coherently and according to some internal (or external) chain of logic. So as I 
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think about how to go about beginning, or imagining, research into the general 
topics of nation, citizenship, race and history, I am particularly concerned about 
the foundationalist logic that underlies modern history-making (why are practices 
of historical study often understood as ahistorical?) and empiricism (is historical 
evidence found, or made?). I want to produce knowledge that critiques the 
inequalities and violences that are enabled by particular concepts and categories 
of race and nation, but it seems that such a critique can be most effectively 
directed toward the epistemologies and ontologies that make such concepts 
possible. Knowledge claims makes sense in part through their relation to other 
knowledges that are understood in particular ways across time. Looking critically 
at nation- and race-making practices across time requires, therefore, an 
interrogation of the very concept of history; how are knowledges situated in 
relation to one another across time, in systematic ways that serve to reproduce the 
foundation for such knowledges to exist in the first place? And how, then, can 
critical historical research imagine alternative ways in which to understand 
history, the present moment, and the relation of both to future imaginaries? 
 Thus, the task of producing alternative, critical knowledge claims about 
and through history is necessarily bound to the politics of the present, navigated 
through the politics of past and future. This is the point Wendy Brown makes 
when she describes the political potential of alternative (in this case genealogical) 
history-making: “in posing the question ‘who are we [right now]?’ genealogy 
attaches both history and philosophy to a political task…it aims to make visible 
why particular positions and visions of the future occur to us” (Brown, 2008, p. 
	   152	  
109). Making such alternative histories requires particular avenues through which 
to do so, but ultimately involves a more general adherence to a politics and a 
philosophy of critique, of imagination and of possibility. That is why, in 
introducing this thesis research, I have not yet mentioned which specific histories 
I intend to draw upon in navigating the process of history-making (and, 
consequently, the making of myself and others), nor will I describe with any 
singularity a proposed vision for the future.  
 So without promise of “solution” at the end of this thesis, but in hopes of 
inviting dialogue24, to begin to expose the contingencies of our historical 
imaginations I will be looking at two particular historical moments, or events, 
through which the questions posed above may begin to be investigated. I am 
taking as a starting point for this project the existence of “racist culture,” or a 
culture of white supremacy, which has emerged and been maintained in particular 
ways since, and prior to, the foundation of modern nation-states (Goldberg, 1993; 
hooks, 1992; Omi & Winant, 2006; Thobani, 2007; Winant, 2006). To this end, 
one of the groups chosen was, I initially thought, a “representative” of early 
nation-building ideology in Canada; The United Farm Women of Alberta is 
particularly interesting in this respect because of their role in the early women’s 
rights, agrarian democracy, institutionalisation and eugenics movements of the 
1920s (roles that often did not entirely align with other political projects the 
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  I have chosen to include Dr. Ramp’s voice directly within the text as one way 
of conceiving, and conveying, knowledge construction as a mutual encounter and 
as always open to dialogue. This is just one way, and one voice. But including it 
offers one more opportunity to invite dialogue from others through the 
complication of knowledge claims made in texts such as this one.  
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UFWA as an organisation, or individual members, took on, but which, 
nonetheless, were part of complicated conditions of possibility for the 
emergence/maintenance of race-based national identity). To look at the 
contemporary moment, which I originally conceived of as comparative due to its 
perceived distinctness from “the past,” I chose the magazine American 
Renaissance for its unabashed propagation of white nationalism and 
paleoconservative racial politics. As mentioned above, however, there is nothing 
about these two groups, for lack of a better term, that would make this research 
project untenable without them. In fact, given the idea that racism is embedded 
within the very foundation of North American culture, claims about the 
superiority of the white race and the corresponding degeneracy of non-white races 
can be thought of as the very logical extreme of systematic racial prejudice of the 
type that has existed since, and prior to, the inception of modern North American 
nations; there is no shortage of “material” from which to draw when one wants to 
investigate these issues.  
On top of there being no shortage of “material,” there are also 
innumerable possible ways to go about “tracing,” or making, various 
(dis)articulations between these two groups, produced as they are by already 
existing sets of racial knowledge, classification and evaluation, and by the modern 
establishment and ongoing maintenance of Western, liberal democratic nations 
(amongst infinite others). Acknowledging how vastly complicated social life and 
history are eventually becomes a productive starting point for me. So while I say 
that I could just as easily have chosen other histories to navigate, as it turns out 
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there is a particular reason why I chose to look at AR and the UFWA that has to 
do with the complexity of social life – I chose them because I encountered them at 
such a time, and in such a way, that they seemed to be connected, even if I 
couldn’t fully articulate why. Something about AR seemed to resonate with 
echoes of UFWA voices, and something about the future imagined by the UFWA 
seemed to be in uncanny and direct conversation with that future. The process of 
putting together these two histories in ways that recognise their mutual resonance 
with one another sparked my imagination and shaped the ways that I went about 
interrogating broader questions about history, subjectivity and knowledge, 
questions which were exposed to me in part because I took up this project. The 
entire production of this research was intimately bound up in the particularities of 
these two groups, but it was also bound up in the particularities of my own life 
and body, the things I noticed, the things that incited a variety of sensations and 
imaginations, and the things I have not and may never recognise. And what I was 
therefore motivated to make with this multitude of experiences, my own and those 
of others, became increasingly apparent, at times through obfuscation, at every 
moment throughout the process of experiencing them.  
What remains throughout this account is a desire to encounter the stories, 
imaginations and accounts of others whose memories, and whose encounters with 
the memories of others, intersect with mine in ways that resonate with, are 
indifferent to, and/or openly contest them. Out of such encounters may emerge the 
most thoughtful attention to the histories of the UFWA and AR, their individual 
delegates, authors and readers, and the vast constellation of other histories and 
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subjects whose relationships to the same conditions of possibility have yet to be 
made. 
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